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Abstract 
This thesis presents an alternative to prevailing understandings of politics in East Timor in the 
period 1999-2009. Employing the language of state-building, dominant views posit that the new 
nation’s ‘crisis’ in 2006 is attributable to a ‘weak state’, arguing that substantial constraints on 
‘human development’, a legacy of either the Indonesian period or failures of UN state building, 
presented insurmountable challenges to ‘capacity building’ which hampered the development of 
a public administration and other arms of the state. A closely related body of analysis attributes 
the causes, passage and resolution of ‘crisis’ to actors from the political elite. In this view, intra-
elite conflict foreclosed the possibility of the crisis’s early resolution, and attributed crisis to bad 
‘policy-making’. A second perspective posits that a crisis was the result not of a weak state, but 
of the disempowerment of a strong civil society, that through ‘networked governance’, a legacy 
of the resistance network against Indonesia, can be relied on to rule. This thesis suggests that the 
remarkable uniformity of these analyses can be explained by their having: a) largely overlooked 
pre-1999 politics; and b) used a liberal perspective in which both abstractions and technical 
solutions (rule of law, capacity building) are assumed to be able to ‘correct’ ‘problems’ leading 
to ‘crisis’.  
This thesis proposes an explanation for contemporary politics found not solely in crisis or peace, 
but in the past. The postcolonial state is examined through the lens of colonial power relations, 
in terms of the extent and limits of modern ‘bio-power’. Successive chapters examine health and 
hygiene, the inculcation of norms and dispositions, family and habitat, and monetization. These 
themes are related back to state formation across the 20th century, and moreover, to an 
evaluation of life and death, processes evident throughout the practices of contemporary 
politics, including being significant in the institution of the postcolonial state. A key site of this 
power across time has been ‘missionary power’, embedded and semi-autonomous from the 
colonial state, rather than the Catholic Church per se. The manifold limits of colonial bio-power 
are identified not only as being a result of the paucity of material resources of the state, 
therefore, but also colonial ambivalence over subjects, durable relations between (and divergent 
representations of) missionaries and indigenous authorities, and contradictions between 
‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’, all of which are shown to play out in contemporary politics. 
Through this analysis, the thesis reveals an alternative interpretation of East Timor since 1999, 
and offers possibilities for considering politics in other postcolonial contexts. 
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Work (P) 
SCU - Serious Crimes Unit  
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TS – Tempo Semanal. East Timor Daily newspaper. 
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UNDP - United Nations Development Programme 
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UNMISET – United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor 
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UNOTIL – United Nations Office in East Timor 
UNPOL - United Nations Police (was CivPol) 
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GLOSSARY 
 
Indonesian (I) 
Portuguese (P) 
Tetum (T) 
 
Adat - customary village law. Similar in meaning to lisan (T)  
Adipura - a ‘clean city’ programme begun by the Indonesians in 1986 (I) 
Ai-Tarak – name of militia formed by Indonesian military operating in East Timor, 1999; 
lit. ‘thorn’ (T) 
Aldeia - hamlet, a sub-division of a suco (see below) (P) 
Asrama – military dormitory (I) 
Assuwain - a warrior, traditionally status attained by decapitating head of an enemy.  
Avos - grandparents, ancestors (T, P) 
Balai desa – village hall (I) 
Balisa - boundary between chiefdoms  
Barlaki/Barlaque - Marital exchange, or giving and taking of women as wives, resulting in 
the forging of alliances (T, P) 
Besi Merah Putih – militia operating in the western part of East Timor during the late 
1990s, especially in Liquica district. (I) 
Buan – witch (T) 
Camat – subdistrict head (I) 
Catana: machete (T) 
 15 
Chefe de suco - Chief of a suco (see below), administrative unit introduced by Portuguese 
in early 20th century (P) 
Civilidade e urbanidade - civility and politeness (P) 
Comissão de Homenagem – Commission of Homage established to make awards to ex-
combatants (P) 
Concelho - administrative subdivision of distrito under Portuguese rule (P) 
Contra-Costa - the south coast of Timor, on the Timor Sea (P) 
Contratado - indigenous person contracted to work sometimes forcibly (P) 
Dato - noble or chief in the hierarchy of a reino (see below) and by extension, person in 
charge of a suco (see below) (T) 
Dimajukan – ‘developed’, advanced (I) 
Dom – honorific title for male (P) 
Dona – honorific title for female (P) 
Escuteiros - Portuguese scouts (P) 
Estilo/Estylo - indigenous ritual (P) 
Externato: day school (P) 
Feiticeira/o – witch, sorcerer (P)  
Finta: tribute, tax paid by the reinos to colonial administration; abolished in favour of a 
head tax (P) 
Formação/formasaun - in narrow sense, teaching/training; in broader sense, dispositions 
acquired from a particular environment (P, T) 
Funu - war (T) 
Funu Nain – warrior (T); see also assuwain. 
 16 
Gentio: non-christian, ‘uncivilised’ member of the indigenous population 
Hansip – Pertahanan Sipil / Civil defence forces (I) 
Heróis Tombadas – Fallen Heroes, referring to deceased ex-combatants (P) 
Imposto de Capitacão – Head Tax 
Indígena: Portuguese term for indigenous person 
Intel: Indonesian state intelligence service 
Internato: boarding school (P) 
Julgamentu: Judgement (T) 
Katuas – elder male, term of respect 
Kerja Bakti - work in voluntary service in Indonesia (I) 
Kopassus - Komando Pasukan Khusus / Special Forces Command (I) 
Lia Nain: lit. ‘keeper of the word’ (T) 
Lisan - authority of traditional elders; customary village justice (T) 
Liurai - chief of a reino in Timor (T) 
Loromonu - west, ‘westerners’ (T) 
Lulic/lulik - taboo, sacred (T) 
Malai - non-Timorese, foreigner (T)  
Maneiras de comportamento: modes of behaviour (P) 
Matandoc – ‘witchdoctor’ or ‘shaman’. Lit ‘distant eye’ (T) 
Maubere - From an indigenous Timorese language, originally a derogatory term for 
indigenous East Timorese people; later coopted to mean people of the resistance (T).  
Mestizo/a - person of mixed Timorese and Portuguese ancestry (P) 
Morador - indigenous militia organised under Portuguese rule (P) 
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Nai lulic - wielder of sacred power (T) 
Olheiros – overseers (P) 
Operasi Kikis – Operation attrition, Indonesian military operation (I) 
Operasi Pagar Betis – Operation fence of legs, Indonesian military operation (I) 
Pataca: monetary unit introduced in Portuguese Timor in 1894 (P) 
Palacio do Governo – Government Palace (P) 
Pancasila - Indonesian state ideology (I) 
Ponta Leste – Falintil’s area of operation in the far eastern part of the territory (P) 
Povoação – village and smallest territorial unit (P); later replaced by aldeia (P) 
Povu - the people (T) 
Pramuka - Indonesian national scouts (I) 
Processo – trial, judicial process (P)  
Regulo – reino’s chief, petty king (P) 
Reino - ‘kingdom’ or political unit through which Portuguese ruled Timor until early 20th 
century (P) 
Sagrada Familia  - ‘Holy Family’ established by L-7 (Cornelio Gama) and other Falintil 
guerrillas in Baucau area in 1989 (P) 
Seara – Dili Diocese’s publication from the second half of 20th century until 1975. 
Restarted after 1999 (P). 
Seminario menor – minor seminary (P) 
Suanguice – ‘witchcraft’, ‘sorcery’ (I, rendered in P) 
Suangge – ‘witch’, ‘sorceror’ (I, rendered in P) 
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Suco: sub-division of a reino in Portuguese Timor, and subsequently sub-division of 
subdistrict in Independent East Timor (P,T) 
Surat Jalan – ‘travel letter’, needed by East Timorese if travelling between districts or 
outside East Timor prior to 1989 and by those accused of compromising ‘security’ 
thereafter (I) 
Terbelekang – backwards, underdeveloped (I) 
Tuaca/tua-sabu - palm wine (T) 
Uma lisan/lulic: wooden building containing sacred objects (T) 
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1. Introduction
I. 1999-2009: existing interpretations
This study develops an alternative interpretation of politics in East Timor in the period
1999-2009, by showing the extent and limitations of colonial attempts to institute bio-
power and its resultant manifestations in the present. In 1999, precipitated by a United
Nations-sponsored referendum in which almost 80% of the territory’s population voted
in favour of independence, East Timor became subject to a UN Transitional
Administration (UNTAET), thus ending Indonesia’s 24-year occupation. Indonesian
rule had originally begun with a military invasion in 1975, shortly after the declaration
of East Timor’s independence, following Portugal’s declaration of its intent to
decolonise the previous year. With a budget of hundreds of millions of US dollars and
relative peace, the UN hailed its mission as a success of state building, after a series of
shortcomings in other missions such as Somalia. After the end of its mandate in 2002, a
government led by the political party Fretilin, originally the movement that during the
first years of Indonesian occupation led resistance, took power, after elections in 2001.
The UN maintained a large contingent of administrators and peacekeepers, charged with
‘building capacity’ in a fledgling civil service and security forces, in accompanying
roles. Much of the RDTL budget was coordinated through dispensations of aid through
donor countries, so that in 2004, the state’s own internally raised national budget
amounted to only about a tenth of the combined sources donors’ budget. In 2006,
following protracted tensions in the state’s UN-created military, F-FDTL, a breakdown
occurred in that institution, in which soldiers from the west of the country protested
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against ‘discrimination’ by a mainly eastern officer corps. Apparently ‘spreading’
quickly1 through the population, the crisis caused widespread displacement, damage to
property, and recriminations between different groups and individuals in East Timor’s
society. On the surface, these events, referred to as a ‘crisis’, fed into long dormant
regional (sometimes described as ‘ethnic’) identities. The ‘crisis’ saw the intervention
of a non-UN-mandated ‘Joint Task Force’ (JTF), an Australian military contingent, later
known as the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), that operated alongside UN police
and which was responsible for peacekeeping. Several other initiatives beyond those in
the sphere of ‘security’ were attempted by the country’s political elites and donor
countries to put a halt to events of ‘crisis’, including encouraging the return of
‘internally displaced people’ from camps in the capital Dili and elsewhere that allegedly
accommodated as many as 10% of the population.
Meanwhile, political configurations of events, which had in 2006 led to a temporary
dissolution of both F-FDTL and the police, PNTL, saw the surrender, imprisonment,
then escape, of Major Alfredo Reinado, the deserting head of F-FDTL’s Military Police.
Certain themes, in many senses motifs of the events, animated and gave traction to
Reinado’s cause, including affinity with petitioning soldiers and voicing grievances of
‘westerners’, rather than easterners, who were held to have been in the ascendancy
under the Fretilin government and in its institutions, especially the military. Reinado’s
communications from hiding, directed towards a wide and in many instances
sympathetic public audience, were held to have dictated the tempo of events with
increasing frequency during 2006-7. His death at the house of the president, Jose
Ramos-Horta in February 2008 – allegedly a reaction by Ramos-Horta’s security detail
1 The thesis argues that the tensions in the military were in fact inseparable from those that existed in
society at large
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to Reinado’s surprise ‘attack’ – appeared however to mark the end of tensions that had
begun approximately two years earlier. This event has often been regarded as the end of
a ‘crisis’ from which East Timor would thereafter return to ‘normality’.
Elite attempts to arrest these events, as noted in brief above, had already begun prior to
the death of Reinado in 2008. After the resignation of the Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri
in July 2006, an interim Fretilin government served until national elections in 2007. The
election as Prime Minister of Xanana Gusmao’s newly formed CNRT party (named in
imitation of the nationalist movement formed and led by him in the middle of the
Indonesian period) in June 2007, along with the election as president of long-time ally
Jose Ramos-Horta at the same time, is often regarded as forestalling the end of crisis.
Gusmao’s heading of a broad coalition government (AMP), appeared to have aspired to
a ‘national unity’ government, the kind of which the opposition party, Fretilin did not
agree to in their first, and so far only term of office. The election of Gusmao and
Ramos-Horta, who promised to end crisis by negotiating with Reinado, are held by
some to have been key markers of an apparent recovery. The coalition government’s
term in office until 2009 was marked by much higher public spending, enabled by
money channelled through a state petroleum fund. Designating 2009 the ‘year of
infrastructure’ appeared to signal both the AMP’s intent to direct the country out of
crisis, as well as UNTAET’s inadequate reconstruction efforts after the territory was
laid waste to by departing Indonesian forces in 1999. The influx of oil money also
heralded a sharp increase in instances of large and small cases of corruption. Seen from
this perspective, the trajectory of politics between 1999-2009 appeared to many to
follow a straightforward sequence of events. After initial stewardship by the UN, the
post-independence state struggled with limited resources, an unskilled workforce and
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competitions in security and other institutions became ‘unmanageable’. Resolution of
‘crisis’ came in the form of greater democracy represented through greater party
political participation, and the election of popular leaders of the resistance movement
who, although renowned for their charisma, aspired to a technocratic form of
government. However, further examination of scholarly explanations is required to
provide a closer focus on the period in question.
From the early post-1999 period scholarly focus was trained on UNTAET. It quickly
became evident that a gap existed between the UN’s own pronouncements on its
successes, and the version produced by scholarship critical of its government (Chopra
2000, Gorjao 2002, Philpott 2006). This criticism was based on a lack of inclusiveness
of East Timorese in leadership structures (beyond a small coterie of the elite), profligate
spending on the salaries of international staff, and a determination to create a
profoundly centralised concentration of power after previous disastrous missions.
Among the most important of these failings under the UN’s reign of ‘benevolent
despotism’ was that it did not come to terms and work with existing East Timorese
social organisations that it found on arrival in 1999, but sought to remake the population
by fragmenting it to the level of rational individuals who were regarded as ‘producers’
and ‘consumers’ (Hughes, 2009b). By contrast, the UN could point towards peace as
justification for such a centralised form of government, replacing its mission UNMISET
in 2005 with a scaled down ‘Office’ (UNOTIL). In 2006, the territory’s political crisis,
however, invalidated such claims. As ‘sovereignty [had been] observably held hostage
by a veritable army of international experts, advisors, donors, and peacekeepers’,
(Hughes, 2009a:1) so it initially seemed that the UN’s unequal ‘dispensation’ of power
was key to diagnosing the unequal material outcomes that led to crisis. This causality
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seemed especially clear as the same lack of economic development under UN
governance was repeated during Fretilin’s term in office (2002-7). Materialist readings
proposed that, in contrast to relatively higher spending in the capital Dili, another UN
legacy, agricultural extension programmes of the Indonesian era were discontinued,
sharpening grievances against the government (Moxham, 2008; Kingsbury, 2009).
Against this backdrop, some scholars found a more specific and seemingly self-evident
explanation for East Timor’s ‘problems’ in the form of a weak state. This work saw in
both a weak society, and ‘internal disunity’ among political elites, a need for deeper
intervention to forge a liberal state. Both intra-elite conflict, and Fretilin’s inability to
‘keep control’, presumably a reference to security institutions’ endemic weaknesses,
allegedly foretold the possibility of ‘state failure’ (Cotton, 2007). The crisis was
explained as a legacy of UNTAET (Ingram, 2012), whereby institutions that it created,
including the military (F-FDTL) and police (PNTL), had been the subject of poor
policymaking by political elites. Until 2006, regional differences between easterners
(firaku) and westerners (kaladi) were thought to have been confined to security
institutions (Simonsen, 2009; Sahin, 2007). These works attributed to regionalism a
sudden combustibility within society at large at this time. Intra-elite conflict and bad
policymaking was triangulated by the ‘low capacity’ of the RDTL’s public
administration. This was occasionally attributed to the historical reason that its East
Timorese agents were either hamstrung by lowly rank and inadequate experience during
the Indonesian period, though also to inadequate training by international consultants
after independence (La’o Hamutuk, 2005). Ample evidence seemed to exist for this
view, whether in the unfulfilled goals of the National Development Plan seen through
low Ministerial budget execution, or police brutality. Others sought to link this ‘low
24
capacity’ of the state with its inability to fend off challenges from ‘traditional authority
structures’ (Zaum, 2007). The problem for these scholars seemed to be managerial
failings and vaguely defined historical antipathies of a political elite, combined with
weak ‘capacity’ in state institutions bequeathed by UNTAET. The state required more
foreign assistance, and more engagement of the kind likely to help ensure that liberal
norms became institutionalised. In a criticism of this view, it has been proposed that
while problems are invariably seen as originating in the state and a handful of its agents,
their resolution can only be found within the state (Grenfell, 2008). However, an
alternative perspective is not brought forward. Yet whether regarded as ‘strong’ or
‘weak’, the view of the state often posited remarkably abstract views of its workings. In
accounting for the crisis, a diagnosis of ‘weak institutions’ took its place alongside an
‘undermined’ constitution and political system that had been ‘shaken to its base and
fractured’ (Weldemichael, 2012:309). Commentators were sure that the events of 2006-
8 were inevitable indicators that East Timor had lacked the ‘rule of law’ (Jolliffe 2007;
Kingsbury, 2008).
By contrast, others viewed postcolonial politics as characterised not by a weak state, but
a society that was not fulfilling its potential. Some drew attention to elite relations with
the international community, characterised by deals and accommodations, but achieved
at the expense of ‘popular’ rather than ‘state sovereignty’, whereby a suppressed society
languished as the state did the international community’s bidding (Hughes, 2009a).
Indeed, East Timor’s society also became part of the solution to ‘resolving’ ‘crisis’.
Society was frequently glossed as ‘civil society’, with an activist heritage from the
Indonesian period. In one reading, civil society ‘transformed itself’ from a ‘people’s
movement’ into ‘development organisations’ after independence. In such analyses, the
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case for civil society as representative of the authenticity or ‘reality’ of society is seen
through a generational distinction drawn between civil society - its members grew up
under Indonesian rule - and a lusophone elite ‘who returned at independence’. ‘Civil
society’ has even been posited as an autochthonous core of ‘tradition’ that ‘maintained
respect for local knowledge and practices of their elders’ (Wigglesworth, 2013). Given
this overwhelmingly positive evaluation, it is no surprise that others have sought to
further develop the idea of a society with activist roots checking the power of an out-of-
touch state. In this reading, society made a virtue out of participating in the Indonesian
bureaucracy, by using its structures to engage in clandestine work in support of the
resistance. ‘Networked governance’, originally resulting from the clandestine
movement had primed East Timor for liberal democracy more effectively than in many
‘developed’ states. Using a normative framework derived from republican theory,
Braithwaite, Charlesworth and Soares suggest that a ‘networked politics of hope’
defeated Indonesia and ‘realist’ states complicit in the occupation, both through
clandestine activism within East Timor and abroad where its exiled leaders were
resident. A key relation of networked governance is, they argue, that it elided
‘hierarchical bureaucratic power’, with its agents using these bureaucracies from within.
At the dawn of independence, such a form of governance had the potential to avert the
tyranny that many postcolonial countries fall prey to. The UNTAET period generated
unacceptable concentrations of power in elites that along with inadequate oversight of
security institutions, effectively led to the 2006 crisis, from which, they suggest, lessons
have been drawn by the same elites. Thus, they insist, ‘increasingly variegated checks
and balances’, deriving from ‘networked resistance’ can ensure a robust response in the
event of state abuses of power (Braithwaite, Charlesworth and Soares, 2012).
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This view of a strong, ‘untapped’ society, key to both amelioration of crisis and
preventing the state from becoming too powerful, finds resonances with an established
liberal perspective on state-society relations. Joel Migdal (1988) posited a typology of
strong and weak states, attributing a mixture of reasons to the inability of ‘third world’
states to become strong. The presence of local ‘strongmen’ in society often cannot be
overcome, he argued, if there was no strong state that could rotate officeholders, an
assurance against concentrations of power in individuals. War and dislocation also
militated against the build up of ‘social control’ by the state. Through determining the
state’s ‘capabilities’ as either ‘low’ or ‘high’, states are assessed in terms of how well
they fit within existing typologies (for example ‘authoritarian bureaucratic’) that may
contribute in turn to a state’s ‘strength’ or ‘weakness’. Migdal’s work has been looked
on favourably by recent advocates of ‘hybrid governance’, who posit ‘customary
solutions’ (Asfura-Heim, 2013:15), of enlisting ‘traditional security providers’, or, the
support of ‘society’ where building a ‘strong state’ alone is financially or politically
unviable. Hybrid governance, which proposes a synergistic relationship between state
and society, posits among other things, that as societies become more ‘open’ the state
continues to need the engagement of ‘civil society’ and NGOs in order to govern
effectively (Spink and Best, 2009). Clearly, there is much overlap between Migdal’s
and the ‘hybrid governance’ view, of which ‘networked governance’ appears to be a
variation.
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Map 1
East Timor showing locations mentioned in thesis.
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More particularly, these views posit that states or societies are agents of social and
economic ‘development’. This is significant to the liberal statebuilding project in East
Timor, and interpretations of postcolonial politics in general. In particular, as Devant
has noted of the view, ‘crisis’ is viewed as an aberration from development, because
development is taken to be peaceful (Devant, 2008). The resolution to crisis may come
in identifying its events, rather than understanding it, a precondition for making
recommendations for its redress that steadfastly centre on the strengthening of state
institutions and promotion of civil society, which may play a role in mediating between
antagonistic political factions (Kingsbury, 2008). Yet the slippery issue of history and
its legacies are not adequately reconciled in this view. The resistance movement is the
basis for civil society and the fount of political legitimacy for elites. Paradoxically it
may also have the potential to compromise ‘good governance’, because explanations of
crisis have been sought in the latent or open criminality of agents of the resistance
movement (ICG, 2006; Nixon, 2011). In this view, East Timor’s politics is still
characterised by certain ‘subterranean’ features innate to the clandestine movement, and
lacks ‘openness’ and ‘transparency’. Thus, a further feature of building a liberal state
involves ‘professionalisation’. Had, for example, F-FDTL been rendered free of
‘political’ interests associated with resistance politics from its inception, (with which,
conversely, society had been so richly endowed) and been subject to assertive civil
leadership, it is suggested, it might have remained peaceful.
The Catholic Church is also often cited as another element of ‘civil society’. Many
sources explain the Church’s contemporary power as deriving exclusively from the
Indonesian period, which ostensibly represented a complete break with the previous
Portuguese period. The Church was a bulwark against Indonesian attempts to
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‘Indonesianise’ East Timor’s society and supplant its culture from the 1980s.
Indonesian requirements compelled mass conversions to Catholicism, but also reflected
the population’s need for protection (Kohen, 1999:132). Father Martinho da Costa
Lopes was installed as leader of the Church after 1977 followed by Bishop Belo’s
inauguration in 1984. As Carey and others have pointed out, key moments of the
Church’s developing affinity with the nationalist cause can partly be identified by
decisions taken within the Church as an institution. These include placing East Timor
directly under the authority of the Vatican by making it an independent diocese in 1981,
and thus outside the jurisdiction of the Indonesian Bishop’s Conference (KWI). This
was preceded shortly before by the publication of the Catholic liturgy in Tetun, a
language banned under Indonesian rule. During this period the Church used its ability to
communicate with the outside world to relay information about human rights abuses.
Others have similarly cited legal agreements to assert that the traditional role of the
Church vis-a-vis the Portuguese colonial state, represented by the 1940 Concordat
making ‘faith and fatherland indissociable’ (Castelo, 1998:132), was ruptured after
Soeharto’s signing of a document integrating East Timor into Indonesia in June 1976
(Lennox, 129).
Moreover, in this context, it is claimed that the period after 1975 saw a break with the
past and the birth of a new Church and faith (Hodge, 2012). Other accounts have argued
that in the aftermath of the invasion, it is difficult to regard the Catholic Church’s clergy
as monolithically activist, partly due to constraints of the occupation, but also due to
inertia (Smythe, 2004 in Field, 2008). There is, furthermore, evidence of continuity
between the historical time periods that cannot be traced through legal agreements. A
network of indigenous catechists, trained under Portuguese rule and more numerous
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than priests or nuns, played an important role in conversions before and after 1975
(Martins, 2001:9). Aside from clergy, the majority of the population converted to
Catholicism during the Indonesian period, but 20% or more had converted before
Portuguese decolonisation, of whom many were influential elites. The Tetum liturgy
may have been published at a crucial historical moment in the early years of Indonesian
occupation, but this built on prior missionary publications in the Tetum language, the
first as early as the late 19th century. It has been asserted that many of the generation of
‘political’ elites educated in Portuguese-era missionary schools in the 1960s and 70s
had been deeply influenced by their educational experiences (Dunn, 2003). However,
the same argument is not often made for their contemporaries that went on to become
East Timorese Catholic priests and nuns despite often more prolonged training. This
picture raises questions not only about how civil society is to be regarded, but also what
other sources of historical continuity there are in the contemporary Church’s power, and
how this may be understood through its relations with the state and population.
Thus, to summarise, a series of paradoxes exists in contemporary thinking about
postcolonial politics. A weak state must be strengthened to avoid conditions of the kind
that led to crisis in 2006. Yet an excessively ‘strong’ state is undesirable and to mitigate
this possibility, society, particularly, ‘civil’ society must play a balancing role. ‘Civil’
society is formed out of the clandestine resistance network. Association with the
resistance movement is a prime source of political legitimacy, but also criminality.
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II. Towards an alternative framework for understanding politics after 1999
State-society analyses frequently use a simple formula to highlight apparent
discontinuities between anti-colonial liberation movements and post independence
‘instability’. Yet as seen above, they also give rise to other configurations that can be
compared with earlier accounts of state-society relations. Writing 15 years after
Indonesia’s independence, for instance, Clifford Geertz saw in Indonesia – East Timor’s
former coloniser - a tension between, on one hand, the primordial attachments of sub-
national populations, whether to communal, racial, religious or regional identities, and
on the other, a ‘demand for progress…a rising standard of living [and] more effective
political order’ represented in a central modernising state (Geertz, 1963:111). In
common with other views of ‘primordialism’, Geertz saw in the modern state an
inability to penetrate society that operated according to different rules. Like others that
pit state against society, Geertz’s analysis operates according to a familiar
configuration. If Geertz’s view is to be distinguished, it is through historical
contingency, particularly as it was written as the ‘new states’ came into being, out of
synch with primordial societies in the 1940-1960s (Two decades later, a different
account by Benedict Anderson, (1990) posited that Indonesia had by contrast a ‘new
society’ and an ‘old state’ inherited from the Dutch colonial period). That prevailing
views of given time periods inform accounts during which they were written is not
surprising. However, this is only one part of the significance of a historical perspective.
In East Timor, the impact of history in the present is evident in other ways than the
recent past, and the perceived implications of this history to the present, i.e. the
Indonesian period. East Timor is, after all, a nation with a renowned, deeply impacting,
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and possibly unique history of colonial contact and subjection (c.1600s-1943, Portugal;
1943-1945, Japan; 1945-1975, Portugal again; and 1975-1999, Indonesia).
Thus, other considerations related to a historical perspective need to be considered. For
example, distinct historical periods are entwined with the epistemological conditions
that give rise to different understandings of state and society over time. Acknowledging
this raises questions that state-society analyses may address (for example, where does
the boundary between state and society lie, or what are the exterior limits of each? What
implications does this have for their relations, and the rule of law?) and seems to be not
simply a matter of objective reason, as much as informed by a desire to strike a balance,
even a contract, between the two. While liberal scholars assert the importance of
establishing where the state’s remit is, and the conditions for its relations with society,
much of this analysis tends to overlook how each was constituted historically. As
Mohammed Mamdani has suggested, a ‘bifurcated state’ was a decisive legacy of
colonial state formation in Africa, in which two systems of law operated, civil for urban
areas, and customary for ‘the hinterlands’. Colonialism, it is suggested, sought to
institutionalise segregation, as an alternative to the ‘civilising’ mission, which by the
early 20th century was increasingly viewed as unworkable. By putting the population
outside urban areas under the direct control of tribal authorities that it empowered,
customary law in the hinterlands was to be contrasted with civil society under civil law
in urban areas. Such a historical analysis is necessary to account for ‘civil society’ as a
derivative of racist notions of ‘civilised’ society, rather than in an unremitting
programmatic and ideological sense (Mamdani, 1996:6-14). This is a variation of
Ranger’s concern, also about Africa, that studies of anti-colonial movements have
33
“served in all too many cases as moral propositions rather than intellectual ones”
(Ranger, 1985:3). Grounding examinations of contemporary states with reference to
colonial formations of power therefore may present an alternative to either liberal
statebuilding or hybrid/networked governance scholarship, that view ‘weak’ states or
civil society as needing to be strengthened/empowered.
Timothy Mitchell (2005) has similarly sought to treat the state through historicizing it,
rather than defining its boundaries. Mitchell views power as being generated through
the production of categories such as state and society, elaborating on Foucault’s
observation that knowledge is brought to bear in the creation of binary divisions of all
kinds, which are ‘characteristic of modernity’ (Foucault, 1991a:74). Thus rendered, and
following Foucault, Mitchell sees the state not as a place where power emanates from,
but where it is contested. Power is therefore evident in many locations, not only the
state. In other readings, the state is not an abstraction where policy is devised, nor a
centre from which power is dispersed, but a ‘site’ of power through which struggle
between competing groups and individuals over discourse and practices takes place
(Joyce and Bennett, 2010). The analysis of these scholars suggests that taken-for-
granted distinctions are themselves the result of knowledge formations. Interrogating
them may reveal the source(s) of their power.
i. Governmentality and bio-power
In a practical example, examining the construction of categories such as civil society
serves to show that multiple sites of power exist, including those embedded in others.
The Church, for instance, is an institution often posited as a key element of ‘civil
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society’. Its distinction as apart from the state is a cornerstone of ‘modern’ government.
Analysing the practices of power that led to this distinction found in 17th century Europe
are informative not only of how the idea of ‘modern’ government of the kind described
above began to take shape, but also how the church, through this separation, came to be
regarded as part of a ‘civil society’ and therefore as ‘contest[ing] and repel[ling] the will
of government’ (Gordon, 1991:23). For Foucault, the precursor to ‘governmental’
power was the power of the ‘pastorate’: priests, their communes, and the structures and
interests of medieval Christianity. The principal historical reason for the diminishment
of pastoral power was resistance to it from within the Christian population, made
possible by the ‘institutionalisation’ of the pastorate from the early centuries after the
advent of Christianity.
The Church’s imbrication in political power, indeed its indivisibility from it, especially
after its increasing use of juridical norms in the seventh and eight centuries and its
acquisition of land and people (‘feudalisation’), were the catalysts for a profusion of
‘counter-conducts’ – dissent from the prescribed conduct inherent in the obedience
pledged to the shepherd by the flock. However, Foucault wanted to draw attention to the
detail of this institutionalisation in terms of its internal struggles as much as grand
sweeps of history. Material, but also epistemological inequities were resisted by the
flock, such as the surrender of knowledge of one’s self to the priest through confession.
The pressures created by the requirement of the pastor’s charges to be unquestioningly
obedient, opened avenues for small acts of dissent and larger acts of revolt, the most
famous example of which has been termed ‘Reformation’. It is tempting to see such
‘great events’ as of overarching significance. Yet, again, the changes wrought as the
result of counter-conducts took place at the micro-social as well as grand historical
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level, and Foucault emphasised that these changes were usually linked to other
grievances or events (Foucault, 2009:194). They are significant in explaining that the
power of the Church was not suddenly replaced in the 16th century with the secular state
(Foucault, 2009:229). Indeed, religion and politics in the modern west are better
described by the complex insinuation of pastoral into governmental power, rather than
simply by relations between church and state (Foucault, 2009:191; Elias 1994:279).
Consequently, changes took place over time, within institutions of Christianity.
This shows two key ideas of power relations, as Foucault saw them, that later emerged
as part of modern ‘governmentality’. As seen above, power and resistances to it, were
inseparable. Pastoral power did not so much become intertwined with political power,
but was already a key part of its constitution. Christianity’s institutionalization therefore
entailed the diversification of practices by the flock – asceticism, mysticism, the
predominance of the power of the priest over scripture, community resistance and
eschatology - all played a part in resistance. These were all what could be called
‘tactics’ for resisting power from within, political tools often improvised within broader
regularised practices. Foucault used the term in a wider sense: the ‘deployment of
tactics’ described how discourse became the site of struggle in which the formation of
knowledge was at stake. Tracing these ‘discursive deployments’ through ‘genealogies’
illuminated the formation of fields of knowledge inherent in modern government
(Foucault, 2003:190-212). Tactics and strategies described practical engagements, and
were thus distinctive from power conceived by Marxian scholars in which knowledge -
perception, modes of consciousness, and ideology - preceded political action (Han,
2002:114). Moreover, knowledge was inseparable from power itself. In other words, the
fields of knowledge used in modern government were implicit to power.
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When this analysis was applied to the history of the emergence of modern government,
the apparent paradox in this long process was that although a ‘privatised’ religion
emerged from the drawing back of the power of the Church, resulting from internal
counter-conducts – an ‘intensification of the pastorate in its spiritual forms’ – these
counter-conducts extruded upwards and wrought change at a public level. It is important
to take account of this, not only because it shows a connection and causality between
these two ‘levels’, but also because it shows the central relevance of the ‘individualised’
relationship in pastoral power to later forms of government according to ‘rationalities’.
A key feature of governing rationalities, as before, was that each individual would be
known and acted on. Pastoral power therefore changed in form – whereby a
‘government of souls’ was superseded by a ‘government of men’, but pastoral power
still appeared to transcend historical ruptures. However, there were important
differences in modern government. I will make some remarks that will necessarily be
general, outlining the nature of these differences, amounting to a discussion of
governmentality and bio-power, before moving on to the extent and limits of this in
colonial government.
‘Governmentalities’ means government through rational knowledge, and as the word
‘mentalities’ implies, a way of thinking about and acting on the population as a result of
the deployment of rational knowledge formulated through the human sciences.
‘Mentalities’ in this context refers to how the social world is understood and produced
collectively, rather than through cognitive and rational processes at the individual level.
In particular, the population became the object of government, which has two
precedents appearing to derive from Enlightenment thought, but on closer inspection,
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transcend its associated events. First, acting on the population as an object of modern
government required calculation and measurement, deriving from the fields of
knowledge implicit to this government – the human ‘sciences’ - such as political
economy, the precursor to the discipline of economics, and sociology and criminology
(Dean, 2009:28).
Second, the human population came to be regarded as a species distinct from other
species, and acted on as an object of improvement. This perspective is a starting point
for the emergence of ‘bio-power’, the form of knowledge characteristic of modern
government whereby the human sciences were used to intervene and ensure the
flourishing of the population’s health, productivity, and protection, a precursor of
modern ‘biopolitics’. The transition to government with these ‘modern’ characteristics
was accompanied by a transition away from sovereign rule being a royal God-given
prerogative, and towards democratic government (Dean, 2009:29). The analogies with
earlier pastoral power are necessary to keep in mind. The sovereign was still regarded as
God’s government on earth. This ‘dispensation’ ensured that the sovereign would act in
the common good, distinct from individuals according to self-interest, a view put
forward by Thomas Aquinas, and later, Hobbes. Modern govermentality retained earlier
features of royal sovereignty that took rule to be based not only on God’s will but
secession and kinship, and an ineluctable association between blood symbolism and
territorial sovereignty (Foucault, 1998 [1978]:149). Yet changes were wrought in
modern government that reflected moves away from the sovereign’s ‘right of power
over life and death’. In times of war, a projection of power was no longer a defence of a
sovereign with a divine right to rule, but a defence of the health and security of the
population. In times of peace, bio-power supported the emergence of capitalism,
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through the “controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the
adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes” (Foucault, 1998
[1979]:141). In short, bio-power as a characteristic of government aimed to defend,
preserve and make use of the population.
The role of sovereign guidance had an analogy in both the father’s rule over the family,
and the pastor’s rule over the flock (Foucault, 2009:232-3). In the persistence of this
motif of a single individual as knowledgeable of and responsible for the wellbeing of
many individuals, resonances with bio-power could also be found. Thus, in a general
sense, the characteristics of governmentality are to be found in the individualising
calculations on which rational government was to be based, which found expression in
making the population productive according to economics and biopolitics, disciplines of
the human sciences. The nature of struggle in the forging of these disciplines
illuminates how government was structured, but moreover, the nature of rationality as
something that could produce ostensibly ‘objective’ forms of knowledge.
The third element of governmentality, discipline, forms a ‘triangle’ with sovereignty
and the population as object of governmental management (Dean, 2009:31). In
particular, disciplinary power was distinct from sovereign power, in that it sought to
order and regulate the number of people in a particular territory by organising them
through institutions. It was here that disciplinary power was found to have
commonalities with pastoral power in its existence in medieval monastic institutions. Its
nature has direct resonances with the power relation between shepherd and flock
because monastic orders required observances of strict hierarchies, bodily discipline,
and total subservience to the monastic superior, all later found in modern institutions of
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state such as schools, prisons and the military (Foucault, 1991b; Asad, 1993:135-165).
Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of disciplinary power is its quality as inducing
productivity in its subjects from the inside out. A comparison with Marxian views of
power – which views power as essentially repressive and applied externally - is again
instructive.
What emerges from the above is that Foucault thought that pastoral power was
instituted in the modern state. Changes in power were wrought over time and sometimes
in peculiar ways. For the purposes of this study, however, it is evident that these
epistemological and socio-historical conditions in Western Europe raise questions about
their applicability beyond these contexts. In addressing this, it is necessary to think
about how and whether these concepts can be used when decontextualised, but also how
their conceptual elaboration can be made sense of in the particular contexts of
colonialism and later, postcolonial states.
ii. Modern government and bio-power in East Timor?
In this regard, existing studies have largely posited that while ‘disciplinary power’ in
institutions of modern European government led to increasingly dense grids of
surveillance and reflexive behaviours by the population, the same cannot be said for
government in its colonies. Colonial sovereignty in such contexts is regarded by some
as having been characterised by instability, improvisational strategies of government
and the anxiety of colonial officials rather than the surety of authoritatively-executed
grand plans (Stoler, 2009). The nature of colonial power in these contexts was ‘patchy
and highly uneven’, dependent on ‘excessive and spectacular’ displays of violence, and
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frequently subcontracted to local auxiliaries (Stepputat and Hansen, 2005:26).
Subcontracting bears a resemblance to elements of colonial bifurcation, particularly
‘decentralised despotism’ (Mamdani, 1996). Another body of literature stresses
reflexivity and even reciprocity so that knowledge flowed as much from the colonies to
the metropole as the other way round (Stoler and Cooper, 1997; van der Veer, 2001). In
a general and fundamental sense, the dynamics of colonial ‘governmentality’ are
significantly different to those found in Western Europe.
This divergence is in no place more evident than in East Timor, Portugal’s most remote
possession, described by some as being closer to a protectorate than a colony until the
late 19th century (Tomasz, in Silva 2012), and similarly lacking a ‘state’ until the same
time. Alternatively, rather than look for evidence of a state, or lack of it, others have
proposed that parasitism was a key power dynamic underpinning the pre-1975 colonial-
indigenous relationship (Roque, 2010). A number of recent studies of contemporary
politics have reflected the significance of the intervening period of the Indonesian
occupation, and have also provided analyses sometimes amenable to Foucauldian
perspectives on the operations of power. Silva has argued that power relations between
elites within the state initiated under UNTAET, structured the subsequent RDTL state.
Despite the view of a ‘structured’ state, this is subject to important qualifications, for
instance, ‘Portuguese colonisation [was] discursively constructed, retrospectively, as a
positive experience’ by RDTL state elites. Particularly important in this regard was and
continues to be the ‘pretence of moral and cultural similarity’, between the East
Timorese population and Portuguese on which resistance to Indonesia could be based
(Silva, 2012:46). The unearthing of discursive categories among elites and the
population at large has similarly revealed flaws in the grand narratives of resistance
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(Kammen, 2003; 2009). Within these historical and ethnographic approaches, abiding
binaries of modernity and tradition have been problematized, which were used not only
by colonial authorities until 1999, but also by postcolonial elites and social scientists
(Silva and Simião 2012). Besides ethnographic work, scholars have analysed the
production of ‘objective’ knowledge in international institutions, examining the
discourses that arise during the course of truth-establishing procedures (Devant 2008;
Drexler, 2010). These studies all show how certain kinds of discourses might be subject
to examination in order to establish more closely the workings of power/knowledge.
Ethnographic studies have also highlighted what may first appear to be the postcolonial
state being held to account by society’s invocations of cultural codes such as reciprocity
(Silva, 2010). This view posits that while the governing elite had been supported by the
population in the resistance struggle, the population had not been ‘paid back’ for their
support after independence. Proponents of this view show, however, that reciprocity,
and the mass of ‘the people’ are conceptually different from the modernist vision of an
activist society holding the state accountable. In a clearly articulated account, Elizabeth
Traube showed how the Mambai ethnic group demonstrated political elites’ unfulfilled
obligations to them by incorporating historical events into local narrative (Traube,
2008). These are narratives of ‘nationhood’ in which the state does not figure, except as
a means with which to satisfy ‘unpaid wages’ and the notion of elites held accountable
by ‘citizens’ is not entertained. Traube’s account is reminiscent of the scholarly
identification of a ‘little tradition’ of peasant struggle, embedded in, but semi-
autonomous from an urban, educated elite, operating in a ‘great tradition’ (Scott, 1977).
Kammen (2009) has traced points at which a ‘little tradition’ existed within the
resistance movement, from which utopian visions would be realised after independence.
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Kammen showed that East Timor’s little tradition in places looked forward to
‘traditional’ monarchies, a far cry from abstractions of citizenship, the rule of law,
development, and other teleologies that prescribed a proper role and relationship
between state and society. Both of these accounts usefully retrieve and show how
subaltern aspirations and beliefs from the resistance period were manifested after 1999.
In related ways, ethnographic studies have broached the question of land. In particular,
these studies explain the significance of ‘traditional authorities’ invoking precedence by
(re)constructing ritual houses and performing ceremonies. This is an important
dynamic, McWilliam and Traube argue, of post-1999 politics in that it represents the
‘…enduring associations that people assert and sustain with the land of their ancestors’
(McWilliam and Traube, 2011:1). This is of significance in understanding long-term
patterns of displacement and resettlement throughout the Portuguese and Indonesian
periods, but also conflicts inherent in these processes (Bovensiepen, 2010). The legacies
of this displacement, McWilliam and Traube argue, ‘continue to inform social and
political agendas in contemporary Timor-Leste’ (Ibid, 9). Yet the limits of ritual
authority are to be found, it has also been proposed, at the point at which this authority
encounters the state. This meeting point is explored by examining recent land law
legislation, with other scholars arguing that claims of precedence over land can be
equated and understood in western legal terms in a qualified sense, as ‘first possession’
(Fitzpatrick, Barnes and McWilliam, 2012). The analysis of these separate systems -
prompted by attempts to reconcile state legislation and cultural practice – lend further
weight to the idea of a historical division between two systems of law stemming from
the colonial period. Land is also of relevance to understanding the causes and meanings
43
of ‘crisis’, (Devant, 2008; Silva, 2010), and to identifying how contemporary politics
relates to claim making to land and space.
III. Outline of argument
The thesis proposes an alternative interpretation of politics of East Timor through an
examination of the limiting factors and parameters of bio-power; and looks at how this
played out in the present. As noted above, the dominant view of East Timor’s
postcolonial politics has been informed by liberal perspectives that see a configuration
(and correct and relative positioning) of the boundaries of the state in relation to society,
which serves to check state power. In proposing alternatives I describe attempts under
the late phase of Portuguese colonialism to forge a ‘classically’ Foucauldian
‘biopolitical’ regime, where the population could be decisively shaped as modern
subjects, and argue that this approach was only partly ‘effective’. Furthermore, the
contemporary state has often been seen as subject to mediating forces of ‘pre-colonial’
tradition (often used to contrast with elite modernization). The thesis examines the
extent and limitations of ‘bio-power’ under colonialism in successive chapters, bringing
into focus themes of health and hygiene, the inculcation of dispositions, practices
related to the family, habitat, monetization, the value of life and death; relating these
themes as they developed during colonial periods to the post-colonial era.
Moreover, a more nuanced view is elicited by examining the particular nature of power
in East Timor. On the one hand, while power, contemporary sociality and politics have
been explored through a lens of ‘the resurgence of tradition’, or of modernity, rather
than searching for points where these two perspectives may be reconciled, the thesis
aims to problematise their boundaries by showing that their creation depended on the
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historical workings of power. In short, the thesis historicizes, rather than defines
categories. A second point specifically concerns power’s quality. In the Foucauldian
view, as noted, power does not only issue from the state, but from multiple locations.
Moreover, it may be seen through discourses, practices, and symbols, rather than
material evidence of ‘development’. This has implications for its third aspect. Rather
than analyse power by looking at how it is distributed by the state in contemporary
politics per se, the focus is on the historical constitution of power in the colonial period
and the ways in which it has fed into the present. Similarly, the significance of power’s
multiple locations and relations can be seen in an extended analysis of ‘missionary
power’. This comprises a significant part of the argument of the thesis because
missionaries were embedded in communities and the colonial project (cf. Foucault,
2009), as well as often being closer to the indigenous population than other colonial
personnel, historically during the course of postings to remote locations. As such, it is
argued, missionaries sought and achieved influence not through force, but by means
such as the family, providing one of several points during the 20th century through
which they attempted to negotiate the transmission of modernity.
IV. Methodology
This thesis is based mainly on a year’s fieldwork carried out between September 2008
and September 2009. I also drew on interviews conducted in two further periods,
between November 2006 and August 2007, and in a follow-up period from April to
June 2010. Interviews were conducted exclusively in Tetum, which I had become
proficient in before September 2008, having lived and worked in East Timor for almost
three years prior to the beginning of my main period of fieldwork. This earlier
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experience was highly significant because it gave me an ability to conduct research
without needing to spend time learning the language, or working through an interpreter;
and consequently gave me a level of independence that I might otherwise not have
experienced. It also allowed me to understand important elements of my planned
research and how to approach it before I ‘formally’ investigated it.
This process, though far from smooth or predictable, was greatly facilitated by
enhanced opportunities to converse with a network of East Timorese and foreign
contacts. Some, but not all, are mentioned in my acknowledgements. By and large,
however, only in a few cases did I rely on friends and regular informants to establish
contact with potential interviewees, more often relying on many dozens of
conversations with East Timorese beyond this circle of regular informants for
background information. Indeed, these conversations over the years helped to identify
topics, a process that seldom came about in a linear fashion. In chapter four, for
example, I had originally intended to study the postcolonial influence of a resistance-era
‘subgroup’ in Baucau district. Ultimately, however, I switched to researching what I
found both to generate more information and to be more interesting - the history and
contemporary claims to a natural resource in the same geographical area.
In order to identify topics, and provide context, I also relied on reading daily
newspapers in depth. When I wanted to look more closely at an event or series of events
(such as can be seen in chapter two) I requested access to the archives of two such
newspapers located in Dili, namely Timor Post and Suara Timor Lorosae. Both
institutions always graciously complied with my requests. My choice of locations for
fieldwork (in roughly half of East Timor's districts - Ainaro, Baucau, Covalima, Dili,
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Ermera, Lautem and Manufahi) was largely determined by events and actors that
illustrated the rich political landscapes that I was beginning to observe and have tried to
describe and explain.
The nature of interviews often required their arrangement by meeting in person with a
potential interviewee, or telephoning in advance, explaining on these occasions the
purpose of interviews. It was sometimes possible to conduct my mainly semi-structured
interviews on a first meeting in this way, while at other times interviewees needed more
time to prepare or to consider my request. I requested interviews with one or at most
two people at once, rather than group interviews. On occasion, other trusted individuals
would accompany interviewees. Several interviewees were men in positions of authority
at local and national level, many were people with less discernibly high status. I sought
contrasting views among interviewees and often encountered contentious perspectives; I
selected interviewees on the basis of their apparent knowledge or proximity to and
recollection of events, corroborating this where possible with others. In several
instances when I considered the subject matter too sensitive to reveal an interviewee's
identity, I anonymised their contributions and the location of interviews and associated
information. Where possible, I attempted to interview women, although I should stress
that achieving parity of gender representation among interviewees was one
consideration among many regarding who should be interviewed (the number of women
that I spoke with in informal conversations over the years amounted to many times the
number of formal interviews conducted). In any case, attempting to do so would have
been an arguably flawed way of addressing the issue of gender. Instead, I address it
directly and indirectly (chapters three and five), but since it has not been an explicit aim
of research, I have largely left it and associated debates to be addressed elsewhere.
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The focus of my thesis changed according to possibilities determined by interviews and
sources, but also according to how various ‘components’ of research could be mutually
complementary or otherwise. Interviews in particular that I conducted on the subject of
the politics of language and the Tetum liturgy required my submitting a list of questions
to two individuals associated with the Catholic Church (who helped write the liturgy) in
advance. Despite the very interesting insights these interviews produced, I could not
accommodate their subject matter within the themes of existing chapters. In a particular
way, omitting this element of research shows the extent to which my research changed
from the seeds of an initial idea in 2005 to the conclusion of fieldwork in 2010. Having
witnessed the church-led demonstrations in April and May 2005, dealt with in chapter
six, I had originally planned to address the broad theme of the role of religion in East
Timor’s society since 1975, and against this background, the specific question of how
political transitions affect religious institutions.
Two things, both involving the practicalities of research, changed the trajectory of this
plan. The first was the ‘crisis’ in 2006 that drew my interests towards its associated
events, and how it had been both explained at the time and later by others. Second,
before fieldwork, I had been aware of possible limitations of conducting research on an
institution such as the East Timorese Catholic Church. Access to records was limited by
their destruction in 1999, and also by the variable cooperation of its personnel in
complying with my requests (interviews, and above all, documents) for information
since that time. These limitations were underscored by my experiences during the first
five months of my research. Recognising this, I refocused my research to encompass a
broader range of themes for the remainder of my fieldwork. Still convinced of the
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necessity to explain the influence of religion and other modalities of power, during my
later fieldwork, I started to develop a historical explanation based on documents then at
my disposal, that I hoped would eventually transcend focuses on power as residing in
institutions, often privileged by conventional political science.
In the course of formulating this approach, I identified sources located in libraries and
archives in London, Lisbon, Porto, Macau, East Timor and Darwin. In two instances, I
found it easier to access sources outside East Timor that were theoretically available in
country. For example, I consulted many more duplicates of CAVR sources in London
than the originals held in Dili. Likewise, although I used little of my research at the
Museum of Resistance in Dili in my final thesis, it was much easier to access these
records, which at the time were available via the website of the Mario Soares
Foundation in Lisbon. I was very grateful to have had the full cooperation and
assistance of the staff at Dili and Baucau district courts when conducting research there.
IV. Chapter outline
These considerations inform an analysis of how pre-existing forms of power mediated
bio-power, and the sequence of the thesis chapters. Chapter one explores how the events
of the postcolonial period are best understood by examining the schisms and struggles
that took place in the resistance movement. Governing elites’ efforts to make the state in
the image of the resistance movement signalled an attempt to consolidate an authentic
version of history in which the dead and living could be ordered, but such designations
became subject to contestation. Chapter two examines the problematic nature of these
historical categories by which contemporary awards are made, through an examination
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of witchcraft and witchfinding. It suggests that persecution of ‘witches’ was intertwined
with power and resistance against Indonesian rule. As such the scope of bio-power is
broader than the state’s ordering and recognition suggests.
Chapter three suggests that the narrow focus of the postcolonial state’s awards and
designations be seen through an examination of state formation beginning in the early
20th century. Taxation, forced labour, and monetization were all features of state
formation. The chapter questions whether these constituted the kind of intrusive
interventions characteristic of ‘modern bio-power’, and how the postcolonial state is
perceived at the local level, and in light of historical experience. Chapters four to six
examine how far ‘missionary power’ can be regarded as having instituted a form of
contemporary bio-power. In chapter four, missionary promotion of modern habitat and
forms of the family  is considered against the backdrop of the use of older forms of
power. The effects of missionary education are also proposed   for consideration not
only through the prism of the Indonesian period, when its influence cultivated local
resistance, but through the origins and technologies of colonial education. In light of the
uses to which populations put  monetary awards conferred by the postcolonial state, the
chapter explores whether either distributive forms of power and reciprocal relations, or
bio-power are adequate ways of characterising how colonial power formations have
been made manifest in the present. Chapter five continues the theme of missionary
education through an analysis of the inculcation of norms of ‘civility’ and ‘courtesy’
and examines in historical perspective how far this may have constituted the basis for
‘civil society’. This is again compared with ostensibly ‘pre-modern’ forms of
missionary power, interwoven into a discussion of the Catholic Church’s relations with
the state that preceded the events of 2006-8.
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Chapter six examines the extent of bio-power by way of looking at the contemporary
public policy of mass street cleanings. It examines the historical antecedents of a policy
often supposed to have emerged in the wake of ‘crisis’, by asking how far colonial
notions of subjecthood and citizenship form the basis for the policy’s supposed civic
dimensions. Against a background of colonial practices relating to hygiene, and
postcolonial posturing that a social contract underwrites relations between citizen and
state, it explores whether public cleaning is able to induce ‘productive’ behaviours in
subjects, given historical experiences of repression. The conclusion revisits the central
question of how far ‘modern bio-power’ is evident in light of the alternative forms of
power outlined throughout the thesis.
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2. Instituting the State: Evaluating life and Death 
 
This week the world has witnessed a world-offence being committed in East 
Timor…What good, you may ask, is a moral stand against an armed militia. The doubt 
is rational, but it coexists with something larger, a feeling that there is court of appeal 
beyond the rational… This is the high court of the spirit where hope and justice are 
realities, simply because their reality is kept alive by...our need to rescue them from the 
bloody catastrophe of history and re-enshrine them constantly as sacred words and 
redemptive possibilities. 
 
Seamus Heaney, on the steps outside the US Embassy in Dublin, September 1999 
 
 
I. Introduction: building a modern state? 
 
A discussion of the state serves as a starting point of the thesis as a whole. As noted in 
the introductory chapter, almost every analysis of East Timor’s post-colonial politics 
has included discussion of the state (its agents, its role, and occasionally, its nature) 
usually conceiving of it as working synergistically with, or opposed by society, and 
therefore one of two sources of power. A consideration of the state therefore serves to 
address a theme that appears in existing studies. However, in presenting an alternative 
view, many of this chapter’s themes appear throughout the rest of the thesis, in relation 
to subjects primarily other than the state. For example, existing studies largely conceive 
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of the state as a modern, secular, rational, rule-bound, elite-led entity. Equally, however, 
the state can be sacred, characterised by its practices rather than rules, a site of struggle 
rather than being the end result of anti-colonial resistance, and ‘traditional’, or at least 
appeal to the idea of tradition. These motifs point towards the themes of subsequent 
chapters. As Seamus Heaney’s words above indicate, the struggle for East Timor’s 
independence was kept alive inside and outside the territory often against rational 
calculation. By 1999, therefore, to many this struggle had become one of rescuing East 
Timor from the historical and depositing it with the transcendental. My aim at the outset 
is to address this by showing how after 1999, history was not discarded but ‘re-
enshrined’ in the state and postcolonial politics. 
 
The state may be understood in a wide sense, as a representation of ideas through 
symbols and discourses, and as a series of practices comprising ‘temporal arrangement, 
spatial organisation, supervision and surveillance’ (Mitchell, 2005:184). This analysis 
concentrates on the way in which the state is comprised through ideas. This can be 
summed up in the central paradox that while the international community argued that 
instituting abstract processes of the state and constructing its material institutions would 
inaugurate ‘transition’ and establish a decisive break with a violent past, discourses of 
the resistance period unsurprisingly persisted. This chapter argues that representations 
of the resistance period were key to constructing the state. Between c.2000-2006, elites 
attempted to reconcile the present with the past in several ways. They attempted to 
make the state distinct from its contenders by establishing a monopoly over symbols 
and discourses associated with the resistance movement (1975-99), by excluding 
‘imposters’ and ‘collaborators’. These latter designations were also easily understood 
and used by the population at large because, as the following section shows, internal 
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struggle was a mainstay of the resistance movement that was constituted by the 
population. These designations, and others connected with regionalism, overshadowed 
more complicated struggles among the population, explored in later chapters.  
 
The following section then shows how the state was recast in three ways. In contrast to 
the period 2000-2006, state elites after 2006 devised and disseminated official 
narratives of the resistance, aiming to definitively achieve a monopoly on its discourses 
and symbols. This practice differed from similar attempts before 2006 through attempts 
to incorporate ex-combatants within the state, signified by extracting, exposing and 
archiving their histories. Such practices showed state elites’ intentions to institute the 
state in its own image, by attempting to take charge of history. More than simply 
designating ex-combatants as loyalists, however, they were assigned values, 
underpinned by material rewards and regalia. Yet, these designations, ranks and awards 
were unstable. Not all groups and individuals that sought recognition for pre-1999 
activities were able to fit archetypes of resistance, an argument substantiated by 
examining in some detail below a group that claimed a part in resistance. In sum, the 
first section explores the Indonesian period, interpreting the meaning of struggles within 
the resistance movement and how this meaning was interpreted to produce an official 
history. The following section then traces how, after 1999, state elites attempted to 
establish a monopoly over signs and discourses of resistance. The profusion of claims to 
historical truth in this immediate post-colonial period among the population at large 
preceded the events of 2006. State attempts at redress involved producing and 
conferring a ‘quality of resistance’. The subsequent case of the problematic nature of 
this process serves as a prospectus for the theme in subsequent chapters.  
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The use of the armed resistance as a focus of analysis intends to explore the idea of its 
‘transition’ into F-FDTL, the military formed in the early 2000s. It presents an 
alternative to existing views of F-FDTL’s significance to postcolonial politics. On one 
hand, F-FDTL is viewed either as having been created by the UN in the context of a 
continuing threat from militias, or in an attempt to satisfy an ‘indigenous demand’ for 
its creation (Rees, 2004). A closely related view has it that F-FDTL’s creation was a 
mistake – a military had no place, so the view had it, in a democratic modern state 
(Oliveira, interview, 2006). By contrast others have posited that excessive attention on 
both the armed resistance and F-FDTL has distracted from the subaltern histories that 
remain unrecognised in the state’s annals of resistance (Kent 2011:453 in Soares, 
2012:126). In this view, “unofficial memory practices” have served to invoke the past at 
a local and often personal level, in ways that the governing elite has eschewed or has 
even attempted to suppress. This view partly addresses the issue, raised throughout the 
thesis that official categories of recognition are unable to account for those that fall 
outside the state’s designations.  
 
This view also questions the nature of ‘transition’ in official (i.e. state) renderings in 
which atrocities committed in the past are forgotten in the pursuit of better relations 
with Indonesia or because of abuses carried out by the resistance movement against the 
population. Instead, it is argued here that the means through which official practices and 
discourses are constructed should not be overlooked exclusively in favour of a subaltern 
perspective. The creation of an official history needs to be understood because it is an 
important means of showing how power operates. The representation of resistance in 
the state is a powerful practice connected not only with ‘official’ discourse but with 
government in its broadest sense, i.e. as a means to conduct and represent. Lastly, at 
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stake in a debate about transition and the state is another debate about ‘tradition’ and 
‘modernity’, or rather, why the ways these things are conceived of and practised, 
impacts on politics. The construction of the state in the present is connected, however 
distantly, with the way resistance was in part orientated using selective experiences and 
motifs of late-colonial Portuguese modernity. As will become clear, this was more 
complicated than simply taking cues from ex-colonisers1, not least because of the 
experiences of Indonesian occupation. If the aims of the resistance movement in the 
past were to realise modernity and independence from Indonesian rule, then the way 
that past is officially represented in the present cannot only be understood by the ways 
in which it is forgotten.  
 
II. The ‘resistance in the resistance’: official history and its struggles 
 
After 1999, symbols and discourses associated with resistance became subject to 
contestation in the context of elite attempts to achieve a monopoly over them and make 
them coterminous with a state. This section explores antecedents of struggle over 
discourse in the resistance period which generated histories of alleged treachery and 
loyalty in the postcolonial period.  
 
The armed wing of the resistance movement, Falintil, was transformed into F-FDTL 
during UN governance in 2001 and constructed with the remnants of Falintil guerrillas 
and new recruits. For more than a year after the arrival of UN forces in September 1999, 
they were kept in cantonment, causing tensions with the UN government, and among 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 At certain junctures, resistance leaders reproduced symbolic repertoire of late-Portuguese colonialism. 
In preparations for the 1983 ceasefire negotiations between Falintil and the Indonesian military, Xanana 
Gusmao requested that ‘re-tailored’ Portuguese military fatigues be provided rather than an ABRI 
uniform (Chamberlain, 2008:85).  
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guerrillas.  In January 2006, 159 western soldiers in F-FDTL presented a long list of 
grievances stretching back to the period of cantonment in Aileu, in a petition to then 
president Xanana Gusmao. All of the top-ranking officers in the new military were 
easterners, and the petition detailed complaints against several senior officers of F-
FDTL, except its commander Taur Matan Ruak. Their dismissal from F-FDTL for 
going on strike, the subsequent resignation of a further 500 western officers who 
supported their cause, and the support of Gusmao, emboldened them to march on Dili in 
April 2006 in a bid to seek redress. The events of that period increased tensions 
precipitating ‘crisis’: within Dili, disputes over land and property and regionalist-
sectarian identifications were superimposed onto territorialised divisions leading to 
displacement of the population. Regional identifications manifested in this period were 
complex and have been explored in historical perspective partly with reference to Timor 
Island’s ecology (Kammen, 2010). This analysis attempts instead to place regional 
identifications alongside other struggles over discourse during the resistance period.  
 
The ascendancy of officers from the east in F-FDTL originates from the period in which 
the armed resistance was destroyed in the west of the country in the late 1970s. After 
1977 the wearing down of resistance as a result of Indonesian aerial and sea 
bombardments and infantry offensives saw a more consolidated presence in the western 
border region, and by 1979, the military had a stronger presence throughout the 
territory, including the lowland northern and southern coastal regions. Despite this, the 
strength of its units varied greatly depending on locale. In 1978, in the east, its infamous 
‘encirclement and annihilation’ operations forced the local population and guerillas, 
who had until then remained together in ‘liberated areas’ (Bases de Apoio), to take 
shelter en masse on Mount Matebian. Judging the strategy to be ultimately futile against 
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overwhelming military force, the population surrendered. After their descent to lowland 
areas they were rounded up and placed in concentration camps, according to a military 
strategy of dividing ‘civilians’ from ‘security disturber groups’ (GPK). Despite the 
reduction in numbers of Falintil by 80% and its arms by 90%, however, armed 
resistance persisted, as fifty guerrillas escaped to the far eastern point of the island 
(known as Ponta Leste) after the Mount Matebian siege, where they regrouped during 
the course of the following three years.  
 
The persistence of armed resistance throughout 1980-83, indicated changes in strategy 
by both Falintil and the Indonesian military. The creation of resettlement hamlets by the 
Indonesian military created more permanent establishments through which the 
population could remain under surveillance. The military conducted a psychological 
warfare (‘hearts and minds’) strategy, but due to low troop morale, related to inadequate 
preparedness to face a guerrilla opposition, and limited resources, these campaigns were 
imperfectly executed (Budiardjo and Liem, 1984:44-7). Meanwhile, the much-reduced 
strength of the resistance movement in the East led to its reorganisation in 1981 under 
the leadership of Xanana Gusmao. Prior to the reorganisation, only three members of 
Fretilin’s Central Committee within the territory remained alive, including Gusmao. 
The reorganisation removed Falintil from party political influence (that of Fretilin), 
aimed to build a clandestine front in the population, and adopted a guerrilla strategy 
(Budiardjo and Liem, 1984:72). These strategic changes, and attempts to enlist the 
population precipitated renewed Falintil offensives against the Indonesian military up to 
1982. As noted previously, the strength of Indonesian military units varied, and the 
success of offensives caused informal ceasefire and co-existence agreements to be 
brokered between Falintil and local Indonesian commanders that could not answer these 
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attacks. On this basis, the Indonesian military and Falintil agreed a ceasefire that 
commenced in January 1983. 
 
i. ‘Treason’ in the people’s army: 1970s-1990s 
 
Prior to the 1983 ceasefire, divisions had already appeared in the resistance movement. 
The first notable struggle was between those that saw the movement best served through 
concentrating on a ‘military’ strategy, and those that favoured a ‘political’ approach, 
when such a debate was still possible. This occurred some months after the Indonesian 
invasion during May 1976 near Soibada at a meeting of the Central Committee of 
Fretilin (CCF). The debate within the CCF in which these views were aired, occurred at 
a time when a majority of the population accompanied armed guerrillas that still 
controlled a sizeable proportion of the territory. The ‘political’ approach won out, with 
the leadership of the movement subsequently controlled by a council of members 
ideologically wedded to Marxist-Leninism. A purge was conducted in 1977 of less 
radical leaders associated with Fretilin’s first president Xavier do Amaral, with his 
supporters treated, according to Abilio Araújo, a CCF member, to “summary justice, 
persecutions and killings, inflicted in cold blood on [Xavier’s] faithful combatants” 
(Araújo, 2012:165).  
 
These previous internecine struggles, culminating in Xavier’s capture, also caused 
mutual distrust among a dispersed external leadership. Fretilin’s leaders abroad - the 
‘external front’ that departed East Timor before the 1975 invasion - had in any event 
difficulty communicating with the internal front. In 1978, Alarico Fernandes, a CCF 
member based within East Timor, negotiated with Indonesia in an attempt to oust the 
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CCF leadership, along with the newly elected president Nicolau Lobato, by denouncing 
his leadership on ‘Radio Maubere’. The broadcasts and apparent collaboration between 
Fernandes and the Indonesian military precipitated an Indonesian assault leading to 
Lobato’s death in December of that year. Unclear whether the broadcasts were 
Indonesian-inspired ‘black propaganda’ or a purely internal affair, Fretilin leaders 
abroad became consumed by infighting amidst allegations of ‘betrayal’ within their 
ranks2. Although apparently amicably resolved, according to Abilio Araújo, it had “an 
enormous repercussion on the External Front, leaving injuries that were never healed” 
(Araújo, 2012:153-5).  
 
Similar ‘unhealed injuries’ again emerged just before the 1983 ceasefire. The 
commitment to an ideological strategy by members of Fretilin’s Central Committee 
persisted following the 1981 reorganisation. Kilik Wai Gae, Falintil’s Chief of Staff, 
and two other members of Falintil’s ‘Red Brigade’, Ologari Asuwain and Mauk Moruk, 
disagreed with the ceasefire and wanted to maintain offensives. Furthermore, they 
disagreed with the premise of admitting UDT - the losers of the 1975 civil war - to a 
movement of national unity (Rees, 2004:41). A notable eruption occurred when Mauk 
Moruk, Falintil’s Chief of Staff, disagreed with Gusmao, exchanging heated 
correspondence through a messenger (Direito, 2003). Gusmao subsequently demoted 
Mauk, who then surrendered to the Indonesian military under duress. Gusmao later 
claimed that Mauk Moruk attempted to depose him (the ‘supreme command’) (Rees, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Araújo (2012:153-5) described how Radio Maubere’s broadcasts and the group’s exile combined to 
‘generate a climate of ‘who is the traitor?...He is betraying! He is the traitor!’. In this atmosphere, Rogerio 
Lobato became convinced that Mari Alkatiri and José Ramos-Horta, based in Maputo, Mozambique, were 
the sources of attempts to unseat his brother, Nicolau Lobato. On arriving in Maputo, Lobato found that 
they were in New York, and so held their wives hostage in Fretilin’s house. After his arrest and release 
from custody, Fretilin’s external leadership held a meeting, mediated by the Mozambican Government. 
They compromised to elect a new spokesperson (José Luis Guterres) and agreed that the source of 
betrayal had not come from within their ranks. 
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2004:41). Kilik Wae Gae, and two other guerrillas unsympathetic to the ceasefire, 
Carlele and Oka, went missing in unclear circumstances (Direito, 2003). Several 
different incarnations of the resistance movement followed these events, including the 
abandonment of its revolutionary socialist credo under the name of the Revolutionary 
Council of National Resistance (CRRN), and the forging of a closer relationship with 
the Catholic Church. This, along with an earlier decision to situate Falintil beyond party 
politics, were precursors to closer engagement of a clandestine base of support in the 
population at large, another policy instituted in 1981.  
 
In the following years, engaging as wide a section of the population as possible became 
a key aim of the resistance movement and a precursor to the departure from Fretilin of 
Gusmao and José Ramos-Horta, the leader of the diplomatic front abroad, in 1987. The 
same year Ojectil, a student resistance organisation was founded based in East Timor, 
and the following year, the foundation of Renetil, led by Fernando de Araujo, a 
clandestine organisation of Timorese students in Indonesian universities, further 
signalled Gusmao’s intention that the leadership of the movement should lie less in a 
party structure and increasingly under a broader front led by him. The decision to unify 
the armed, diplomatic, and clandestine wings of the organisation under the banner of the 
CNRM in late 1988 confirmed such a strategy. In the wake of the Dili massacre in 
November 1991, in which several hundred people were killed after the Indonesian 
military opened fire on funeral-goers, a crackdown on the clandestine organisation as 
well as a sustained campaign of military offensives severely weakened the resistance. 
The number of its guerrillas was reduced so that overall numbers fell to a third3.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  In some instances, the reduction was much greater. The border zone (fronteira) went from having 200 
to 14 guerillas (Carrascalao, 2012:85) 	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The general decline in the resistance’s fortunes appeared to be sealed by Gusmao’s 
capture in late 1992. Again, this was believed by senior leaders such as Taur Matan 
Ruak to be the result of betrayal (Carrascalao, 2012:99-100)4. The longstanding 
situation of ‘easterners’ in all senior roles therefore continued as Mau Hunu, the only 
founder of Fretilin that had not been either killed or captured, assumed the leadership. 
Gusmao’s role as ‘historic leader’ was undisputed, but his functions were frozen due to 
imprisonment. Mau Hunu led through a politico-military council of Fretilin members 
with two vice-secretaries, Lu-Olo and Konis Santana. Thus when Mau Hunu re-
confirmed a longstanding decision to keep Falintil free of party affiliation, Fretilin still 
continued to be a key symbolic and organisational element of the resistance movement, 
and had the loyalty of many senior leaders.  
 
The offensives against Falintil and the clandestine network throughout 1992 also had 
the effect of disconnecting one region, where guerrillas operated, from another. Each 
regional commander thereafter proceeded more autonomously. Now organised as four 
regions, not only were the majority of leaders of eastern origin, but the most detached of 
all was the ‘Ponta Leste’ zone, where the Indonesian presence was least stable, and 
numerous guerrilla offensives took place under the leadership of Lere Anan Timor 
(Mattoso, 2005:230). By this stage, the Indonesian military also had a greater 
knowledge of the entire territory than ever. Its paramilitary intelligence operatives, 
Intel, had become increasingly adept at recruiting double agents to infiltrate the 
clandestine network on which the movement relied. It was this infiltration that led to the 
capture of Mau Hunu in April 1993. With the capture of leaders of the armed movement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Taur attributed this not to enemies within the leadership, but to the necessary use of clandestine 
resistance networks. Indonesia let these grow, he suggested, so that they could be more easily infiltrated 
(Carrascalao, 2012:100)	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in consecutive years, by the mid-1990s, leader of the executive council Konis Santana, 
and Chief of Staff Taur Matan Ruak, thought that they could not change the political 
situation militarily (Carrascalao, 2012:86). They perceived a long-term campaign of 
urban resistance, combined with pressure at the diplomatic level as a necessity. To 
reflect Santana’s role as leader of the executive council, closely in touch with the 
clandestine network, he permanently relocated to the west (and mainly the mountainous 
Ermera district) in the early 1990s. His assumption of the leadership seemed 
temporarily to have caused a rift with Taur which subsequently eased when it became 
clear that he was trusted by Gusmao (Mattoso, 2005:223).  
 
Yet beyond these alliances betrayal continued to take place. Another of the ‘troika’ of 
leaders, Sabalae, leader of the clandestine wing, disappeared in 1995 following a 
meeting in Gleno5. Outside East Timor, other parts of the resistance movement in exile, 
including former Fretilin Central Committee member Abilio Araújo wanted to pursue a 
policy of ‘reconciliation’ with the Suharto regime (and was accordingly isolated by 
others). Throughout their joint leadership, Santana and Sabalae, close friends since 
school, identified challenges to their leadership and perceived these to have originated 
in a betrayal of the movement as a whole (Mattoso, 2005:260-3). Their perspective was 
not unique: the impression that the resistance movement was being subverted from 
within was reinforced by the disappearance in June 1997 of David Alex, another leader 
of more than two decades’ standing, almost two years to the day following Sabalae’s 
disappearance.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Mattoso (2005:258) notes that rumours that his successor, Manudati, had accompanied Sabalae to Dili 
shortly before his disappearance persisted; likewise, an ex-leader of the clandestine resistance, and former 
close  confidant of Xanana, Ai-Tahan Matak, latterly leader of the CPD-RDTL, was tainted by rumours 
of collaboration following his release from imprisonment 
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Thus, despite the award of Nobel prizes to Ramos-Horta and Bishop Belo in 1996, the 
resistance inside Timor remained at a low ebb throughout that and the following year. 
Santana expressed a desire to Gusmao and Ruak to hand over his duties to another 
leader. This was a marked change, since at the end of 1992 – another low ebb – he had 
talked several deputies, including an aide from the west, Tara, out of surrendering. As 
far as is known, this appears to contrast with declarations by Lere Anan Timor during 
the same period, that he would ‘fight to the death’ (Mattoso, 2005:196;209). In the 
context of the disappearance of senior leaders, the fluctuating fortunes of the movement 
at home and abroad, and Santana’s own ‘crisis of confidence’ (Jolliffe, 2010:79), his 
death in February 1998, ostensibly the result of an ‘accident’, inevitably became subject 
to rumours of betrayal. An official story released by the resistance, that Santana had 
died from a fall while in Ainaro, was intended to prevent the real location of his death in 
Ermera becoming known to the Indonesian military. Although the whereabouts of his 
remains were known, his death was attested to by only a handful of people, giving it a 
‘certain mystery’ (Mattoso, 2005: 300). This, together with the fate of others that 
disappeared, both armed, clandestine, and those beyond these resistance structures, 
represent two important themes that provided discourses that continued in the 
postcolonial period such as identification along ‘regionalist’ or ‘nationalist’ lines.  
  
The idea of ‘betrayal’ was an unavoidable dynamic of the resistance movement after 
1975. It was first evident with the division of those favouring ‘military’ and ‘political’ 
approaches in May 1976. Other fissures were given traction as the armed resistance was 
decimated in the west and remained alive in the east, and as the population separated 
from the armed movement. As stated above, the armed leadership’s concentration in the 
east, formed another discourse that transcended the resistance movement’s formative 
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experiences. Lastly, the involvement of the population in the 1980s and 1990s created 
opportunities for Indonesian infiltration of the clandestine resistance movement. 
Especially after 1983, with attempts to ‘normalise’ Indonesian rule, the use of East 
Timorese auxiliaries became more pronounced, culminating in the 1999 arming and 
organisation of East Timor’s militias.  This picture does not diminish the efforts of the 
resistance movement. Rather it describes divergent practices including deceits that 
emerged from collective attempts to counter Indonesian colonial rule. After the 
Indonesian departure in 1999, these were themes that, as suggested above, were 
perpetuated.  
 
ii. Subverting symbols: ‘imposters’  
 
The transition of the armed resistance to a notionally ‘professionalised military’, was 
inexorably tied up with the policies and politics of the UN Transitional Administration 
that sanctioned its creation. The criticisms of this process were that little attention had 
been given by its international sponsors to how a guerrilla force could transition to a 
military6,7 with aid badly coordinated, legal frameworks inadequate, and political will to 
exert ‘civilian power’ largely absent. While these observations still stand, it is suggested 
here that the political meanings of the resistance period in this context have been left 
relatively unexplored. The representation of its legacies were of greater importance than 
its supposedly logical converse – that civilian power over the military would be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The UN’s plans have been described as a capitulation to ‘indigenous pressure’ to make a new military 
(Rees), but also subject to minimal review. The SRSG Sergio de Mello gave the Timorese representative 
body only a two-day window in which to review during UNTAET. 
7 For example, Rees describes weak coordination of aid to F-FDTL from its bilateral donors, which were 
supposed to work through the Office of Defence Force Development (ODFD), coordinated by the UN, 
but rarely did so in a coordinated fashion (Rees, 2004; Lao Hamutuk, 2005). Together with inadequate 
legislation, according to conventional standards of ‘security sector reform’, the policy and legal 
framework to affect control over the military known as ‘civilian power over the military’ was regarded as 
inadequate. 
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desirable or acceptable to either state elites or F-FDTL’s leadership. This section 
develops this argument by examining how tensions in F-FDTL in particular were 
refracted through discourses of the resistance period, rather than simply catalysed by 
post-1999 policies. The same discourses, along lines of regionalist or nationalist 
identification, and often in combination with each other, found resonances in society at 
large because, as shown, struggle was implicit to the nature of the resistance movement. 
 
After 1999, governing elites attempted to commandeer the discursive bases of the 
resistance and refashion and produce new symbols associated with it. As in the period 
1981-85, competing visions characterised this period. Hence, for example, in a speech 
to parliament two months after independence, the leader of the opposition Democratic 
Party (PD), Fernando de Araujo, accused the governing party Fretilin of treachery: 
 
‘Fretilin became the best collaborators of Kopassus, giving information and 
revealing all of the strategies of the struggle, helping the enemy to plan and 
persecute Falintil and its cadres…[Fretilin] came to be better Indonesians, with 
more regalia than the Indonesians themselves’ (TP, 16 July 2002) (emphasis 
added).  
 
Politicians also made public attempts to discredit the idea that society should still be 
divided along the lines of those that favoured independence or autonomy in the 1999 
referendum (TP 18 June 2002). Yet the idea not only persisted but was inherent to the 
politics of the post-referendum period. It was also marked by the (re)appearance of 
discourses, such as regionalism, which was superimposed onto claim-making about 
which region had ostensibly been ‘nationalist’ or ‘collaborated’. Warnings about the 
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corrosiveness of eastern and western identifications over the cause of national unity 
were made by both senior military and civilian figures. However, there are also 
indications that public discourse differed markedly from private discourse, or more 
specifically, that conducted within institutions (TP, 14 February 2004)8. Both 
‘treachery’ and ‘regionalism’ are considered in the context of contestation over the 
resistance, but first, those regarded as its pretenders (or ‘imposters’) are considered in 
the immediate post-independence period.  
 
iii. State as heir to the resistance 
 
The period between 2000-2006 saw elite attempts to take charge of the production of 
symbols and discourses associated with the resistance. They did this by attempting to 
produce a distinction between state and population through representing the state as a 
natural heir of the resistance movement. The first part of the analysis below 
concentrates on attempts to portray the RDTL state as a successor of the resistance 
movement.  
 
Elite attempts to assimilate and establish a monopoly on symbols and discourses of 
resistance were tested on a number of occasions beginning in 2000. Significant groups 
of ex-combatants that refused to be cantoned in Aileu and correspondingly were not 
recruited into F-FDTL, referred to themselves as ‘Falintil-Bases de Apoio’, (FBA) with 
deliberate resonances of the pre-1978 resistance movement’s name for areas under its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The F-FDTL commander Falur Rate Laek claimed that regionalism had not existed during the 
resistance period in the jungle. He was later accused of using regionalist epithets (see section III below) in 
the barracks of F-FDTL’s first battalion.  
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control, and challenged the state9. The very fast process of ex-combatants’ dismissal 
from Falintil in its transition made their complaints more acute TP, 12 and 13 June 
2002). Aggrieved at not having been invited for consultations on demobilisation, 
prominent individuals from within the ranks of ex-combatants such as Mauk Moruk’s 
brother, Leki Nahak Fohorai Boot, commonly known as ‘L-7’, and Samba Sembilan, 
retreated to Bobonaro and Zumalai in the West, and Laga in the East, among others. 
Rogerio Lobato, who had been appointed Minister for Internal Affairs, was patron of 
FBA groups. Both in exile and subsequently president of a disaffected veterans’ group, 
Lobato had had negative relations with elements within what became the military. 
Observers worried that the FBA would use Lobato as a ‘Trojan Horse’ with which to 
win influence in government (TP, 12 and 13 June 2002).   
 
In this context, two elements are key to understanding the seriousness with which state 
elites, the population, and UN peacekeepers perceived the FBA groups. First, shortly 
after independence in 2002, some located themselves along the border area with West 
Timor. Memories of militia activities were still fresh, and remnants of these militias, 
stationed a short distance over the border in Atambua, had made several incursions 
since their withdrawal in 1999. Second, the appearance of FBA groups – dressed in 
military fatigues – suggested, if not an appropriation of the state’s authority and its new 
military, F-FDTL, then a deliberate disregard of it. Thus, when a group of men in 
military fatigues attacked a police station in Suai in July of that year, being only a short 
distance from the border with West Timor, rumours abounded of militia responsibility 
for the attack. In fact, a group of ex-combatants carried out the attack, who were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The term ‘Bases de Apoio’ or bases of support, harked back to the early post-invasion period when 
Fretilin established liberated areas beyond Indonesian control until 1978. 
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unwilling to be subordinated to the state’s new security institutions10. The group had 
indeed recently returned from a suco directly bordering Atambua in West Timor (cf. 
Kammen, 2009). Surrendering to PNTL and UN Peacekeepers after a week, the group 
were brought to Dili, where 12 of them, including their leader, Labarik Maia, were 
conditionally released.  
 
Given the dispersal of FBA groups, the location of the attack, and previous incidents, 
observers noted that identifying groups on the basis of their uniforms was difficult. Yet 
although the group’s pronouncements that they had been ex-Falintil were discussed, 
media in Dili emphasised the Indonesian-ness of the uniforms (TP, 22 July 2002). 
During the resistance period most uniforms were captured from Indonesian soldiers, 
with Falintil badges then sewn on, but with the onset of independence this practice had 
become unacceptable. The conditions of their discharge from police custody were that 
they were required to report weekly to police in Dili, and that they were banned from 
wearing military fatigues. However, Maia asserted that the uniforms were ‘earned 
during the [resistance] struggle’ and ‘won with the north and south kingdom’s 
bones’(ibid). The controversy increased when he claimed that the group had been 
instructed to continue to wear its uniforms by Rogerio Lobato, who denied this, 
claiming that he had told the group that they should only wear uniforms on ex-
combatants day (20 August) (TP, 31 July 2002).  
 
Uniforms were not the only symbols from the resistance period that elites sought to 
monopolise, nor was demobilisation the only thing that had caused negative relations 
between some ex-combatants and the state. Struggles over the past were central to these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The group showed ‘insubordination’ towards Commandante Ular, Ibid 
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relations. Prior to and after independence, the Committee for Popular Defence, 
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (CPD-RDTL) a group led by a former clandestine 
leader, Ai-Tahan Matak, refused to acknowledge the existence of the RDTL state. The 
group regarded itself not as a political party but as a branch of the earliest incarnation of 
the resistance movement, pledging allegiance, for example, to the 1975 constitution and 
flag from the same era, criticising the resistance movement’s reorganisation in the 
interim, and refusing to recognise UNTAET (Ai-tahan Matak interview). In response, 
the government introduced laws setting out conditions for the formation of political 
parties11. In attempting to counter challenges to its authority, the main actors of the 
government – PM Mari Alkatiri and President of parliament Lu-Olo, and President 
Xanana Gusmao – also separately conducted campaigns of socialisation and dialogues 
in areas where support for FBA and CPD-RDTL cadres existed.    
 
Entitled Governasaun Aberta (‘Open Government’), the programme was not simply an 
exercise in instructing people on the parameters of laws, but also served to perform 
ownership of the resistance through both invoking a view of the past and socialising 
new symbols intended to render that view in the present. Thus, Xavier do Amaral, a 
local son, provided an entrée into Gusmao’s dialogue with villagers in Suco Mindelo in 
Turiscai, by presiding over a flag-raising ceremony, where a movement calling itself 
Antigo Combatentes Base Orsnaco [Ex-Combatants’ Orsnaco Base] (ACBO) had 
founded a ‘city’, that it claimed was beyond the jurisdiction of authorities in Dili. The 
excursion to Turiscai was intended to affirm the state’s ownership of the national flag 
by assembling a current and former president in one location. The outcome was an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Law 3 2004, ‘Sobre Partidos Políticos’, 13:1 specified that political parties had to ‘be requested’ by 
1500 citizens, for example.  
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assertion that ACBO was not connected with CPD-RDTL. Although they aspired to live 
beyond the state’s jurisdiction, they appeared not to want to appropriate its symbols.  
 
By contrast, during Gusmao’s visit to the ‘isolated’ CPD-RDTL outpost of Uaibobo in 
Viqueque, villagers repeatedly refused to accept the new constitution, and argued for a 
politics practiced according to the 1975 constitution. Gusmao tried three strategies of 
communicating the state’s authority to counter this. The first owes much to the idea of a 
state as a ‘modern’ entity. He explained ‘what independence was’, and why Uaibobo 
village should assemble into a ‘general community’ of the nation-state. When this was 
rebuffed, he evoked precedence, recalling his memory of Uaibobo villagers fleeing to 
Mount Matebian in 1975 following the Indonesian invasion. Villagers again countered 
this display of authority not by showing submission to the former leader of the 
resistance, but by asserting practical concerns – the right to live separately and without 
harassment by state security forces (they protested against the confiscation of CPD-
RDTL’s radios by the PNTL in Baucau during the previous week). Finally, Gusmao 
asserted that the people’s enemies were those that ‘carried weapons’ [kaer kroat] – an 
allusion that the state would view any group that didn’t accept it as a threat. As if to 
counter the inference that his group presented a threat, Ai-Tahan Matak responded 
subsequently (he was not in Uaibobo for the visit) that CPD-RDTL had cadres 
numbering 200 people but they were unarmed. As will be seen in the following 
sections, this exchange was more meaningful in the light of circulating arms during 
2006 than is at first apparent(TP, 1 September 2003a and 1 September 2003b). 
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Similarly, on a platform in Ainaro, Lu-Olo addressed ‘threats’ from groups ‘such as 
Colimau12 and CPD-RDTL’ by comparing the authenticity of their claims to have been 
involved in resistance with Falintil’s temporary recruits: 
 
[Falintil] appealed for people to fight alongside us, holding guns and killing the 
enemy, so that we could win the war. [Some came] and stayed for a night, but 
then, in the morning, they came to the commandante crying, asking if they 
could return home. Then after the war ended many came to Dili with long hair 
and uniforms, claiming to be veterans. ‘He has long hair, but he speaks naively 
[ibun rahun]. He wasn’t even alive then… he’s not old enough to be a veteran’ 
(TP 16 September 2003).  
 
The symbols of resistance, including the long hair of guerrillas (fuuk naruk) who ‘did 
not cut their hair while at war’ (Joliffe, 2010:84), and uniforms, were being abused by 
‘imposters’. Yet despite these attempts to admit CPD-RDTL into the state, they 
continued to operate independently. In 2004, the group was accused of distributing 
‘illegal identity cards’ to its members in Suco Memo, Bobonaro. The response of the 
district administrator to this incident indicates that the problem was not that CPD-RDTL 
was not a political party, (previous legislation circumscribed their activities on these 
grounds)13 but that their identity cards showed that they were attempting to operate a 
parallel state:  
 
These identity cards are used for when its members work in the fields. No local 
authority can make them surrender the cards…The CPD-RDTL are not 
enemies, but there are differences in their political vision… RDTL became 
independent once; it already has a president, laws, courts, and other institutions 
for the whole territory. The RDTL flag hangs in the UN in New York. It is only 
through the RDTL government that bilateral and multilateral relations can be 
had with many nations throughout the world (TP, 12 February 2004). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 A group or a series of groups that, in at least one incarnation, professed allegiance to the resistance 
movement. In 2003, the state alleged, ‘Colimau’ was carrying out ‘militia’ activities in Bobonaro district. 
The state reacted to ‘Colimau’’s alleged activities by sending F-FDTL to the area, the only occasion 
before the events of 2006 when the military left its barracks. 13	  Law 3/2004 ‘Sobre Partidos Políticos’ 
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The administrator appealed to the group to accept the state by emphasising that a 
contested symbol, the flag, represented its modern character of having international 
relations. As in Uaibobo two years previously, the CPD-RDTL’s coordinator remained 
resilient against these appeals14. As indicated, CPD-RDTL’s previous rejection of 
Gusmao’s overtures was strongly influenced by their grievances stemming from the 
past. This can be clearly seen from the state’s attempts to offset potential for further 
discord with the group by allowing their campaign to have a ‘constitutional 
readjustment’ (reajustamentu constitusional) aired at a ‘National Dialogue’ in early 
2003, prior to the Uaibobo visit (the 2001 constitution remained unchanged). During the 
dialogue, it became clear that the group held a common cause with L-7, with both 
wanting, above all, to discuss the 1983 internal conflict in Falintil, but had been 
frustrated by state elites’ guiding discussion away from the topic (Direito, 2003b and 
2003c).  
 
A ‘quality of resistance’ was therefore constructed and laid claim to in numerous public 
fora by the state. In the eyes of many, however, the position of its elites in speaking 
with authority on such matters appeared to be laden with contradictions. As a 
newspaper editorial noted, in the same period, a police operation sanctioned by the 
government to arrest those from the Suai FBA group still wearing ‘Indonesian military 
fatigues’ was being led by PNTL, of whom almost 80% were former Indonesian police 
(PolRI). The population, it noted, were ‘cynical’ about the allegiances of former 
Indonesian police, believing that many had worked for Intel (TP, 23 July 2002). 
Paradoxically, too, Lobato commanded both the PNTL and had close relations with the 
Suai group. To this configuration was added the idea not only that resistance was a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 He responded by calling for 28 November 1975 to be recognised as independence day and accusing the 
UN of attempting to ‘divide the Timorese people’.  
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quality that could be declared in discourse and reified in symbols, but that this was 
equally true of its supposed converse, ‘collaboration’ with Indonesia. 
 
III. Collaborators 
 
By 2005, while the state’s leaders proceeded along this course, disquiet festered in the 
ranks of the F-FDTL. This was partly due to material conditions in barracks, borne out 
by the several occasions when Lere Anan Timor, one of Brigadier General Taur Matan 
Ruak’s two deputies, complained that the state needed to give more attention to 
alleviate the military’s poor conditions (TP, 21 September 2003). While the state had 
banned ‘FBA’ ex-combatants from wearing military fatigues, western officers 
complained that they did not even have uniforms. This was exacerbated by a 
comparatively well-equipped police force, with several special units, raising questions 
about what Lobato’s intentions were. It is often overlooked in these observations that F-
FDTL’s ‘difficult conditions’ related not merely to material hardships, but also to its 
institutional investiture by way of material symbols, which in turn shored up 
hierarchical differentiation. As Pierre Bourdieu has argued, the favourable reception of 
an institution will be more likely if there is a ‘collective belief…made concrete through 
qualifications and symbols like stripes, uniforms and other attributes’ (Bourdieu, 
2012:126).  
 
Therefore, if the state definitively commandeered the discursive and symbolic bases of 
the resistance, so the thinking went, multiple ‘truths’ among the population would not 
continue to circulate and remain subject to contestation along axes of those that 
remained loyal or collaborated. As noted above, a pre-existing discourse of regional 
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differences metastasised after 1999, touching off histories of alleged treachery during 
the period of resistance. This discourse found popular expression beyond F-FDTL, in 
the streets of Dili, where easterners and westerners intermarried, socialised and fought.   
 
In F-FDTL, easterners accused westerners of collaboration with the Indonesians, and 
similarly accused PNTL of collaboration. From the earliest period of its cantonment 
after 1999, western Falintil veterans began to assemble a list of incidents of 
‘discrimination’ by their eastern counterparts. Demobilisation and recruitment have 
already been noted above as being contentious issues and contributing to the activities 
of disgruntled ex-Falintil under the aegis of Bases de Apoio. However, the petitioners 
alleged that some prominent ex-combatants were told not to apply to F-FDTL on 
grounds that they were westerners (petition, 18). Eastern veterans, already having 
demobilised, and subject to assistance from the World Bank-sponsored Falintil 
Reinsertion Assistance Program (FRAP) programme (chapter 4), were called back and 
awarded with relatively senior ranks in F-FDTL in January 2001, shortly before its 
formal inauguration. Some eastern veterans given these positions were allegedly too 
old, had poor eyesight, or were disabled, they alleged. By contrast, longstanding 
western veterans were not given similar invitations15. Other allegations that the petition 
made were that eastern recruits were accepted back into F-FDTL after having 
committed criminal offences, while western soldiers were summarily sacked for lesser 
offences; that long-term unexplained absences by soldiers from the east were willingly 
forgotten; and that contrary to treatment given to western female soldiers, the 
institution’s leadership turned a blind eye to eastern female recruits that breached 
conditions that they should not become pregnant within three years of joining. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 These included Samba, Dudu, Mautino, Mauputo, Kakahe, Susar-Lemorai, and Hakiak, among others  
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Compared, however, with these alleged practices of exclusion, discrimination and 
favouritism, alleged casual pronouncements by eastern leaders that westerners had 
collaborated with Indonesia, sometimes accompanied by physical and verbal threats, 
were taken more seriously. Given both their prominence in the petition and follow-up 
letter to Taur Matan Ruak, it is likely that compared with other complaints, these 
accusations had potential to cause more anger and resentment among petitioning 
soldiers. The petition alleged that Eastern commanders told their western counterparts 
that they were worried by militia border incursions, but more worried about sending 
westerners to engage militias in case they ran away to join the militias and “make war 
against us again” (petition, 2006:7;13)16. In the period after the petition became 
publicised, in the barracks, eastern officers are reported to have ordered guns to be 
trained on the group of petitioners (Dirigi ba Taur)17.  
 
The perception of PNTL as staffed by ex-PolRI, fuelled by rumoured allegiances with 
Indonesia, helps explains why on several occasions, the police and military fought each 
other prior to 2006 (Petition, 14. 14. 5/02)18 (TP, 20 February 2004). Lere Anan Timor, 
ex-Falintil commander in the Ponta Leste region, reportedly told western officers that if 
they did not want “[easterners] commanding [them], go and call Rogerio Lobato and 
Leandro Isaac to command you”. After sending the petition, however, he reportedly told 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Reported to have been said on 8/2/05. ‘…Returning from the firing range [carega de tiro] [Falur] said, 
‘[if] we mobilise the force to shoot at the border, and the Lorosae soldiers are killed or injured, we will 
suspect the loromonu soldiers of collaborating with the militias to make war against us again.’  
17 ‘M-16 guns [metralhadora], were all simultaneously aimed towards where the petitioner forces were’ 
18 ‘Cap. Higino das Neves with Alf Juvenil Sergio Caetano Pinto brought an armed section of [F-FDTL] 
to assault the police station in Kaikoli Dili, there was condemnation, it was just forgotten about; but in 
2003 Ten. Deker brought [F-FDTL that were] victims in order to find out about a case in which some of 
the police were condemned for the beating of the soldier Marcelo Caetano, for which he had to be tried 
and thrown out of the F-FDTL, although he hadn’t committed a crime’.  
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western soldiers that F-FDTL would declare war on the PNTL if they joined19 (dirigi ba 
Taur, 2006:17 February). For the purposes of this analysis, therefore, two overarching 
themes are apparent from the events in F-FDTL barracks prior to the departure of the 
petitioners. While declarations of F-FDTL’s professionalism were being debated 
elsewhere, its leaders fundamentally saw continuity with the past. For example, Lere is 
alleged to have told westerners that fractiousness in Falintil ‘began in the jungle with 
the Mauk Moruk group’ (Ibid, 12 Feb). Secondly, competing discourses of treachery or 
nationalism were enlivened when concerned with representations of the past. This is 
especially obvious when concerning deceased resistance leaders. Westerners were 
alleged by easterner commanders to be responsible for the death of Konis Santana20 
(petition:3), which, according to the same document, westerners rebutted by asserting 
that he was their ‘brother’21 (Petition:5).  
 
It has been shown that state elites’ attempts to establish a monopoly over symbols and 
discourses of the resistance were intended to exclude rival claimants called 
‘collaborators’ and ‘imposters’. This was consistent not only with the fractiousness of 
the resistance movement since 1976, but also an attempt to index society and the state 
along the lines of this narrow view of history. As uniforms were symbols to shore up or 
contest this view, so too was weaponry. Moreover, the question of the unauthorised 
circulation of police and military weapons was a key part of the events of 2006-8, 
perceived at once to signal a breakdown of law and order and the dissolution of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 “Don’t think that you will be able to join the police, if you do that means we’ll be at war with the 
police, just watch it happen, we’re not scared’.  
20 Col. Lere is alleged to have said: you [westerners] did clandestine activity because of us, you became 
members of Falintil because of us…[but] because of you the late Konis Santana went to the west, because 
in Tutuala [in the east] there was no food; so he died in Ermera because of you westerners, not because he 
drank medicinal [moruk] coffee that made him drunk, but because you are westerners (petition:3) 
21 A petitioner, Neves, refers to “my brother [maun] Conis Santana…who died because of the war”, i.e. 
not, it can be inferred, as a result of western treachery. 
	   77	  
police and military. Below, the symbolic significance of these circulations is considered 
in terms of the immediate events of the period, then against the backdrop of the history 
described above. A brief exploration of events leading from the dispute between the 
petitioners and government provides the context of this.  
 
As noted previously, petitioners’ grievances were compounded following their 
dismissal by Taur Matan Ruak from F-FDTL in January 2006. This led to an impasse 
with the government that supported the decision to dismiss them, which was broken the 
following month when Xanana Gusmao made an address on television. This address has 
been the subject of much critical debate to the effect that it provided a pretext for the 
beginnings of communal violence in Dili, largely, but not exclusively directed at 
‘Easterners’ (Proc.no.16/CO/07/TR:3). Two significant elements of the events that 
followed from this had been the mobilisation of protestors from western districts 
(especially from areas where the ‘petitioners’ enjoyed strong support) to topple the 
Alkatiri government, and the circulation of police and military weapons from the 
national munitions storeroom [Paiol Nacional].  
 
In late April 2006, the petitioners held demonstrations in Dili at the Government Palace 
(Palacio do Governo) where they were joined by elements who committed acts of 
violence against public buildings and avowedly wanted to overthrow the government. 
During the ensuing month elements of the police and military deserted, and tens of 
thousands of people in Dili fled their homes, taking up residence in impromptu camps. 
The origins and mobilisation of support from protestors that accompanied the 
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petitioners in this period remains controversial22. Two sets of organised mobilisations 
are therefore focussed on, which transcend the immediate events in late-April 2006. 
These mobilisations had common objectives, i.e. the resignation of the Prime Minister, 
Mari Alkatiri. First, among deserters from F-FDTL, Konis Santana’s former deputy and 
F-FDTL’s Head of Communications, Tara, formed the ‘National Front for Justice and 
Peace’ (FNJP) in early May, with other veterans such as Riak Leman, a PSD MP (Riak 
Leman interview; Tara interview)23. As the rate of desertion in the police and military 
increased throughout May, so also more people fled from their homes, especially in 
Dili, anticipating, or having experienced sectarian-regionalist persecution. At the end of 
the month, the government permitted the JTF, a non-UN mandated force mostly 
comprised of the Australian military to ‘restore order’. 
 
Following the arrival of these forces, calls for Alkatiri’s resignation increased from 
Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos-Horta, the two senior members of the government not 
part of Fretilin. Much has been made about the pressure exerted by these actors in 
forcing the resignation in late-June. Certainly, when Alkatiri finally resigned, it 
appeared to embolden deserting soldiers to surrender. The deserting head of the Military 
Police, Alfredo Reinado, disarmed and was cantoned, while the petitioners remained 
stationed in Gleno. F-FDTL soldiers associated with the FNJP, Tara and Marcos also 
surrendered their group’s weapons. On the one hand, then, wary of being seen as 
insurgent against the state, the FNJP surrendered weapons and worked through 
established channels, becoming closely affiliated with Mario Carrascalao’s PSD Party. 
Furthermore, their ‘movement’, the FNJP, became a vehicle for the mobilisation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Some have claimed that the ‘protestors’ that accompanied the petitioners were no more than 
opportunistic criminals, while some have used the events to claim that their violent nature ‘proved’ that 
East Timorese ‘culture’ is prone to violence. 
23 Tara said that he had deserted as a result of intimidation by Lere Anan Timor and Ular when both 
entered his house on 5 May.  
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‘protestors’, bussed in from ‘the districts’ to demand the dissolution of the government. 
The consequences of these tactics caused distress among a sizeable population living in 
makeshift camps across the capital (TP 9 July 2006)24. However, these older veterans 
had by then lost control of the FNJP, which had been renamed the National Movement 
for Unity and Justice (MUNJ) (Lucas da Costa interview)25, by mainly non-veterans, 
some of whom were affiliated to the Democratic Party (PD). The MUNJ continued to 
mobilise protestors from western districts and aligned their cause with that of Reinado. 
After having surrendered, Reinado was imprisoned in Dili, but in August 2006 escaped.   
 
Thus, Tara and Reinado, (neither of whom were ‘petitioners’), surrendered their 
weapons in July 2006; yet Reinado subsequently continued an insurgency, with the 
MUNJ’s mobilisations supporting his cause26 (Augusto Trinidade Junior interview). He 
represented a popular strand of thought that distrusted state elites (especially those that 
lived outside East Timor during the Indonesian occupation, as seen from the photo 
below) (TP 8 July 2006). Eventually western politicians supportive of Reinado 
converged after having been courted by older state elites such as Ramos Horta during 
the 2007 elections (STL 20 April 2007)27. On the back of this support, Ramos Horta 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 According to UNHCR, there were about 72,000 People living in camps in Dili in June 2006. Timor 
Post reported that IDPs ‘were scared because the actions of the FNJP can create problems which refugees 
(sic) could become victims of’.  
25 Da Costa said that MUNJ “tried to accommodate”, including people from the East on its inception. He 
prefaced an explanation of its activities with a promise that its membership was made up of “Lorosa’e, 
Loromonu, Catholics, Protestants, and Muslims…everyone”.  
26 Ramos-Horta refused to capitulate to MUNJ’s calls to negotiate with Alfredo that the Catholic Church 
had agreed to consider mediating, and blocked planned MUNJ demonstrations on security grounds 
causing its spokesperson Augusto Trinidade to suggest that Ramos-Horta was untrustworthy Of this, 
Augusto Trinidade said: “Many things that he talks about don’t have any reality. Now he’s talking again: 
‘send the [international forces] to prevent [us] having a demonstration’. Truly contradictory to what a 
Nobel Prize Winner should be saying.” 
27 For example, in the presidential elections, after a poor showing in districts where candidates perceived 
to be sympathetic to Alfredo won, (Bobonaro, Ermera, Covalima and Oecusse won by the PD candidate 
Fernando Araujo) Ramos-Horta wasted no time shoring up support by announcing that he would tell the 
Australian military to stop hunting him: negotiation with Alfredo was thereafter the favoured strategy. 
Media coverage followed shortly after designed to convince doubtful voters and observers that Ramos-
Horta enjoyed the support of ‘the people of Manufahi’.	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became president28. Yet he and other state elites did little to ‘resolve’ the standoff with 
Reinado directly as they had promised. They were more interested in those, like Tara, 
who had transitioned out of the role of insurgent, and who in late 2007 was used by the 
new AMP Government led by Xanana Gusmao, returned in July 2007, as an 
intermediary with a small group of deserting soldiers (who were not signatories of the 
January 2006 petition) when trying to resolve the continuing standoff29. Apparently 
regarding these attempts as outmanoeuvre rather than a gesture of reconciliation, 
Reinado accused Xanana Gusmao of initially supporting his cause and subsequently 
betraying him. On February 11 2008, Reinado was killed at Ramos Horta’s house 
having ostensibly arrived with the aim of negotiating with Ramos Horta30. With this 
element of insurgency dampened, state elites then organised the surrender of the 
remaining petitioners later in the year following a joint police-military operation; their 
later cantonment on the edge of Dili, and their payoff with sums of between 1,500 and 
8,000 USD (Decree Law 15/2008) seemed to signal the end of ‘crisis’.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For the politics of PD’s capitulation to Ramos-Horta’s overtures see Timor Post, 27 April 2007; 
compare the antipathy between Ramos-Horta and Fernando Araujo a year previously in Suara Timor 
Lorosa’e, 13 May 2006. 
29 The group included other soldiers such as Captain Cesar ‘Piloto’ Valente, one of F-FDTL’s Chiefs of 
Staff, who indicated that he left F-FDTL not because of discrimination, but because he didn’t want to be 
part of an army in which ‘people had lost trust’ (Interview, Cesar ‘Piloto’ Valente). 
30 A passage from an autopsy report of one of Reinado’s accomplices implies that he was assassinated. 
Leopoldino Mendonca Exposto, Mortuary Report No.90, Guido Valadares Hospital, Dili, February 11 
2008. 
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Figure 1 An MUNJ banner hanging on the national stadium with an image of Reinado, reading: ‘Struggle for Justice, throw out 
CPLP judges’, lusophone, UN-appointed legal staff, thought to have affinities with what the MUNJ dubbed the ‘Mauputu [sic] 
group’, Fretilin’s formerly exiled leadership. To the right reads ‘Parliament=Puppet’. Author’s photo, Dili, February 2007.	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An analysis of the surrender or taking up of arms reveals the positions of agents of these 
events, in particular whether they remained allied or opposed to the state. Such a focus 
on elite agency in the distribution of weapons resonates with the view that they 
represent the location of power in a single source - the state. This view also sees the 
surrender of weapons as a means to correct the problem of their distribution31. If 
circulating weaponry is taken to be a sign of anything, it is that there continues to be a  
‘weak rule of law’. This view overshadows the symbolic meaning of weaponry. Even 
before the onset of events leading to violence in 2006, weapons’ symbolic significance 
had been written into state legislation. In April 2006, in the run-up to the events 
described above, the government passed a new law, a ‘Statute for Combatants of 
National Liberation’. The preamble stated that the Statute fulfilled a constitutional 
guarantee (RDTL Constitution:article 11) to recognise the contribution of ex-
combatants to national liberation, which it would do by awarding pensions and regalia. 
This attempt at incorporation also required exclusion, since the exclusion of ‘imposters’ 
was a strategy that was central to making symbols and discourses of resistance 
coterminous with those of the RDTL state. Later amendments to the Statute included 
the practice of publicising applicants for decorations and pensions, intended to root out 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  In March 2006, the head of the PNTL, Paulo Martins, began to secretly channel arms from the paiol 
nacional, sending its contents to three western districts, Ermera, Aileu and Liquica 
(Proc.no.16/CO/07/TR:6). Martins was an appointee of Rogerio Lobato, who had the previous year 
distributed weapons to civilians in Atabae, Bobonaro. Lobato had also distributed arms during the crisis. 
Lobato had distributed arms from his own well-armed and equipped special police units built up under his 
supervision. His imprisonment in 2007 for seven years was a gesture against these acts, although he was 
subsequently released on health grounds. Others such as Taur Matan Ruak also distributed weapons 
having sought permission from the Minister of Defence.  
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false claimants, who, after independence, fabricated or exaggerated their role in the 
resistance movement32.  
 
However, as well as identifying false claimants the legislation sought to identify 
‘collaborators’. Closely related to this discourse was the symbolism of weaponry. As 
shown above, the state itself propagated notions of ‘collaboration’ and ‘nationalism’ 
that were widely understood, and became intrinsic to conflict in 2006-8. Yet in view of 
the widespread association of these terms with individual ‘truths’ of resistance, the 
imperative for the state was to take charge and incorporate these discourses by making 
them visible in its procedures and performances. Those ‘proven’ as having collaborated, 
would lose the ‘right’ to bear ex-combatant regalia (3/2006:2a,b). Furthermore, those 
‘not recognised as ex-Combatants’ were people who ‘voluntarily collaborated with the 
enemy’. However, a second provision of the statute – later removed – prevented 
recognition to ‘those members of Falintil who voluntarily surrendered to the enemy with 
their weapon’ (3/2006:4, emphasis added). This implicitly referred to those who, as 
Mauk Moruk had done, surrendered with weapons in 1983. Taur Matan Ruak, who 
claimed to have brokered unsuccessful negotiations between Xanana and Mauk before 
his surrender, said that among remaining Falintil: “The fact that Mauk surrendered with 
arms was harshly criticised at the time, but, after, everyone understood” (Carrascalao, 
2012:144). 
 
That there was anger when weapons were lost in this way reflects their scarcity, 
acquired with great risk by salvaging or purchasing them from the Indonesian military. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 For a discussion of similar claims to ex-combatants pensions in the Republic of Ireland, see Toibin, C. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/aug/10/history-students-no-grand-narratives. Accessed: 
30 August 2013  
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As indicated, weapons were also powerful symbols. In 2003, as noted, Xanana indicated 
that those that held weapons (‘kaer kroat’) were the ‘people’s enemies’. In early 2007, 
still as president, Xanana launched a campaign entitled ‘Haloot Meik no Kroat’ 
[assemble sharp objects and weapons], which involved travelling to the districts and 
symbolically placing, as suggested in the campaign title, weapons in their holders 
(Kammen 2009; Bovensiepen 2011; Tewelde 2012). Insofar as this was significant in 
representing an ‘end’ to conflict, it also resonated with wider symbolism of weaponry. 
Thus, despite a government campaign to retrieve police and military weapons in 
circulation among the population under the aegis of a ‘Joint Command Operation’ 
(Komando Operasaun Konjunto), this objective remained unrealised by the campaign 
deadline of 10 May 2008. Yet this failure appeared to have caused more concern (STL, 
2 May 2008) among those that saw it as a sign of a ‘weak rule of law’. To East Timor’s 
state elites and arguably many in the population, its meaning was different. To differing 
degrees, of arguably greater concern was forging the state in the image of the resistance, 
particularly by incorporating the population of ex-combatants.  
 
IV. Recasting the state in the image of the resistance 
 
As argued above, the significance of political change that occurred across the period 
2006-8 was that the state came to be recast as a repository of both official history, and 
incorporated the ex-combatant population. This differed from c.2000-2006 in that much 
of that period was spent trying, in the face of persistent contestation, to affirm that the 
power of a repertoire of unstable symbols and discourses would contribute to a 
‘truthful’ narrative of historical experience, by becoming associated with the state. 
Thus, the period between c.2000-2006 was characterised by a barrage of competing 
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‘truths’ or ‘claims’ that coalesced around the themes of nationalism and collaboration, 
loyalty and treachery. The period after 2008 was characterised by state attempts to bring 
coherence and stability to these ‘truths’, by extracting them through incentive, airing 
them publicly to confirm their ‘veracity’ and archiving them, entrusting the Museum of 
Resistance and National Archive with this task (Law 3/2006:21)33.  
 
As noted above, the centrepiece of the 2006 Statute offered the provision of pensions to 
ex-combatants, or families of deceased ‘ex-combatants’. To this effect, several 
categories were created to define ex-combatants. Founders (‘Fundadores’) of the 
resistance movement, those in leadership roles in Fretilin/ASDT before May 1976 were 
held in highest esteem. ‘Veteran combatants’, were those with 15 years’ experience in 
an officially recognised organisation that included CNRM, CNRT and Fretilin. 
‘Combatants’ qualified if they had eight years’ experience in a resistance organisation, 
while those with less than eight years still qualified for recognition as ‘Civilian cadres’ 
if they were active in the Bases de Apoio until late 1978. ‘Martyrs’ were those that died 
between 1975 and 1999 while engaged in resistance. To be considered for a pension, an 
applicant had to prove that they had spent the entire period for which they wished to be 
considered engaged in resistance activities, excluding work or study, or incarcerated or 
in exile. There were four categories of pension: ‘special reform’ for those with more 
than 15 years’ experience; subsistence for those with eight years; ‘special subsistence’ 
for those mentally or physically incapacitated by resistance activities; and ‘survival’ 
(sobrevivência). ‘Martyrs’ were automatically considered to have served 24 years. The 
last category was awarded to the closest family members of Martyrs, or awardees of 
other categories of pension.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The Museum was charged with ‘guard[ing] and conserv[ing]’ records of ex-combatants going back to 
the President’s registers of the early 2000s, and subsequent periods of registration. 
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There were complicated rules in particular for family members that were awarded 
survival pensions. Surviving spouses could not have remarried, elderly parents could 
not be more than 55 years old, and surviving siblings could receive it if they had been 
tortured, exiled or imprisoned for more than one year (Law 3/2006:26). Once the holder 
of the pension died, it could not be inherited. The legislation was altered in 2009 so that 
eligible recipients of Martyr pensions could be widowers as well as widows (originally 
it was only the latter), and adult children as well as younger children, and ‘eldest’ 
orphans, were eligible for an education scholarship up to the tertiary level. In addition to 
this, provisions of Law 3/2006 stood, that parents, or siblings who had been tortured, 
imprisoned for a year or exiled while engaged in resistance activities were eligible for 
the pension. Additionally, the 2009 legislation made provisions for one-off payments 
for those that had served between 4-7 years (equivalent to 12 months’ minimum civil 
service salary), or where no immediate family of a Martyr was alive, those up to four 
degrees along the collateral kin line were entitled to a payment equivalent to a year’s 
survival pension.  
 
The Statute built on previous programmes for registering ex-combatants, adding ex-
combatants from the clandestine front to guerrillas who until 2006 had been registered 
by the President’s office. After 2006, the body that oversaw the registration process and 
decorations was a specially created ‘Commission of Homage’ (Comissão de 
Homenagem), which was composed of government, presidential and parliamentary 
appointees, representatives of veterans and F-FDTL, and operated under the secretary of 
state for ex-combatants. The registration involved a process of publicising the 
decorations and awards through television, radio, and the press; applications made were 
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then assembled and posted in prominent places in a locale where an applicant’s place of 
birth, current residence, and ‘militancy’ (i.e. which branch and at what rank of the 
resistance they claimed to have belonged to) were displayed. In managing registration 
and decoration, the Commission could effectively determine whether or not an applicant 
would be awarded a pension, and its level. The Commission could also waive 
requirements that an applicant should have spent a certain period of time to qualify for a 
pension (Law 3/2006:7), by recommending higher amounts of pension to be awarded to 
‘prominent individuals’, based on ‘merit’, for which no guidelines of amounts were 
made (Law 9/2009:26b). The Commission could therefore decide whether or not a 
person could be registered as an ex-combatant, and had the discretion of awarding a 
higher than normal sum. 
 
The state revived, refashioned and created new regalia, which both underpinned awards 
of pensions, and connected state with resistance. This was most obviously seen in the 
adoption of ‘national symbols’ such as a crest bearing an image of an AK-47 rifle and 
Mount Ramelau (Law 2/2007:6, 1g and n). However, other symbols indicated their 
recipients’ status by bearing rank, and in doing so, conferring relative values on the 
population of ex-combatants, making a permanent overlay of distinctions that shored up 
the esteem in which many were already held. Medals were ‘compulsorily’ required to 
bear ‘visual or symbolic representation’ precisely inscribing both the order to which the 
bearer belonged (of which five existed34), what ‘level’ within each order they belonged 
to35, and the periods of time of their participation. These levels superimposed 
distinctions within the byzantine structures of the resistance onto state-approved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Five orders exist: Guerilha, Nicolau Lobato, D. Boaventura, Funu Nain (posthumous) and Laran Luak 
(Decree Law 51/2006). 
35 Guerilha, Nicolau Lobato and Funu Nain each have 3 levels.  
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hierarchies. ID cards, diplomas of honour, uniforms and the right to use the title of 
‘Combatant’, or ‘Veteran Combatant’ were all symbols that publicly demonstrated the 
sanctity of resistance history and the bearers place within it, guaranteed by the state.  
 
As well as ordering the resistance within the state, sanctioned regalia also served to 
exclude those not entitled to such laurels. The possession of combatant ID cards created 
a situation where alternative claimants on the quality of resistance were rendered as 
imposters, such as the CPD-RDTL with its illegal ID cards and ‘out-dated’ constitution. 
The use of uniforms on public occasions, allegedly in short supply even among F-FDTL 
soldiers only a few years previously, immediately distinguished its bearers from those 
such as the FBA, with their ‘Indonesian’ fatigues that were now memorialised in the 
Museum of Resistance. These general and particular distinctions show how inclusions 
in and exclusions from the resistance – now not only enshrined in law but inscribed in 
the state – were to be represented. When the statute was first passed, it contained 
provisions relating to those who were recognised as ‘founders’ of the movement and 
those that were involved in leadership roles before May 1976, thus marking a cut-off 
point from the divisions that emerged during that month between military and political 
wings (3/2006:8). The importance of this group is that, even despite subsequent 
struggles, their status was defined according to a period that preceded struggle, placing 
them above conflict. The recognition of this group of sanctified ‘founders’ is seen above 
all in the elevation of one – President Xavier do Amaral – above the rest, when 
recognised as the ‘proclaimer’ of independence on 30 November 1975 (Nygaard-
Christensen, 2012). This act, belatedly recognised before Xavier’s death in 2012, 
elevated him above a swirl of conflict signified by his arrest in 1977 and capture by the 
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Indonesians shortly after, and served to institute in the state both him and the other 
founders as beyond struggle36. 
 
Constructing a state in the image of the resistance therefore also involved establishing a 
‘truthful’ account of history in which the dead played a significant role. The state 
supported families of dead ex-combatants through survival pensions and invoked them 
in public spectacles. Since the Indonesian withdrawal, both Catholic Church and state 
commemorated the Santa Cruz massacre annually and had declared it one of the 
principal events of national history (TP, 12 November 2002), yet many of its dead 
remained unaccounted for. Efforts to locate mass grave(s) assumed to hold the bodies of 
some or all of the victims (TP, 4 March 2009) and recovering their remains continued in 
the period after 2008. The families of dead or missing armed or resistance members had 
also often appealed to the government to locate and bury the dead and missing. For 
example, Konis Santana’s mother expressed her hope that the state would exhume and 
give a dignified burial to her son (Mattoso, 2005:37-8), which finally took place in 
December 2012. Each decoration was accompanied by a Diploma of Honour, which 
could be awarded posthumously. The dead had its own Order, Funu Nain, and subject 
to the president’s approval, Martyrs – like all other Combatants, capitalised in 
legislation - could be buried in special cemeteries, such as the cemetery adjoining F-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 However, an official version of history that instituted founders as beyond struggle was still open to 
challenge. In 2013, Mauk Moruk returned from exile in the Netherlands to East Timor. In public 
pronouncements he addressed the 1983 conflict in Falintil, calling for a public debate on the reasons for 
his surrender and disappearances of other guerillas. In response, Xanana Gusmao addressed Mauk’s 
attempts to ‘distort or make history go a different way’ [halo historia ne’e sai oin seluk fali] in order to 
‘deceive the people’. Xanana also accused Mauk of ‘showing the [Indonesian military] how to attack 
[David Alex]’ after Mauk’s surrender. This combined two issues characteristic of struggle over history: 
collaboration, and the dead. A third issue was prompted by Mauk’s importation of military uniforms 
‘from Indonesia’, thus relating to resistance symbolism, to be used by his associates in Baucau. As CPD-
RDTL had done previously, his invocations suggested that his allegiances lay not with the generation of 
resistance elites that instituted the state, but elsewhere.  http://www.timorhauniandoben.com/2013/10/pm-
xanana-mauk-moruk-labele-distorsia.html. Accessed 1 November 2013; 
http://www.timorhauniandoben.com/2013/11/alfandega-rekonese-la-kontrola-farda.html, Accessed 12 
December 2013 
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FDTL’s 1st Battalion in Metinaro. Several bodies of disappeared Falintil were located in 
the period after 2008. The remains of João Bosco Sarmento Quintão were found in 
2011. A former soldier in the Portuguese military before 1975, Sarmento had been the 
commander of the resistance’s Central North Sector (Sector Centro Norte), before being 
captured by the military and disappearing sometime in 1983. The Indonesian invasion 
had separated Sarmento from his wife Olandina, an operator on Radio Maubere, who 
was captured and imprisoned, giving birth to their child while in custody in Kupang. 
Sarmento’s remains were placed in a special burial ground for fallen heroes (heróis 
tombadas), while being overseen by F-FDTL soldiers. Ex-combatants were therefore 
immortalised in orders, mortuary rituals, archives, and welfare for their bereaved 
families, and in being recast to incorporate the dead, the state availed itself of their 
image. It also simultaneously dispensed with the image of the period 2000-6, of a 
technocratic, distant, spiritless, abstract entity bequeathed by the UN and international 
community (cf. Verdery, 1999). 
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The burial of the remains of Falintil soldier João Bosco Sarmento Quintão in 2012, who disappeared in 
1983. Photo: Nugroho Kacasungkana. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   92	  
The ‘valorisation’ of ex-combatants in the state also took a more practical form. For 
instance, ex-combatants were proposed as instruments of public order, when in late 
2006 continuing communal violence in Dili was attributed to young men, specifically 
‘martial arts gangs’. To counter this, the then Secretary of State for Ex-Combatants, 
David Dias Ximenes, proposed to activate a veterans’ network that would ‘monitor’, 
and if necessary, counter violence in neighbourhoods through unspecified means. 
Ximenes claimed that this course of action would be most effective because anyone 
against veterans [i.e. violent youth] were ‘the same as [pro-Indonesian] militias’ (TP, 11 
October 2006). To its proponents, this idea possessed an unchallengeable logic and 
would be reflexively understood by the wider population. If it seemed natural to 
position ex-combatants as a solution to countering communal violence, then the same 
could be said for F-FDTL. This was particularly evident when military service [servico 
militar] was initially suggested as a way to stop ‘undisciplined’ youth. Under the plans, 
all “Timorese citizens” between 18-30 would carry out service in F-FDTL for a period 
of 18 months (Law 3/2007:preamble;7). Many of military service’s proponents believed 
that youths committed violence because of a ‘lack of discipline’ (Mirando Branco 
interview). Support for the scheme was particularly strong among men in their 50s that 
had undergone compulsory military service in the late Portuguese period, regarded as 
‘essential’ to the ‘formation’ of youth. Developing ‘mental strength’ and ‘facing 
professional life’ were also envisaged as its benefits (João Goncalves interview; TP, 13 
July 2006 and TP, 17 August 2006)37.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 By 2013, the fruition of the idea of using the military as a disciplinary instrument could be seen. F-
FDTL soldiers were compelled to renounce their membership of martial arts groups, by handing over 
their uniforms in a ceremony at the Ministry of Defence overseen by General Lere Anan Timor. Lusa, 4 
October 2013. 
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The military service mooted between 2006-9 was explicitly connected by its advocates 
with ‘formation’ that could produce modern subjects. Military service was formally 
intended to cultivate ‘civic virtue’ among the population, thus conferring positive 
connotations on late-Portuguese colonial governmental practices. However, there was 
also an ambiguity to its historical meaning. Military service was originally implemented 
before 1975 when there was limited scope for recognising a citizenry. Moreover, in 
other parts of the Portuguese empire, military service had entailed coercive state 
practices38 (Penvenne, 1996:445). Military service, then, refracted colonial policy prior 
to 1975 through the period of resistance. Its strongest advocates had experienced both 
Portuguese military service and were resistance leaders. Taur Matan Ruak announced 
his bid for the presidency near the site of Konis Santana’s hideout and place of burial in 
Mirtutu, Ermera, and then again in Assailatula, near Venilale, ‘a symbolic homage’ to 
David Alex, who he was with when the latter was captured in June 1997 (Carrascalao, 
2012:25). Taur combined the charisma derived from his leadership of the resistance 
movement with proposals to introduce military service, which he had advocated since 
2007. Despite its apparent popularity, the policy was not taken up in 2009 when put to 
parliament and as President he did not try and compel its adoption. However, the 
resurgence of this idea some five years after its original discussion confirmed that it had 
been a long-held aspiration of some of the older generation of ex-combatants. It was 
also a convenient way that the idea of Falintil as a ‘people’s army’, supposedly 
obscured in the transition to F-FDTL, could be retrieved and revived. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 As Penvenne notes, in Mozambique, although introduced during Republican rule with the aim of 
cultivating ‘civic virtue’, it has been described as a ‘modern form of slavery’, that ‘made a mockery of 
Republican rule’. In East Timor, in the late 1940s, 106,000 people were registered as payers of the 
indigenous tax (imposto indigena), with 41,000 of this number eligible to pay the tax in kind through 
military service. 10,000 of the total registered as taxpayers ‘could be contracted’ (‘podem ser 
contratados’) (BOCT 46, 12 November, 1949:427). 
 
	   94	  
The period between 2006-9 saw attempts to recast the state by inscribing it with an 
official history of the resistance. As well as committing this history to museums and 
archives, this involved incorporating into the state ex-combatants that worked within 
official organisations and networks, and assigning each member with a value based on 
their rank, symbolised through newly produced official regalia. These ideas were made 
more concrete by processes of inclusion in the state by virtue of an individual’s 
‘loyalty’ and ‘nationalism’, and exclusion based on ‘treachery’ and ‘collaboration’. 
These enshrined the notion of struggle as intrinsic to the nature of the resistance 
movement. Conferring or denying a value to the population based on such categories 
encountered certain difficulties in two ways, however. While the state exhumed and 
reburied some remains, it was criticised for not ensuring that sites where remains were 
located were not protected by legislation (Walsh, 2010). Second, there was an apparent 
paradox in the state’s valorisation of the resistance, while pardoning imprisoned ex-
militia leaders (Robinson, 2009). Other contradictions created by categories of 
recognition are explored in the next section. 
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i. Within and without state designations  
 
I’ll tell you a story. Earlier I received an sms…from our Consul Geral in 
Kupang, Jose Caetano. In the past he was an ex-prisoner [who spent] seven 
years in Becora jail…[he said] all the East Timorese refugees in Kupang told 
him: ‘we won’t vote, but we support Ramos-Horta’…I won’t forget our 
brothers in Atambua, in Kupang, in Kefamenanu, in Java. If I’m chosen as 
president, I will strengthen even further our relations with the Republic of 
Indonesia, the very big nation [nasaun ida bot teb-tebes], our neighbour…I 
received a call from president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono after I became 
prime minister in July 2006. He embraced me [as prime minister] and the 
people of East Timor and Xanana Gusmao.  
(Jose Ramos-Horta addressing a campaign rally, 4 April 2007) 
 
In the knowledge that decoration brought pensions and one-off payments, throughout 
2009, groups of ex-combatants began to organise themselves to petition the state to 
recognise their struggle. Under changes in Article 5 of Law 9/2009, smaller clandestine 
groups could be decorated as long as they were recognised by ‘superior structures of the 
resistance’ (Fretilin, CRRN, CNRM, CNRT). The resistance group Santo Antonio was 
one such organisation that sought to be recognised on the initiative of its former leaders, 
Ananias do Carmo Fuka and Aleixo Cobra, both of whom had previously served time in 
detention during the Indonesian period. The group was founded in the early 1980s by 
Ananias, while studying, then training as a teacher, at the Portuguese language 
Externato de São José (Chapter three). The school served as a staging post for the 
clandestine resistance, from where students ran messenging errands to and from 
Falintil39. After independence, Ananias won election to parliament as an MP for the 
PPT, but left parliament in 2004.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Ananias used the resistance name Otaola. An acronym for ‘Olan Timor Assuwain Oecusse Lifau’. 
‘Olan’ is a corruption of ‘Holanda’, the Portuguese for the Netherlands, referring to West Timor, 
Assuwain means warrior; Oecusse, Ananias’ home, is also one of the places with which Santo Antonio 
the saint is associated, and Lifau is an older name for the enclave. Ananias had been described by some of 
the group’s members as having suffered serious psychological trauma, possibly as a result of detention in 
the 1980s and 1990s.   
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As I will argue, attempts by Santo Antonio to be recognised as a resistance group 
brought into focus contradictions in attempts to order ‘ex-combatants’ as ‘loyalists’ and 
others as either ‘traitors’ or simply unworthy of being recognised. The group is best 
known for its alleged attempts to organise an attack on the convoy of president Suharto 
in 1988 while in East Timor, which precipitated the arrest and imprisonment of its 
leaders. In the context of the arrest of more than 200 people around the time of the same 
visit, there was nothing that elevated Santo Antonio above any other group except 
perhaps for the apparent audacity of its plans (Taylor, 1991:164). The plans for the 
attack were allegedly betrayed from among its own members. As shown below, this 
made the group’s claims difficult to reconcile with official categories permitted by the 
state.  
 
The veneration of saints, ancestors, and children believed to be Jesus, is a theme evident 
in popular narratives about resistance against Indonesia and before. In some cases, these 
have been understood as a surrogate for or prelude to anticolonial sentiments40. Santo 
Antonio41 became the name of the group in a period of East Timor’s isolation from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Barros Duarte (1986/7) comments on the appearance of a ‘boy Jesus’ [menino Jesus], venerated by the 
local population in the Fatumeta area of Dili in the late 1960s; this may have been the same as a child 
recalled by a local suco chief, in about the same period (interview Luis dos Santos). Santos remembered 
the appearance of what people at the time called ‘Maromak Aileu’. There were several people in the 
neighbourhood however that didn’t want to kneel before the infant. Many were also suspicious of the fact 
that they had to give money after praying to ‘Jesus’. On arriving in Dili, the followers of the boy 
assembled at the house of what in 2009 was the HQ of the political party Kota (in the late 1960s there 
was only one house in the area). A further story has it that in the mid-1950s, a ‘young Jesus’ carrying a 
bowl had asked traders in the market in Dili for food. They ‘knew he was Jesus’ because he ‘had red hair 
and his manners were different – he asked patiently for food’. The market was only usually a place where 
adults congregated. He was venerated for two Sundays before reportedly being taken by the authorities to 
an orphanage, possibly in the Balide area. (Interview, Felix Ataide) 
41 ‘Santo Antonio’ is commonly associated with the first Bishop to reside for a prolonged period in 
Portuguese Timor, who was also the Bishop of Malacca. Father Manuel de Santo Antonio was famous for 
challenging the authority of the crown, in the 1720s successfully rejecting a governor sent from Goa, 
from where East Timor was then governed. Beyond this, the name was most clearly associated with the 
patron saint of (among others) lost things, and was very influential among native Christians, especially in 
Manatuto. In 1960, Jorge Barros Duarte reported a ‘typical’ exchange with a native Christian, suggesting 
they believed that Santo Antonio was Jesus’ father. D: ‘Who is the father of our Lord Jesus Christ?’ / It’s 
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outside world before 1989. As conversion to Catholicism had exponentially increased 
after 1980, so statues, icons and other representations connected with popular Christian-
inspired narratives provided succour and a way to channel ancestors that protected 
against capture by the Indonesian authorities42. Yet the divergence from doctrine that 
many of these practices involved, including the use of unapproved objects, led to a 
mixed reception by the Church:  
 
The Catholic Church’s theology had a problem with the mediums of spirituality 
that these things represented…However, Santo Antonio had a Christian 
‘method’ that we tried to construct. If a priest accepted us, I think this priest 
could have received criticism from Rome. The priests might have accepted us, 
but they didn’t formalise us. And some priests declared Santo Antonio illegal 
(Amaral interview). 
 
Groups with a similar outlook had Catholic priests as their patrons. During the 1980s, 
two priests oversaw the laying of the first stone of the Colimau group’s Dili grotto 
(Romisio Fernandes interview)43. The group Sagrada Familia, founded by Mauk’s 
brother L-7, met with Bishop Belo who along with Jose Ramos-Horta were patrons 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Santo Antonio / D: Santo Antonio? Why?! - He is the one who is holding [Christ] in his lap…[traz ao 
colo]’ see ‘Na Safra’ SEARA, April 1960. 
42 Amulets and protective charms known as ‘birus’ were used by Taur Matan Ruak and others in Falintil 
(A.M. Carrascalao, 2012:159); Mattoso (2005:258) attributes the death of Commandante Sahen and three 
others in 1995 to the belief that they were invincible, having received amulets from a double agent before 
fatally launching an attack on the Indonesian military near Ainaro.  
43 However the overtures of the Colimau group to the Church were reportedly spurned at first. In 1988, 
the same year that its founder, Martinho Vidal, had a dream predicting East Timor’s independence in the 
year 2000, Martinho and his brother Philippe approached a priest, Father Rafael dos Santos, in their 
aldeia of Uelaluhu in Manufahi district, asking for prayers that they had written on sheets of paper to be 
‘made official’ (diresmikan) and in an effort to gain the Church’s support. According to Philippe, Father 
dos Santos “probably threw them away” (Phillipe Vidal, interview), though Father dos Santos claimed to 
have had no memory of having received their prayers (Rafael dos Santos interview). Martinho was a 
professional healer who, according to his wife, often treated “friends that came down from the jungle”, 
i.e. members of Falintil and its messengers with “prayer, clean hands and medicine that came from God” 
(Joanata Vidal, interview). In his dream, Jesus Christ told Vidal that independence for East Timor would 
come in 2000, and that Martinho should tell trusted people (who would then become adherents) to wait 
for the year 2000, during which time they should avoid their traditional beliefs in the power of inanimate 
objects such as rocks (fatuk) and tree bark (ai-kulit). Vidal built up a steady retinue of followers so that it 
was claimed, by 1999, about 30,000 people were involved in a clandestine capacity in the movement (de 
Jesus interview). He is said to have accurately predicted his own death in 1999. The group aspired at 
some level to channel resistance through the Catholic Church as well as loosely structuring its practices 
around doctrinal orthodoxies (rejecting animist beliefs and sin). 
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(Cornelio Gama interview; TP 1 May 2002). Similarly, Ananias claimed that Father 
Martinho da Costa Lopes had given his approval to Santo Antonio (Ananias Fuka 
interview).  
 
Ananias was regarded as spiritually powerful and several members of the group 
reported having seen him walk on water in Dili harbour. The group used an initiation 
ritual, known as the julgamentu [trial] to give them courage and ‘equip’ them to carry 
out their work:  
 
Even if one of us was murdered, we would use the patience that this [ritual] 
gave us. When we did the judgement with a crucifix we were filled with Jesus’s 
spirit. In the past our avos [ancestors] used trees to find witches [buan]. But [in 
the Indonesian period] we used the same things as our avos to defend 
independence…they would accompany us during our work (Balbino de Araujo 
interview).  
 
Another claimed that the powers developed through these rituals gave them 
premonitions of imminent danger (Antonio Alves Fahik, interview). Yet this power did 
not serve the group when it allegedly planned to attack Suharto during his 1988 visit to 
East Timor. As far as can be ascertained, the plan may have involved throwing grenades 
at Suharto’s convoy while en route from Tibar, to the west of Dili, where he watched a 
performance by the Pramuka (scouts). Some in the group, although confirming that such 
a plan had been made, denied that they had had the willingness to carry it out. 
Furthermore, it is not known if this plan was given assent by anyone more senior in the 
resistance movement, but it failed because, allegedly, two would-be attackers informed 
on the group to Intel, who promptly made several arrests, imprisoning Ananias in 
Becora prison. Sent to trial on 25 January 1989, he was ‘accused of being the founder of 
clandestine organization Santo Antonio in East Timor’, after which he was again 
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imprisoned (CAVR i.). This marked the end of the group’s activities, at least with its 
original leadership, and some continued to be monitored.  
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Figure	  3.	  Ananias Fuka (centre) during interview in Manufahi, author’s photo, 18 April 2009.	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When the group canvassed the government for recognition in 2009, it made few 
references to events that it had been involved in before 1999. The secretary of state for 
ex-combatants, Marito Reis, himself a former resistance leader, seemed to promise 
receptivity to the group’s application for recognition based only on the group’s ability 
to organise and account for itself in the present: 
 
[Resistance organisations] bring people together to live according to what we 
think and want…how do these organisations work? They must have their 
principles. They must have their rules. They must have their laws, their 
order…we can see that there are [many organisations similar to this one]…[one 
is] L-7’s organisation, Sagrada Familia, which is scattered. Santo Antonio is 
also scattered…because of this I say that when you come here so that the state 
can give recognition, you must first improve your structure, you must have 
statutes, so that the organisation can work [la’o]. Because in our constitution 
we have a [section] that valorises the role of those that participated in our 
resistance. CRRN…and CNRT, they had written statutes (Marito Reis address). 
 
In this context, state recognition depended not on constructing a narrative of 
involvement in the resistance, but on presenting data related to its membership and 
organisational structure that the state would validate. The alleged planned attack and 
betrayal of the group therefore remained unexplained.  
 
Curiously, however, while difficult to verify the incident, these processes of recognition 
can provide a sense of how the events were elided. During the process of collecting data 
that would lead to the decoration of ex-combatants, the ex-leader of the Ai-Tarak militia 
group formed in 1999, Eurico Guterres, a former member of Santo Antonio, appeared 
on the front page of a magazine edited by an Indonesian priest that worked in East 
Timor, pictured holding medals. In 1999, he had openly incited violence against pro-
independence supporters. Four months before the vote for independence, in April 1999, 
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he led militias on a rampage around Dili resulting in the deaths of 13 people including 
12 inside the house of brother of former governor Carrascalao, Manuel Carrascalao, 
where pro-independence supporters had sought refuge. Guterres organised post-
referendum violence with General Tono Suratman and Major-General Zacky Anwar 
Makarim, which in the event of a pro-independence vote would result in Dili being 
turned into, in Guterres’ infamous words, a ‘sea of fire’. Since 1999, he and other 
Militia members had lived in Kupang, West Timor and in 2002 he was indicted 
alongside members of the Indonesian military from whom he received instructions and 
material support, by the UN Serious Crimes Unit (SCU). He had been long regarded as 
the source of Santo Antonio’s betrayal with another member living in Indonesia, 
Lafaek, and the bizarre sight of him bearing resistance medals caused outrage and 
curiosity in East Timor. The spectacle was of obvious public interest and the magazine 
went through successive re-prints. Published shortly before the group’s Manufahi 
meeting in April 2009, the caption of the magazine reads ‘the time has come for Timor 
people to speak out’. 
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Figure	  4	  
Magazine cover showing Eurico Guterres holding medals.	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Guterres’ intervention in East Timor politics from his home in Kupang, West Timor 
coincided with his campaign as a candidate in Indonesia’s legislative elections 
(Pemileg) for Amien Reis’s National Mandate Party (PAN). In the article, Guterres 
chastised the East Timor government for objecting to his bearing the medals, implying 
that he was left no choice but to favour Indonesia by asking ‘do the [Timor-Leste] 
government tend to see me, its son, as someone that chose to join Indonesia?…’ Other 
sources, however, claimed that Gutterres had never been a ‘political’ player but “more a 
street fighter who followed the money than a political player”44 that had come under the 
influence of the military. Gutterres claimed that the contribution of pro-Indonesia East 
Timorese to the former province’s development had been ‘as great as the resistance 
movements’, saying ‘[Falintil] developed the jungle, while we developed the towns’ 
(Eurico Gutteres interview).  
 
The Commission of Homage’s first reaction was to declare that the medals were fakes 
(TP 6 March 2009). In fact, the medals were genuine, but belonged not to Guterres but 
to his father and younger brother. The ensuing controversy centred on the government’s 
vetting procedures for the award of medals. A group representing ex-resistance and 
prisoners wrote to the Commission of Homage asking if it was right that the 
Commission should have to retrieve medals that had been ‘wrongly’ awarded, and 
questioned what evidence there was for Guterres’ family members’ contribution to the 
resistance movement. The group also demanded that the Foreign Minister contact East 
Timor’s Consul General in Kupang to demand the return of the medals. Guterres duly 
complied, and in a small ceremony returned the medals to Jose Caetano, East Timor’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 http://yayasanhak.minihub.org/mot/cons92z%20-%20Eurico%20Guterres.htm accessed 2 September 
2013 
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consul general in Kupang (TP, 4 March 2009). After the medals had been handed back, 
it emerged that Ananias had gone to Kupang to consult Guterres before resurrecting 
Santo Antonio. Guterres said that the purpose of Ananias’ trip had been to get Guterres’ 
agreement for Santo Antonio to seek recognition from the state. This episode, and 
Ramos-Horta’s address to an audience in Dili suggesting an embrace of anti-
independence East Timorese and Indonesia itself, suggests a difficulty on the part of the 
state to conferring a quality of resistance. In any case, the exclusionary limits of this 
value were immediately tested. As shown in the following chapters, its limits were not 
only tested around state designations of collaborator or loyalist. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Instituting a state required reconciling an official history with the present, this chapter 
has argued. This could be seen as much through a series of practices, as at the level of 
official declarations and documents. In contrast to other analyses that have focussed on 
how ‘statebuilding’ took place through the adoption of modern procedures and the rule 
of law, that represented clear attempts to break with the past, a struggle over history was 
inseparable from a struggle to establish a state. This meant more than simply 
commandeering an official narrative of the past, but making it work in the service of 
government. Government required establishing and reflecting commonly intuited – 
though not necessarily agreed upon - ideas about the past in the service of making 
subjects recognise the state and interact with it in a concerted way. Hence, the conferral 
of value was crucial to this enterprise. Recognising ex-combatants at once instituted the 
state in the image of the resistance, and attempted to crystallise ex-combatants’ 
positions relative to each other. 
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Yet, as has been shown, harmonious state rituals belied not only the hardship of war, 
but also fraught struggles of postcolonial politics that could not be easily glossed over. 
As these struggles were indexed by appearance - ID cards and weapons, clothes and 
hair, flags and anniversaries – they also served to bring past into present. As such, the 
political dynamics of the postcolonial period played out with reference to the resistance 
period. The illegal circulation of weaponry, for example, was significant not only 
because of the source or agents of its distribution, or for the moment of its surrender to 
the state; it had broader meaning unrelated to its materiality. Similarly, the mobilisation 
of people to Dili from the districts provided a spectacle that promised to call into 
question the image of the state. Between 2006-‘8 insurgents and their supporters saw 
the state as representing regionalist-sectarian (as well as former-exile and crypto-
communist) interests. One of the main sites of power and sources of insurgent 
discontent was the military, which had been somewhat undermined by a largely foreign-
dominated inauguration, but which also highlighted antagonisms within the resistance 
movement. Yet while this and later material paucity explain much about problems in F-
FDTL, fundamentally, contestations over history drove grievances and regionalist 
identifications that resonated in and beyond the military. The military was not the centre 
of these grievances, but its split illuminated many parallel contests rooted in diverging 
histories based on land, kin, association or possession. The state’s overarching narrative, 
by 2006 still not established, only later attempted to accommodate these histories by 
incorporating ex-combatants into the state. Laying the dead to rest was not only 
symbolic of this attempt at convergence, but also showed the practical thrust of 
instituting the state: the provision of pensions accompanied searches for the dead and 
reburials.  
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A significant aspect of the process of instituting the state involved incorporating ex-
combatants into the state. The award of medals and pensions represented the refinement 
of an official history to which the state laid claim. On the other hand, as the above 
examples shows, the increasing hardening of these claims into material things like 
medals and uniforms, created relative values for the population that could ‘prove’ their 
historical ‘worth’ and simultaneously bring under control its often competing truths. Yet 
like the FBAs of the earlier period that donned military uniforms despite F-FDTL’s 
official monopoly on resistance symbolism, the representation through official regalia 
and categories also had the potential to be subverted. Thus, this chapter has argued that 
the state was instituted by the propagation of historical tropes that served not only to 
honour constitutional guarantees, but more importantly conferred relative value on those 
that it recognised. The powerfulness of this process was twofold: it came from assigning 
permanently inscribed order, hierarchy and rank, but also exclusion of those deemed 
unworthy of recognition, of which the limits of this exclusion quickly became 
contested. Other exclusions from such schemes of recognition are explored in the 
following chapter. 
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3. The meaning of ‘witchcraft’ for occupation, resistance and after 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Now nothing that is done to save life can be matter for accusation 
Apuleius, Apologia 40 (A Discourse on Magic) 
 
As the previous chapter argued, the process of conferring awards and ‘taking charge’ of 
history showed the state to be neither exclusively ‘modern’ nor ‘traditional’ nor viewed 
as such by the population. This chapter argues that further difficulties to the idea of a 
uniform quality of resistance to recognise and organise population and state in the 
present may be seen from an analysis of ‘witchcraft’ and ‘witchfindings’. Such events 
are shown not to represent an indigenous culture untouched by a modern state, but 
figure strongly in power relations forged during military occupations. Second, the first 
engagements that the postcolonial state has had with ‘witches’ are often after arresting 
and trying those accused of their persecution either by injury or death. Given 
sensitivities surrounding discussion of ‘witches’ in contemporary East Timor, 
furthermore, it is almost inconceivable that anyone openly identified as such could be 
formally recognised, much less honoured by the state1. The chapter therefore shows 
how narrowly defined limits of recognition are informed by historical power relations, 
but moreover, that the categories these relations produce may similarly be used to 
define those that fall beyond them.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 However, the term ‘witch’, discussed below, does not have exclusively negative connotations. See also 
Hicks, 1976:110.  
	   109	  
In particular, by showing how power relations in the colonial era catalysed 
witchfindings, two elements of it are revealed. First, case studies show how witches are 
produced in the context of power relations that emerge during military occupation. In 
many instances, individuals and their kin identified as witches were scapegoated as 
causing sickness or misfortune to local communities. However, in such cases, witches 
are shown to be not so much a peculiar product of the imagination of local communities 
but as a result of the engagements of these communities with colonial authorities. In this 
regard, the chapter considers the postcolonial treatments of cases where witchfindings 
resulted in witchslayings, in the process identifying by what means witchcraft is framed 
as ‘superstition’, and identifies instances where these understandings resurfaced as a 
feature of the postcolonial judicial system. In such settings, witchcraft is held to be 
practised by people from ‘the districts’. The chapter reveals distinctions of knowledge 
in which witchcraft is both counterposed with the modern conduct of the city, and 
(depending on the time period) may be grouped together with religion and magic.  
 
Observers, politicians, and scholars have often struggled to understand sorcery or 
magic, and some have seen it as part of a cultural system defined in the most 
rudimentary terms. Observers have condemned sorcery as a superstitious belief that 
stands in opposition to modernization (Nixon, 2011). In contrast, others believe that it is 
an attempt to stem malevolent forces that cause inequality, personified in and conducted 
by the rich or the elderly in societies transitioning to democracy (Eyoh, 1998:341-2; 
Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 1998; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Ashforth, 2005). Such 
arguments would appear to be relevant to East Timor, the postcolonial history of which 
is often characterised as a negotiation of modernity. A third position holds that 
witchcraft and witchfindings – often taken as the outcome of magic or sorcery - may 
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only be negotiated if its obscure meanings and causes are better understood (Herriman, 
2009). This chapter is directed towards this last objective, in particular by showing how 
the historical dimensions of these events can transcend colonial rule.  
 
Examining ideas about witches in East Timor on first appearance may seem to have 
little to do with the Indonesian occupation. The chapter shows that witches were 
perceived to cause misfortune, particularly through sickness or death, by assisting either 
the resistance movement or occupying militaries. However, as argued below, the term 
‘witch’ was/is not merely a metaphor for traitor. Rather, four aspects of witchfinding are 
identified: deliberation, kin, territory, and history. Most or all aspects are common in the 
case studies. Such a schema is intended as a flexible method of understanding elements 
of witchcraft and cannot explain every case where accusations against ‘witches’ are 
made. Instead, I have opted here to try and explain the dynamics of power relations at 
the local level that cause the identification of malevolent witches, and responses to these 
cases in the judicial system.    
 
II. Colonial designations: ‘bifurcated’ law and power over life 
 
In the wake of the Indonesian departure in 1999, scholarly and popular accounts of East 
Timor took a new direction. Under Indonesian occupation, research was usually 
conducted at a distance, in the service of publicising abuses against the East Timorese 
population and sometimes in cooperation with the resistance movement. After 1999, by 
contrast, a body of knowledge produced about the country became concerned in many 
instances with ‘state-building’ predominantly involving the identification of ‘problems’ 
with East Timor’s society that prevented ‘development’, with research often, but not 
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always, funded by large aid agencies attached to foreign national governments, NGOs, 
or multilateral institutions. A lack of development was sometimes regarded as caused by 
‘traditions’ intrinsic to East Timor’s culture, which had remained unchanged during the 
Indonesian period. While the East Timorese state has at one level embraced a revival of 
‘tradition’, reflecting a trend among the population at large (McWilliam and Traube 
2011), others have argued that elements of East Timorese culture are impediments to 
the cause of development and can only be eradicated with the onset of modernization. In 
such a scenario, modernization, characterised by rationalisation and disenchantment, 
was seen as countering magic and superstition.  
 
A recent study has posited that a value system is at work in traditional societies that 
serves to mutually reinforce its various elements (Nixon, 2011). The study discusses 
barlaki (Portuguese: barlaque), whereby payments are given by families that take a 
bride, to families that give a bride. These payments were one element of bridal 
exchange which cemented alliances between sucos or reinos. The study suggests that 
the exchange be seen in transactional terms, as ‘compensation’ for a human being, and 
therefore continues to hinder East Timor’s development. It is contended that barlaki 
supports other traditional practices in which payments serve as recompense. Thus, as 
victims of sex crimes are given payments under ‘traditional justice’, so the study argues, 
barlaki becomes equivalent with these crimes, because ‘payments for some sexual 
crimes approximate the payment of the bride price’ (Nixon, 2011:167). However, this 
reasoning fails to substantiate that the payment of similar sums of money in the diverse 
examples somehow establishes their equivalence in a cultural system. The study seeks 
to further connect these parts by making reference to an overarching system of 
traditional law, which has several characteristics. First, traditional law is based on 
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‘traditional thought’ characterised by superstitious beliefs. Practices such as sorcery are 
upheld through the ‘supernatural mandate’ that suco chiefs use to ‘maintain order and 
dispense justice’ (179). Fundamentally, in this view, one system is given coherence by a 
culture of top-down local authority, while another system, represented by a state held to 
account by civil society, (Nixon, 2011:2) may support modernization through 
‘…education, primary healthcare, strong state justice and administration’, which are 
‘natural enemies of superstition and traditional thought’ (Nixon: 179). There is expected 
to be a synergy between the two, as part of which the modernizing forces of the state 
and civil society can end undesirable superstitious practices. Second, traditional law 
permits redress for crimes through violence. Underpinning this view is that ‘the 
Timorese people’ [sic] have an inherent and largely inexplicable tendency to commit 
violence, ‘transform[ing] from the most humble people to barbarians and back to the 
most humble people again’ (Nixon, 2011: 174). In holding that this alleged tendency is 
traceable from at least the 1880s to the present, the study quotes colonial-era accounts, 
taken to be unproblematic reflections of reality. Although it is claimed that the 
Portuguese authorities largely succeeded in stamping out the worst excesses of this 
violence as the result of ‘pacification’ (after the 1912 Boaventura rebellion), the study 
alleges that it has re-emerged in the postcolonial period, through being left unchecked. 
Indeed, such alleged proclivities towards violence were seen during the ‘crisis’ of 2006. 
Third, subsistence societies ‘are notoriously predisposed towards superstitious beliefs 
and the persecution of alleged sorcerers’ (Nixon, 2011:170). Sorcery’s victims may be 
subject to one of two poles of traditional law also intrinsic to traditional culture, 
compensation or violence. 
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Based on a critical analysis of colonial and contemporary sources, violence no more 
connects barlaki and sorcery than payment does. Different readings of the Papua New 
Guinea context with which the above study compares East Timor, show, for example, 
clear differences in compensation for death caused by sorcery, and marital exchange 
(Strathern and Stewart, 2004:69-83). Indeed, the origins of the practice and prohibitions 
on either are markedly different. Catholic missionaries in East Timor forbade barlaki 
and promoted Christian marriage to consolidate colonial sovereignty. Thus, not only 
was barlaki forbidden because it was perceived as involving payment and permitting 
polygamy but Christian marriage could prevent alliances forming against the colonial 
authorities2. Missionaries attempted to convert women, who were to be the anchors of 
Christian families (chapter four). Missionary injunctions against compensation for loss 
of life were derived from Christian notions of the indivisibility of the human being. The 
view that the individual could not be subject to compensation marked societies with a 
‘higher stage of development’ (Simmel, 2004 [1900]). In the Indonesian period, 
authorities and modernist elites viewed barlaki within a wider constellation of practices 
that identified its practitioners as ‘idlers and spendthrifts’ (Martins, 2001[1989]:11)3. 
Such views have much in common with the position outlined in the study of East Timor 
above, which assumes that violence and superstition could be successfully countered by 
attempts to spread ‘civilisation’, conspiring in the view of missionaries and colonial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Araújo (2012:83-88) defended barlaque in the pages of A Provincia de Timor, the military’s journal and 
one of only three published in East Timor in 1969. He reports that its detractors, prominent members of 
the colonial establishment, claimed that it involved the sale of women. Araújo saw it as ‘equal exchange’ 
and integral to Timorese culture. To avoid allegations of anti-colonialism, he couched his argument in 
terms acceptable to the ‘official doctrine of the New State’, that East Timor was an indivisible part of 
Portugal. Araújo claimed that Nicolau Lobato visited him to express support before making his own 
contribution to the debate in the same journal.  
3 In a study of East Timor under Indonesian occupation in the late 1980s, Maria de Lourdes Martins 
(‘Mana Lou’) an East Timorese nun, remarked of the economic situation and cultural practices of people 
in Liquica: ‘Money from the sale of produce is mostly used for adat ceremonies such as commemorating 
a dead tribal elder [tetua suku], the memory of someone’s death, inaugurating a grave, to pay dowry 
(barlaque) to a family that gave a bride, and so on…[people that carry out these practices] are easily 
viewed as ‘idlers and spendthrifts’’. 
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authorities themselves. On this point, a more careful consideration of colonial practice 
is required rather than connecting diverse indigenous practices through an evaluation of 
final sums. It is suggested that two things therefore need to be addressed: the meaning 
of exchange, and power relations in their historical context.  
 
In terms of power relations, the above account fails properly to explain not only the 
fluctuating existence and application of two legal systems under colonial rule, and more 
importantly, the endurance and legacies of this arrangement. One system was comprised 
of the statutes of a written penal code, and operated under areas of colonial influence 
(i.e. mainly in Dili); and the other, customary law, of customs and practices, or 
‘estylos’, which were not formally codified. Although there existed official injunctions 
on ‘superstitious beliefs’ under written law, under customary arrangements, someone 
found guilty of ‘sorcery’ could be condemned. While colonial authorities formally 
disapproved of ‘superstition’, they condoned a bifurcated arrangement that allowed 
‘sorcerers’ to be persecuted by indigenous authorities (Roque, 2010:59). Only later, 
after the Second World War, were more serious attempts made to impose written law 
more uniformly. By that stage, the existence of two systems had become well 
established. Even prior to this belated reversal of policy, however, indigenous 
authorities could demand the application of either system, making this bifurcated 
arrangement a source of confusion as well as of expedience for colonial authorities. 
Thus, for example, barlaki was not always subject to customary law: 
 
The man that makes a family and doesn’t honour the contract (barlaque) can, if 
he is from a different kingdom, abandon [the barlaque arrangement], but cannot 
take the women and children. This gives rise to troublesome claims caused by 
the disturbance of customs, [attributed to] our laws and the catechism. The 
indigenous chiefs mischievously complain to increase their vassals and 
contributors, and therefore come to [the Portuguese authorities to] request the 
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application of customary law, [but] other chiefs ask for civil and canonical law 
to be applied. The marriages and barlaques among members of families of 
chiefs represent offensive and defensive alliances (vassau uman) among 
themselves and reinos to which they belong and sometimes are of great 
political inconvenience. The fathers of women always defend their 
grandchildren even when a barlaque agreement is not realised, and which 
results in an anticipated sexual union, because the importance of families 
depends on its number of members… [and] also [the importance of the chief] 
depends on the number that compose the povoação, suco or reino [that he 
leads] (O Dia de Timor, 31-2).  
 
The two systems were not as categorically and mutually opposed as might be assumed. 
Yet the intent in the above account is clear: the operation of parallel systems should be 
seen as an attempt to designate the limits of colonial and indigenous authority. In 
common with contemporary views that see diverse practices as being comprehensible 
only through sums involved in payment, the account also interestingly sees exchange in 
terms of its transactional, accumulative and utilitarian aspects. As a recent study has 
suggested, this bifurcation may still be evident in the postcolonial period. For instance, 
the view of elites in Dili is that ‘the districts’ represents all that is traditional, backwards 
and in need of modernization (Silva and Simiao, 2012:167). Such a view is redolent not 
only of Portuguese colonial influence, but also the Indonesian period, when official 
state policy sanctioned ideas about developed (dimajukan) and backward populations 
(terbelekang). 
 
An epistemological analysis also helps to explain the endurance of practices associated 
with the colonial period in the present. In brief, colonial authorities’ grouping together 
of witchcraft and other diverse practices as superstitions reflects the forms of 
knowledge used to apprehend and understand them. One view has it that disaggregating 
categories to retrieve pre-colonial meaning is imperative: 
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It is very important, though extraordinarily difficult, to make distinctions when 
one is writing about ‘magic’ ‘witchcraft’ and ‘religion’. It is important because 
colonial administrators and missionaries lumped together every supernatural 
manifestation – and many natural ones – as ‘witchcraft’, combining activities 
and ideas which originally had been not only separate but opposed…we have to 
split these activities and ideas up again. This is very difficult to do today 
because it is now not only missionaries and colonialists who lump everything 
together (Ranger, 2006:351-2) 
 
This account evidently regards the ‘lumping together’ of indigenous practices as having 
a postcolonial life. A second view has it by contrast that a concern to establish ‘proper’ 
boundaries between religion and science is a result of western formations of knowledge. 
Even the contemporary category of ‘religion’, for example, can be seen to have resulted 
from the early Christian separation of ‘true’ and ‘false’ religion; the positioning of 
Christianity as a totalising system of organising life applicable as much to worshippers 
as the Church hierarchy; and the ‘intellectualist and impersonal schematization’ of 
religion in enlightenment thought. Similarly, the opposition between science and 
religion only came about over time, while they were originally united (Tambiah, 
1990:5-11).  
 
Thus, three patterns emerge from the above. First, ‘tradition’ (i.e. practices at the  
aldeia/suco level) has been connected and assumed to be coherent through nominated 
(rather than nominal) values, especially sums of money. In this view, barlaki is 
comparable with magic such as sorcery or other practices, because its value is seen in 
terms of its ultimate ends. Second, such associations risk oversimplifying complex 
historical legacies, not least those involving colonial-indigenous power relations. 
Furthermore, by attributing violence to East Timor’s culture, such a view dissociates 
violence from broader social engagements. Third, both the endurance of arrangements 
from the colonial era and the persistence of the belief in categorical oppositions among 
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magic, science and religion, can be understood by examining the production and 
organisation of knowledge.  
  
In this regard, as previous work has sought to decouple different forms of barlaki 
(Hicks, 2012) so the terms used for ‘sorcery’ and ‘witchcraft’ require closer 
examination. This is a complex field, and the following will be restricted to providing 
some general remarks on terminological usages. In Portuguese colonial accounts, the 
Malay/Indonesian suangice, or suangi (swanggi), is often reported as the ‘indigenous’ 
name for witchcraft or witches respectively, while the Portuguese term feiticeira could 
cover both malevolent witches and ‘sorcerors’. Occasionally, distinctions are made 
between ‘witch doctors’, who are able to both cure sicknesses, envision or have an 
effect on the outcome of future events, and identify malevolent ‘witches’ (for example 
Tetum: Matandoc Fataluku: Ina-haranu); and malevolent ‘witches’ (Tetum: Buan; 
Fataluku: Acharu). Although often grouped together, however, the latter are seldom 
opposed to the former. Indeed, in practice, someone originally administering curatives 
with good intentions may be accused of practising harmful witchcraft (cf. Beatty, 
1999:52). The accounts of missionaries sometimes covered these distinctions in more 
detail, but was hardly more sympathetic to them because their work was concerned with 
conversion and eliminating non-Christian beliefs. Thus, designation of all indigenous 
beliefs as superstitious required them to be grouped together as superstitions but at the 
same time separated. In other words, in colonial accounts, few distinctions exist 
between ‘magic’ or sorcery used for curative purposes and ‘witchcraft’. However, the 
point is more than semantic and the designation of malevolent witchcraft and sorcery as 
practices associated with the districts is explored below.  
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III. Four aspects of witchfinding 
 
This section demonstrates some patterns of witch slayings and responses to them in the 
postcolonial period. It suggests that although the perceived threat to kin (usually, but 
not exclusively in the form of illness) resulted in attempts to identify witches 
(witchfindings), especially against women, this is not the whole story. Instead, a 
combination of genealogical and territorial reasons are involved in these processes. A 
historical aspect is identified in order to examine the perception in trials of 
witchslayings to contrast the districts with the city as a legacy of the colonial period. 
The analysis serves to concentrate focus on witchfindings as conditions of (especially 
local) power relations rather than as the result of violence as a cultural phenomenon. 
The case below will be used to highlight the reasons that some witchfindings take place, 
emphasising three of its aspects: a ‘deliberative’ aspect where killers identify ‘witches’ 
through a process of rumour and conferral; a genealogical aspect where perceived 
threats to kin are countered with the persecution of ‘witches’ whose immediate family 
are also implicated; and a closely related territorial aspect where threats may be seen as 
issuing from sources beyond an immediate locale. A fourth aspect is introduced towards 
the end of the case study proposing that the deliberative aspect may take place over a 
longer period than is initially obvious. This point establishes the basis for the ensuing 
discussion based on historical cases from the Indonesian period, and bears out the 
argument that local and personal legacies transcended the colonial period and the 
official narratives that accompanied transition to the postcolonial period. To protect 
identities, I have made the names of villages anonymous and changed the names of 
individuals, including interviewees.  
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On 7th January 2007, three women were slain in Maubara subdistrict, Liquica district. 
The mountainous region is 70 kilometres to the west of Dili where inhabitants’ 
smallholdings and plantations are used to grow coffee. The three women were three 
generations of the same family. Ten men were put on trial for their slaying. A version of 
events is provided in a narrative extracted from court documents below. These accounts 
were recorded both in the killing’s immediate aftermath in the form of police interviews 
of the defendants, two witnesses, and court proceedings six months later. Within the 
village, according to testimonies of the killers in these documents, the second eldest 
victim, Constancia, was known for her curative abilities, and had been called to 
administer traditional medicine to a sick child, Simão, early on 5th January. In court, the 
defendants said that Constancia had prepared a curative to give to Simão4. One of the 
defendants also alleged that Simão had called the name of Constancia after her visit - 
taken as ‘evidence’ that she had deliberately caused his sickness5. The following day, 
the men each visited Simão in his father, Eugenio’s house, becoming convinced of 
Constancia’s culpability. Believing that witches have matrilineal family lines, they 
implicated her mother and daughter too. Eugenio believed his son’s soul was being 
eaten, manifested by sickness and inertia. At around 9 p.m. on the following day, a 
group of men walked the short distance to the women’s house where Bernardo, the 
husband of the youngest woman Regina, also lived. Steeled to commit the attacks from 
drinking locally produced palm wine procured by Eugenio that day, the Xefe de Aldeia 
shouted to Bernardo on arriving outside the house that the three women were witches 
and that they had come to kill them. Bernardo threatened to confront them with his 
katana (machete), but was told that if he too didn’t want to be killed, he should leave 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Constancia allegedly also placing her hands on his chest and stomach. Court proceedings: Acta da 
audiença de Julgamento, 25-7-07, in Processo no. 72/ORD/TDD/2007:500	  	  
5 Documents recount that when asked for help, Constancia responded in a way ‘that was not concrete’ 
(Acta de Quesitos:672).	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(PNTL interview:351).6 The other women were slain before the house was set alight, 
with only Bernardo and the child spared.  
 
Several explanations for the killings emerged both in and out of court. By examining 
how these reasons are regarded by all involved, four aspects identified above can be 
clearly seen. First, the 10 men accused of the killings established a collective narrative 
made up of stories about the women’s malevolence. The stories appear to have 
snowballed as visitors – nearly all of whom participated in the killings - arrived to see 
Simão’s sickness throughout the day of 6th January7. The 55-year old ex-village chief 
who led the attacks, Joachim, said that a more definitive story regarding the cause of the 
sickness only emerged after he and other village men had conferred for some more 
hours8. Second, in court, while the prosecution counsel focused on substantiating the 
criminality of the acts, the state-appointed public defender attempted to invoke an 
overarching reason for the killings. In keeping with the killers claims, who never denied 
murder, the defence claimed that in East Timor, “in contrast to what happens in many 
other countries, that is to say westernised countries, when a person is considered to be a 
witch, and is killed…the supposed sick person recovers immediately (Ibid:640)9.” After 
the killings, Joachim immediately addressed the supposed purgative qualities of the 
slayings when he told Eugenio that the three women had left the soul of his son 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Constancia encouraged Bernardo to leave and to take their nine-month old baby with him. The group 
entered the house, where, Bernardo told police, Joaquim sexually assaulted Constancia. While still 
holding their child, according to his own testimony, Bernardo claims that he tried to shield her from the 
blows that Joaquim delivered with a length of wood [ai-pedasuk], killing her.	  
7 Another person not implicated in the killings but present among the men that day told the group that on 
some unspecified day in the previous two weeks, “between midday and 1 p.m.”, the ‘witches’ had “called 
a chicken, a cat and a dog”, a sign of witchcraft according to the assertions of Joachim (PNTL interview, 
Joachim).  
8 For example, one of them said that the three women had previously abducted him at night. He	  reported	  that	  they	  tied him up, bringing him to a coffee plantation at midnight. 	  
9 Public defender’s statement 
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(Ibid:510). The line of reasoning that guided the defence’s argument was that 
witchhunts were a cultural phenomenon associated with ‘the districts’. In other trials of 
witchslayings, different lawyers also argued along similar lines. In 2008 in 
neighbouring Ermera district, for example, two men killed two generations of unmarried 
women who lived together. The defence counsel for the killers explained that each of 
the men, who exercised a constitutional right to silence, was used to living “according 
to his own culture”. One was a “simple man, born and brought up in the mountains”. In 
police interviews that preceded the trial, however, the two men saw their actions 
differently, claiming that ‘the state no longer needed [the women], because they were 
old’ (Processo no. 90/C.Ord/TDD/2010:235). The two men also claimed that the 
killings were carried out in ‘defence’ of their communities, specifically by providing 
protection to youths that the women had bewitched (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999). 
References to the defendants’ ‘little education’ and illiteracy (six defendants were 
unable to sign their own testimonies) are not in question; rather the subject of interest is 
explanations that locate action originating in a different culture of ‘the mountains’.  
In either case, and in others, a genealogical, and to a less clear extent, generational 
element is evident. Moreover, the homes from which the victims came and in which 
they were killed were either solely occupied by or had women as a majority of 
occupants. The response to ‘witchcraft’ involved the use of physical force by men to 
counter the supposed ‘supernatural’ powers of females. The persecution of females is a 
mainstay of witch slaying, and in numerous cases, the same patterns are observable. It 
appears, however, that kin - its protection or elimination – is a common element of 
witchfindings beyond these two cases. As gender played a part, it was one, if extremely 
important, element among divergent reasons of which kin and territory were also 
important. In Maubara, the killings were carried out against a family of women in 
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‘defence’ of the child of a killer; in Ermera the same happened. Joaquim recounted a 
conversation to police that he claimed he had had with Bernardo, the husband of 
Constancia about three months before the killings in which Joaquim said that he had 
told Bernardo that he committed an error by ‘marrying a witch’ and that Bernardo 
agreed, saying that he would “arrange a solution” (Processo no. 
72/ORD/TDD/2007:511). In each case agnatic protection was used to justify violence 
against those with enatic association.  
 
Third, a connection existed between kin and territory. The women, for example, were 
outsiders (they were from the neighbouring village and had married in to the village via 
Bernardo). This was cited by their killers as a reason that they fell under suspicion and 
appears to have underscored their vulnerability (testimony:350;417). In initial meetings 
among the group of killers, a 21-year old suspect who was subsequently acquitted 
reported that Eugenio told younger members that ‘many people are dead in Dili, my son 
and I can’t die, if you don’t go and kill [the women], you are not a man’ (testimony, 
356)10. In other words, violent defence of territory and kin were an affirmation of 
masculinity in combination with other elements (Ibid, 351)11. As seen below in other 
cases, however, men could also be targeted as malevolent practitioners of magic. The 
protection of the village was perceived by participants as related in some way to the 
events that began in 2006. It was also still close enough to the events of the previous 
year to warrant a reference to it by an international media outlet that reported it. On the 
manner in which the victims were killed, for example, it was reported that: ‘there were 
spates of arson attacks during unrest in 2006 but this is believed to be the first such case 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Six suspects were under 30 years old 
11 A woman that lived in close proximity reported that she had been ‘woken by screaming, and ran scared 
from my house into the forest’ She looked for the Xefe de Suco, but he had also run into the forest for 
fear. The more senior Xefe de Suco had not conspired with the Xefe de Aldeia, Joachim, nor did he have 
any authority over or prior knowledge of the planned events. 
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involving witchcraft accusations in the overwhelmingly Roman Catholic country (ABC, 
2007)’ (emphasis added). If the incident was comparable with a wider series of events 
in 2006 in terms of the kind of violence carried out, further comparison stopped when 
magic and religion were (together) considered. 
 
Finally, court documents in certain senses present a limited way of exploring the 
historical dimensions of these events. Partly, this is due to the focus on events and not 
their antecedents; due to the reticence of some defendants to speak openly; and because 
of preconceived ideas court personnel and others had about differences between the 
districts and Dili. Rarely are attempts made in proceedings to evince information on the 
history of communities that might help explain the context of killings. However, some 
information relevant to context is (often inadvertently) acquired during the investigative 
stage. In the Ermera case (above), for instance, one of the older suspects, 35-year old 
Rogerio, reportedly declared that during the Indonesian occupation, the women had 
‘already been lucky’, because he had ‘saved’ them, without which help they would have 
already been dead (testimony, 350). Both Liquica and Ermera sucos were attacked in 
1999, when the Besi Merah Putih militia, an organisation formed and armed by the 
Indonesian military, burned villages and caused people to seek refuge in Ermera district 
(Estafeta, 1999). These fragments of information are hardly conclusive, but are at least 
indicative of the need to seek explanations originating in broader contexts. They suggest 
the inadequacy of ahistorical, culturally determined explanations invoked as a way to 
bridge a presumed divide between Dili and the districts, or culture and nature. They also 
provide a basis for further exploration of the historical dimensions of witchslayings, 
alongside the territorial and genealogical dimensions considered so far. 
 
	   124	  
IV.  Eastern East Timor, 1980-2001: the fissures between resistance and occupation?  
  
Foreign occupation in East Timor famously showed the population’s resilience and 
struggle. At the same time, however, it magnified grievances among the population, 
leading to scapegoating, whether by providing opportunities to settle personal scores, or 
through catalysing beliefs that supernatural elements caused misfortune. These cases 
also show something more unexpected: some foreign occupiers may have either 
believed in the power of witchcraft, or used it as an instrument of persecution12. For 
example, after the Japanese defeat, two men were tried for the killing of a male ‘witch’ 
in Ermera in 1943. The court thought that the killer’s reasons for carrying out the 
slayings was attributed to his ‘backward civilisation’ and that he was able to exert his 
will on others that had ‘an imperfect understanding of the seriousness of the crime’, (his 
sons - 11 and 19 years old), to carry out the slayings. It was also inferred that the 
killings took place on the instructions of the Japanese authorities, which ‘could not be 
proven’. The equivocation on this issue suggests not only a lack of proof, but also 
related objectives of the Portuguese authorities of searching for collaborators with the 
Japanese. This apparent overlap, in which witchcraft appears as a pretext for killing and 
a metaphor for collaboration, shows the complexity of retrieving and making sense of 
power relations during foreign occupations. Despite this complexity, aspects of the 
dynamics of power at work in such periods are also evident during the Indonesian 
period, examples of which are explored below. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In 1949, the colonial government sought to ‘establish the facts’ surrounding persistent rumours that a 
government interpreter, Francisco Ximenes Belo, ‘caused the death of many East Timorese that he 
disliked by accusing them of witchcraft in front of the Japanese’. Furthermore, Belo, ‘through his 
intrigues’, is alleged to have had many Timorese shipped to Atauro island, a de facto concentration camp 
established for collaborators with the Japanese after the war. (BOCT 40, 7 October 1950:345) 
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The starting point for an analysis of the issue of witchcraft in the Indonesian period 
must begin with challenging the idea of uniform experiences among the population at 
large. As noted in chapter one, the resistance movement was subject to schisms, 
disagreements and betrayals. However, what official narratives of nationalism and 
collaboration fail to capture are the everyday antipathies between groups and 
individuals that remain undetected in analyses of avowed political ideologies. 
Furthermore, these everyday experiences cannot be separated from the politics of 
‘resistance’, insofar as the occupation that generated resistance sometimes also created 
or ignited pre-existing jealousies and rivalries. Within concentration camps established 
by the Indonesian military in the eastern district of Lautem, for example, as well as 
solidarity and resilience against terrible privations, inhabitants also threatened and 
persecuted each other (Mattoso, 2005:62)13.  
 
A brief historical overview of colonial engagements with Lautem, the most easterly 
district of East Timor, reveals some distinguishing characteristics of the area. Among 
many other features, a significant part of what defined the north eastern coast in the 19th 
century and early 20th centuries was its remoteness from colonial power located in Dili. 
Although this was hardly unusual, it has been suggested that the area was able to 
maintain a relative autonomy beyond this period due to interisland trade, even as other 
revenues from the slave trade decreased. Governor Celestino da Silva sent a ship to 
Lautem port in 1902, which led to the establishment of a more permanent colonial 
presence in the area, via the favour of the Portuguese-educated aristocracy, the Konu 
Ratu (Rodrigues, 1962: 16n1). The Portuguese may have tried thereafter to ensure a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 A prisoner at the Fuiloro camp in February 1976 reported that “some of the songs that were sung by 
young people were insults and threats to my parents and to us”  
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foothold in the area through this relationship as well as encouraging the cultivation of 
crops, especially copra (McWilliam, 2007:18-21). 
 
While the district capital of Lautem town provided the initial entry-point for a lasting 
colonial presence in the early 20th century (prior to this, and even after, authority could 
not be sustained far beyond the colonial fort), it did so again more than seven decades 
later. Having invaded the capital Dili on December 7th 1975, the Indonesian military 
waited almost two months before making an assault on the northeast coast, landing in 
Lautem port and the adjacent town of Liarafa at 2 am on February 2nd 1976. Residents 
of these and surrounding villages spotted reconnaissance planes circling the area on the 
previous day, and on the morning of the attack those that had not already done so fled to 
the interior (CAVR c. 2003). The populations of the villages of Pitileti, Etepiti and Ira-
ona, to the east of Lautem, were among this number. Having survived at a base 
(Caicava-Moko) for more than a year, the population of these areas were told by the 
local Fretilin commander at the end of 1977, that those that wished to surrender to the 
Indonesian military were free to do so because Fretilin was no longer able to protect 
them. Those that surrendered were taken to a concentration camp in Moro, together with 
the local Camat (village head), Edmundo da Conceição, with some allocated to the 
village of Poioco, just to Moro’s east. Subjected to hunger, sickness and arbitrary 
beatings by their military guards, they spent five months in the camp, before being 
moved in October 1978 to Sikara, west along the coast from Com, because Moro was 
too small to hold thousands of people. Conditions in Sikara proved to be no better, and 
in the four months in which they were held there, 35 people died.  
 
It was only in March 1979 that the population of the three villages was allowed to return 
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home. After having been resettled, they were harassed, beaten and kidnapped, and 
subjected to other inhumane treatments by the military. In 1979, for example, Battalion 
745 – of whom a substantial number still consisted of East Timorese soldiers - 
kidnapped four local men from Pitileti and Ira-onu, with villagers told that they would 
be returned after they had acted as ‘guides’ for the military, though they were never 
seen again. The same battalion later brought 19 people to a plantation, Apaloahi, where 
they were tortured for a day. The unit brought these villagers back and raped four 
women from the village. A gift of a buffalo the next year to the battalion commander in 
the district capital, Los Palos, from the village, caused violence and threats against the 
population from the battalion to be reduced, even as all adult males of the area were 
used in the military operation Operasi kikis in 1981 (CAVR c., 2003). 
 
Even while 745’s killings and subterfuge temporarily desisted, Com and surrounding 
villages fell under scrutiny from the local command of Battalion 201, stationed in the 
area. This was accompanied by military attempts to move populations of all 
surrounding villages to a long settlement along the coast at Com. Resettlement of 
villagers revealed the stifling power that the military could exert through this process14. 
Everyday life was marked by the organisation of habitats, and the symbolism of military 
rule was seen through its patronage of the Church and educational system in the form of 
providing buildings and personnel15. However, these military strategies also revealed 
the intensity of resistance against them. On the anniversary of the TNI’s birthday, for 
instance, 18 October 1982, a party was held at the local military compound, attended by 
all military personnel. During the course of the evening and unbeknown to the military, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In 1980, Battalion 201 told occupants of ruku keluarga [clusters of houses] to group their resources 
together to provide buffaloes for special occasions, such as the Indonesian national day on August 17. 
The villagers duly did this, but the military subsequently shot a further four buffaloes. 
15 In 1984, Battalion 408, based near Com, as well as introducing a regime more heavily restricting 
villagers movements, built a statue of Jesus for the chapel, and sent personnel to teach in the local school.	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dozens of local people were rapidly assembled by Falintil along Com’s pier. In an 
apparent demonstration of the fate that would befall collaborators, two local men were 
‘tried’ on the waterfront, with one swiftly exonerated, while the other was executed in 
full view of the crowd that was gathered only 15 metres away. Falintil continued to 
target rumoured collaborators into the next year when they burnt four houses. There is 
some indication that tensions abated after the construction of a large port in 1987-88, 
allowing increased commercial and military maritime traffic with Dili, but also with 
nearby Kisar and Kupang, and even as far afield as Maluku. This piece of infrastructure, 
paving the way towards a so-called policy of ‘opening’ East Timor in the late 1980s, 
was also a departure point for military and militias and pro-Indonesian families fleeing 
in 1999 (CAVRc. 2003:4; McWilliam, 2007) 
 
It is in this context that local events can be considered, particularly given a background 
of violent attempts at subjugation and displacement and the inevitable complexity of 
resistance and collaboration. Valerio Ramos was sentenced to 10 years and 7 months in 
Dili’s Becora prison in January 2002 for the murder of Antonio Magalhaes. The case, 
involving witchcraft allegations, involved genealogical, and historical elements outlined 
above. Antonio, a 50-year old farmer from the same village as Valerio, was also his 
brother-in-law. Ostensibly, Antonio’s killing was preceded by a series of events 
beginning with an episode in July 2001. Valerio’s daughter, Dominggas, received a 
letter from her then fiancé, a trainee police officer in Dili, telling her that he was 
breaking off their engagement. He explained obscurely that he had received 
‘background information’ about Dominggas’s family and that if they married, people 
would ‘tell stories’ about their family in the future. The following day on the way to 
bathe with her sister, Dominggas overheard that a woman from the village, Filomena, 
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had told people not to accompany Dominggas if she visited her sick son, Joao. Like 
visits to Eugenio’s son in Maubara, it would not be unusual that villagers would visit 
the sick in their house as a group, especially as there was a family connection. Together 
with her sister, Dominggas decided to try and find out why Filomena was issuing 
warnings against her, and went to her house. Confronted by Dominggas, Filomena 
denied everything, but Joao’s wife, Cristina, interrupted her denials, insisting that 
Filomena had advised people not to visit Joao’s son.  
 
Dominggas moved out to live with her uncle in Sawarica in early July. At her new 
address, Joao visited her, angrily accusing her of insulting his mother and informing 
Dominggas that a female relative had told their neighbours that Dominggas was 
descended from a family of witches. Later, Dominggas was again tracked down by Joao 
who beat her, making her right eye swollen and making her urinate in her clothes. As he 
was beating her, he accused her of being a witch, and dragged her by the arm towards 
his house, before others intervened, preventing the beating from continuing before 
reaching his house. Dominggas went to see her father, Valerio, who thought that the 
‘problem could not be resolved in the traditional way’ of mediation, because he had 
already been accused of being descended from witches by Joao. This was the first 
occasion on which Dominggas had heard this from her father. 
 
Despite doubts, Valerio attempted mediation and arranged with his neighbours, relatives 
of Joao, to facilitate this, yet Joao did not come when called. The following morning, 
Valerio went to pray at his father’s grave, about an hour’s walk from his house. While 
praying, Antonio, a relative of Joao’s, walked past Valerio, saying aloud that because 
Dominggas had urinated during the attack by Joao, it ‘proved’ that she was a witch. 
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Valerio then jumped from his father’s grave, as he removed his machete from its sheath 
and attacked Antonio, striking him repeatedly on the head and shoulder for three 
minutes until sure he was dead (Valerio’s movements were so quick that Antonio did 
not have time to draw his machete). After killing Antonio, Valerio immediately went to 
report the incident to villagers before returning to his family home, where he told 
Dominggas and his wife, advising them to go into hiding to avoid reprisals from 
Antonio’s family (UNPOL interview)16. He then went to the UNPOL station in nearby 
Parlamento, surrendering his machete, and wearing the same blood stained clothes used 
in the attack, confessed to the killing. Sentenced in January 2002, he was considered 
eligible for parole at the earliest in 2008, although a report of his good behaviour in 
2006 meant that he was free after having served half of his sentence.  
 
The details of the court case only touch briefly on the background and extent of the 
witchcraft allegations against Valerio and his family, which had begun in 1983, not 
2001. The family began to be scapegoated for unfortunate events, set out below, during 
the Indonesian period. In a police interview, Valerio reported that in 1983, there had 
been a bad harvest that Antonio claimed Valerio’s mother had caused by using 
witchcraft. Antonio also blamed Valerio and his family for causing the death of 
Antonio’s mother in 1997 by using witchcraft. As indicated, the wider significance of 
these allegations can be seen in the context of high political tensions, especially during 
1982-3. Across those years, not only was a ceasefire first established then broken, but 
the military’s frustration in dealing with the armed insurgency in the east in particular 
was plain from its attempts to extract information about Falintil through intimidating 
villages that were known to be key in its support.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Proc. no.26/PID.B/2001/PD.BCU:9 
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Such a scenario played out in 1983, in the same year as military actions and Falintil 
reprisals took place. The military reportedly thought that Falintil had been assisted by 
local ‘witches’ to evade capture, ordering villagers to ‘surrender’ them. Under pressure, 
some villagers allegedly identified Valerio, who was arrested by soldiers before being 
taken into military custody (interviewee A). A priest, reportedly Father Luis Bonaparte, 
visited Valerio in Indonesian custody, giving him a blessing and returning to the suco 
where he angrily chastised villagers, telling them that there was no such thing as 
witchcraft. Therefore, the military demanded that villagers produce ‘witches’, by trying 
to turn this belief to their advantage and in the process causing disunity. The 
repercussions of witchcraft accusations against Valerio, his mother and daughter over 
the years, culminating in the killing of Antonio Magalhaes, meant that he and his family 
were still marginalised following his release from prison. Other villagers didn’t want to 
take food that they had grown, and during 2006, the family became worried that people 
would use the context of the events of that year to exact revenge on them. I was told that 
Valerio’s son wanted to train as a priest but that, acutely sensitive to perceptions of the 
‘good standing’ of priests in communities where they work, the Church authorities in 
Los Palos blocked his application (interviewees B and C). This stands in contrast to the 
Church’s earlier defence of Valerio’s family against witchcraft allegations in 1983, 
which showed a familiar missionary injunction against superstitious beliefs, but also an 
awareness that in the politics of the period, the population’s unity could be easily 
compromised both from within and without.  
 
Elsewhere during the Indonesian period, the appearance of witchcraft allegations 
corresponded with local politics in which populations identified ‘witches’ in their midst. 
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In 1980, Cosme dos Santos was a military operations’ assistant (TBO) in Battalion 
745’s dormitory (asrama) in Fatumaca, in Baucau district, some 80 miles west of the 
northeast coast of Lautem. On leave from work, he returned to his village. On the night 
he arrived, a party was underway in the local village administrative office (balai desa), 
which Cosme attended. In the doorway of the administrative office, a local woman, 
Isabela lay down to sleep during the party. On their way out, an Indonesian government 
employee, Jupri and some military colleagues, deliberately trampled on the head and 
stomach of Isabela. A day later, Isabela died from injuries sustained in the attack. 
Shortly after her death, Isabela’s father, Felipe da Costa, the local catechist, called 
Cosme’s mother Fatima and uncle Edio to his house in the belief that both could use 
magic to resurrect his daughter. Fatima was asked to hold [kous] Isabela’s dead body, 
while Edio was to use sorcery to bring her back to life. Edio told Felipe that Isabela was 
dead and that he didn’t know how to bring her back to life. The catechist beat them 
both, insulting them [tolok aat] and telling his younger brother and sons to join in the 
beating. Cosme observed in testimony to CAVR that following these events and after 
Isabela’s burial, Felipe tried to gain the liurai and military’s agreement to punish Fatima 
and Edio. The military then went to Edio and Fatima’s house and without explanation 
subjected them to severe beatings, before holding them captive and torturing them for a 
week. Fatima died from her injuries, while Edio survived the ordeal (CAVR.d).  
 
Conditions of war and occupation therefore provided stimuli or pretexts in which 
witches were identified and on occasions, persecuted with devastating consequences. 
Exploring these contexts may help to shift focus onto elements present in many cases, 
such as the protection of kin from illness or misfortune. Moreover, it may show that in 
some cases, being a witch may be thought of (or perhaps: revealed) as a genealogical 
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condition subject to inheritance. The same cases also demonstrate how being accused of 
being a malevolent ‘witch’ was subject to the collective deliberations, through gossip, 
of the communities from which the accused came. This stands in contrast to the 
statements of colonial authors that compared witches with slaves. They asserted that the 
condition of being a slave would be forgotten after a few generations (Castro 1869). As 
shown in the above case of Valerio, the reputation of being a malevolent witch would 
perhaps not dissolve as surely in the longer term. It could be argued that what both 
‘states’ have in common are the conditions that allowed their creation (i.e. war). Being 
called a ‘witch’ or ‘slave’ was also reportedly the worst insult that one person could 
direct at another (Pinto-Correia, 1934:43fn). Accusing an individual and their family of 
witchcraft involved the use of powerful discourses against enemies, readily understood 
as bringing misfortune, and significantly heightened by conditions of conflict.  
 
To conclude from this, however, that to be called a witch was simply a metaphor for 
‘traitor’, as the case from the Japanese occupation at the beginning of this section 
implies, fails to recognise the power relations at work in the above cases. Foreign 
militaries could also regard people as witches. Whether they did so for instrumental 
reasons or from a genuine belief in their magical powers is interesting, but not greatly 
significant. Instead, the wider point to be made is that these cases show that the politics 
of occupation and resistance cannot be easily reduced to categorical oppositions. As Lan 
(1985) and others have argued, the apparent complicity of peasantries in resistance 
movements was multifarious, as frequently invoking magic as the modernity of political 
ideologies. Santo Antonio’s magic – a prophet that walked on water, procedures that 
guaranteed invincibility – shows this (chapter one). If seen in terms of modernity and 
magic, each easily co-existed during the Indonesian occupation. Their co-existence does 
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little to disturb the popular image often called forth to describe resistance - a ‘mass of 
civilians’ who were ‘the ultimate guarantors of [Falintil’s] security on Mao Tzedung’s 
maxim of ‘living among the people as a fish swims in water’ (Joliffe, 2012:75). As 
others have pointed out, however, the same image reproduced in other wars was an 
official portrayal. Kwon has argued that this metaphor was ‘far more complex and 
turbulent than the idyllic image of fish swimming peacefully…’ in a population’s pond 
can capture (2008:14). As shown in the above, the meaning of power in East Timor’s 
occupation and resistance cannot be reduced to water and fish, nor for that matter, 
modernity and magic.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to provide a basis for understanding witchfindings, by 
identifying four aspects outlined in the introduction, several or all of which are common 
to the cases considered. The most important of these has been the historical aspect. It 
has been shown that, consistent with previous arguments, power relations that preceded 
witchfindings (sometimes by many years) are often significant to their understanding, 
but are rarely explored in court proceedings, or elsewhere. In contrast to accounts that 
cast modernization as able to expunge ‘traditional’ thought, it is argued that before 
denouncing these practices and recommending ‘solutions’, they must first be better 
understood. As such, the meaning of these practices derives in significant part (and 
insofar as they come to light at all) from the nature of colonial and postcolonial 
institutions that receive, understand and cast judgement on them.  
 
Yet police and judicial institutions in colonial and postcolonial scenarios, as shown, 
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have also evidently not moved to widen their ‘scope of surveillance’, nor cause those   
involved in witchfindings to be subject to disciplinary institutions to alter errant 
conduct. Indeed, diverse and enduring forms of power relations have produced, rather, a 
distinct form of engagement with subjects. I have therefore proposed an alternative form 
of power that characterises these engagements identifying four aspects. Above all else, 
these aspects show the limitations of submitting practices of witchfinding or sorcery to 
modernization theory, by emphasising instead the complexity of their historical 
backgrounds and the imperative of disaggregating their meanings. In this regard, the 
production and consolidation of categories of knowledge related to witchcraft, such as 
magic, science and religion, have ensured that the way it is understood in general terms 
has endured. More specifically, state views on witchfindings in institutions have been 
actively sustained through judicial practices that render it through the lens of colonial 
understandings.  
 
As such, the local dynamics of power at work in these events and processes during the 
postcolonial period are given greater complexity when judicial trials are considered. In 
such scenarios, the state exercises a form of understanding on these events and 
ultimately passes judgement on their meaning. In these circumstances, as argued above, 
the practices and mentalities of colonial government are still evident. Tracing these 
legacies turns attention towards the historical aspect of witchfindings. To acknowledge 
the significance of this aspect is to look beyond police interviews, and deliberations and 
denunciations in judicial procedures. Power is always at work, with collective and 
individual experience ensuring that memories of past events are retained as legacies. As 
shown, these legacies go above and beyond either the official histories of resistance, or 
simplistic assertions that magic can be expunged by modernization. Yet neither are local 
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politics divorced from seemingly remote events taking place elsewhere, for example in 
Dili. Taking this temporally and spatially wider context into consideration refocuses 
attention away from the argument that sorcery is always part of a ‘traditional’ system of 
culture, comparable with other practices on the basis of equivalent extrinsic, measurable 
values, or the inevitable outcome of culturally-determined violence. This chapter has 
tried to show a wider context: a) that value cannot be reduced to its transactional costs 
alone and b) particular practices assumed to be similar (i.e. those regarded as 
superstitions) must be considered in light of how their meaning emerges through power 
relations. 
 
This framework of understanding shows other inconsistencies between assigning value 
through the designation of categories of the postcolonial state’s making, and of more 
longstanding origin, such as the modern and traditional. A comparison with resistance 
movements in other scenarios that have drawn as much for sustenance on spirit 
mediums as political ideology, for example, usefully shows how resistance operates in 
everyday contexts. It also shows how considerable overlap exists between practices 
such as sorcery and ‘political’ practice, sometimes considered to be diametrically 
opposed. Throughout the thesis, moreover, different forms of power are explored, with 
the state’s provision of pensions to ex-combatants compared with subjecthood or 
Christian conversion, or, as in the third chapter taxes and work, life and death.  
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4. Evaluating life through work 
 
I. Introduction - state formation and alternative forms of power 
 
This chapter shows the extent that ‘bio-power’ can be regarded as having shaped 
relations between the state and population from the early 20th century. It is argued that 
the state evaluated its subjects according to their work, corresponding to a process by 
which the state introduced taxes, marshalled labour and further circulated money, three 
interlocking processes. By exploring case studies of mineral extraction in Baucau 
district in successive periods, it is shown that social relations mediated the local 
population’s claims to the same resources. The basis for these claims appeared to 
contrast with rational schemes of the postcolonial state. However, the chapter suggests 
that the extent and limits of these colonial-era processes also depended on the changing 
meanings of valuable symbols and objects that were the subject of exchange between 
state and indigenous authorities. Thus, colonial authorities attempted to change the 
meaning of symbols and objects (establishing their relative value) through consecration, 
desecration and representation. Yet meaning could also change between people and 
objects as a result of work. Objects had inseparable meanings from contextual histories 
of power and work (Asad, 1993:53). While work was evaluated principally through 
forced labour, I argue that this must be situated in broader state attempts to evaluate life. 
For example, the taxation of funerary rites and payment of compensation for killing 
were commensurate with state formation, albeit in ways that unexpectedly transcended 
boundaries between colonial and indigenous administrative, ritual and legal ‘domains’. 
 
This analysis relates to politics in the present in the following ways. In the postcolonial 
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period, local populations have made claims to minerals by invoking collective histories 
(including experiences of forced labour) from successive colonial periods. Such claims 
and histories have coalesced around suco, kin, or resistance affiliations. Thus, on first 
appearance, power from the ‘subaltern’ level generates claims based on experience and 
precedence. It is suggested that state formation is of equal significance. As the state 
attempted to organise, evaluate and make use of life in the colonial period, so its 
institution more recently has involved similar processes, albeit with different meanings, 
trajectories and outcomes. Themes of postcolonial politics such as martyrdom, loyalty 
and resistance affiliation are shown to overlap with local practices, at the points at 
which claims over minerals and state recognition meet. 
 
II. People, objects and symbols: changing meanings 
 
State formation in the early 20th century was indicated by taxation and correspondingly, 
money’s wider circulation. However, this was underpinned at a second level: the 
meaning of objects and symbols subject to exchange or used in ceremony could be 
changed through representation (consecration, desecration), and work. Symbols and 
objects subject to exchange between colonial and indigenous authorities were endowed 
with meaning and value. The colonial government used monetary values, but 
throughout the 19th century, money was not in wide circulation. Colonial interpretations 
of money’s meaning in indigenous eyes are evident from a report of a visit to the colony 
of the Mission Superior from Macao, in the year before the introduction of a head tax. 
The visit of Bishop João Paulino d’Azevedo e Castro, who arrived at the port of Liquica 
in 1905 from Dili, was an opportunity to ‘unite the Christians of Maubara and 
Fatomassi’, including regulo converts. The Bishop gave the Eucharist in a chapel in 
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Liquica town, built by a Portuguese soldier that had died in the revolt of Manufahi in 
1895 (BGEDM, Dec 1905:141), before the joint military missionary expedition went 
inland and upland. Arriving at Governor Celestino da Silva’s Pahata plantation, the 
Bishop was introduced to a ‘dethroned queen’ who:  
 
approaching his excellency, completely possessed of respect and humility, 
prostrated herself on the ground, grasping between her withered hands those of 
our venerated prelate…with all of her soul [she] printed a kiss on [his] sacred 
ring, putting in his hands a coin…a florin! It is fitting to note that, in general, 
the Timorese do not know the value of money. All of their trade is made and 
paid in kind [em generos]” (BGEDM January 1906:170) 
 
This exchange can either be interpreted as missionaries invite us to, as showing that 
East Timorese did not ‘know’ the value of money, or in other ways. For example, it was 
offered as an object of veneration for a visiting dignitary. Although it is not clear from 
the account, the Queen could have been Dona Maria, Queen of Maubara, who ‘lacked 
the necessary authority to gain obedience from all the nobles” (Pelissier, 1996:75). In 
1894, the same nobles (suco chiefs) started the Maubara revolt1. Whether it was the 
Queen of Maubara or otherwise, it could therefore be viewed as a token of esteem 
rendered in a currency comprehensible to the colonial authorities, or even a defence of 
the Queen’s prestige by conferring something that was known to be valuable to the 
visitors2. Furthermore, florins were usually made partly or wholly from gold, and thus 
for Portuguese, the gift could have been valued in light of this much sought after 
substance, prospected for in Timor 15 years previously3. By contrast, gold played a part 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  During the early 1890s the reino Liquica also had a rainha, Dona Ursula da Costa. (França, 1891:24) 2	  Equally, the opposite may be the case: given that Maubara had been a Dutch coastal trading post until 
1879, the money may have been Dutch, rather than Portuguese. This raises the possibility that the Queen 
was conferring a gift regarded as antithetical to the visitors. 3	  According to Gomes Silva’s account of a gold search in 1891 (chapter six), gold from Portuguese 
Timor had a ‘much heightened extrinsic value’ when produced for the view of his gold-prospecting team 
(Gomes Silva, 1891) 	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as a ritual adornment of East Timorese chiefs and was exchanged in marriage 
prestations. Its intrinsic worth came from its point of origin being known and its use in 
these exchanges, rather than either the production or measurement of its worth. 
Differences in value in the above exchange may therefore be seen as coming from 
imputed extrinsic and intrinsic values. The florin’s value in missionary eyes was 
understood as being located within a quantifiable, relative value system, while gold 
could be valuable within indigenous social life in different ways. 
 
If money’s meaning was “not known” in late 1905, this situation changed in the ensuing 
years as the result of the imposition of a head tax (imposto de capitação). Even while 
this did not precede a dramatic increase in the circulation of money, the head tax 
eventually replaced the finta, tribute paid by regulos to the government, and bypassed 
their authority. As coffee was cultivated to make the colony self-sufficient, so too was 
the head tax intended to contribute to the same ends. The introduction of taxes to fund 
road-building programmes, wars, or other infrastructure, was not unusual in colonial 
contexts in the same period (cf. Mosko, 1999:52). On the face of it, therefore, the most 
obvious effect was to create a demand for money. While the value of money to those 
that were required to pay the head tax cannot be seen in the above exchange, which was 
implemented later the same year, it is clearer in the circumstances surrounding the 
Boaventura rebellion in 1912. There is no consensus on the cause of the rebellion which 
officially broke out on Christmas eve 1911, lasting until late October 1912, which some 
sources estimate cost 3,500 East Timorese (Pinto and Jardine, 1997:6) and 300 
Portuguese lives (Pélissier, 1996:319-320). In Baucau district, a feature of the 
rebellion’s later stages were raids on European-owned plantations, while rumours 
circulated among the Portuguese military stationed in Baucau town that an assault was 
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being prepared from nearby Seical, by ‘rebels’ in ‘search of money’ to pay the head tax 
(Inso, 1939:140-45). 
 
It has also been proposed that its causes lay in the imposition of the head tax in 
combination with military campaigns since 1895 that increased the size of the state’s 
domain. This accompanied other changes in the early period after the Republican 
revolution of 1910-11 that signified an ‘alteration of fundamental aspects of centuries 
old relations between colonial and indigenous authorities’ (Figueiredo, 2004:519-21). 
Among such ‘fundamental aspects’ were valuable symbols and objects that signified 
specific kinds of power relations between colonisers and East Timorese. These have 
been seen as existing within a symbolic constellation of relations shored up by the 
observance of vassalage and ceremony, and the waging of war by the colonial 
authorities when their ‘prestige’ had been sullied by perceived infractions. As for 
valuable objects such as flags, their recognition by colonial authorities as possessing 
magical power, was a significant part of their observance of an indigenous domain 
(Roque, 2010:51-65). Thus, for example, supplementing regalia of the Portuguese 
crown after the Republican revolution such as the old Portuguese flag was by no means 
only a formality. The powerfulness of flags had been evident long before, in a revolt 
against Dutch sovereignty in Larantuka on nearby Flores Island in 1859. This stemmed 
from a decision by the Portuguese governor to surrender Larantuka to the Netherlands 
as part of a negotiated border agreement. The lowering of the Portuguese flag and the 
raising of the Dutch flag caused outrage among Larantuka’s chiefs, who had been loyal 
to the Portuguese (Castro 1869, 155-181). 
 
If the power of symbols derived from colonial and indigenous observances, however, 
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their meaning could also be changed on the basis of abandoning or altering observances. 
Furthermore, a displacement of meaning could also take place by creating a relative 
value of meaning. Missionaries’ consecrations of land could impact perceptions of its 
powerfulness. Similarly, desecration was intended to downgrade value of sacred objects 
and symbols by rendering their meanings as superstitious. On the same joint military-
missionary expedition to Liquica referred to above, after Bishop Azevedo e Castro’s 
Church service, the military commander, Commandante Borges, cut down a tree 
regarded by locals as lulik. Although the population that worshipped it ‘would not even 
cut one branch of it’, it was reported that ‘Snr Commandante Borges was laudably 
resolved to end the superstition and prohibit all kinds of worship with the tree. [The 
people] understood the result, that the tree could be cut at will without sacrilege’ 
(BGEDM, Dec 1905). These practices of ‘ending superstitions’ were likewise present in 
missionary accounts. The Salesian priest Father Rodrigues recorded how he drank from 
a sacred water source despite being advised by the master [dono] of the land that doing 
so could cause death. Later in the account, missionaries at Fuiloro killed an alligator, 
considered to be a threat to the mission’s cattle but also considered by locals to be a 
reincarnation of ancestors4. Of course, in Borges actions might be seen a performance of 
Christian piety in front of the visiting Bishop. However, it was also in front of regulos 
and suco chiefs, and was no less ceremonial than other observances. 
 
Seen in context moreover, while consecration and ceremony could be used to signify 
respect for indigenous customs, desecration was also readily used to change meaning. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  ‘The Timorese acknowledge the transmigration of souls from ancestors to the alligator, where it 
continues to live, and they call the animal grandfather. Near the mission of Fuiloro there are various 
ponds [charcos ] where alligators appear. One day one of these beasts seized a goat of the mission and the 
boy that watched [the goats] came to tell us. It was a death sentence for the alligator…the amphibian’s 
days were over. With tears in their eyes, the workers took his skin and explained, to give solace, that 
‘Grandfather was killed because he committed a sin’ (Rodrigues, 1962:129:n1) 	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Objects could be subject to changing meanings insofar as their sacredness was 
compared unfavourably with objects with Christian meanings, or regarded as 
superstitious. The conditions for which the meaning and value of an object or symbol 
might change could therefore be dependent on how an object or symbol’s meaning 
changed in ‘a larger system of meaning’ (Schieffelin, 1976:2). Changes beyond the 
symbolic were also dependent on the historically contingent, practical associations 
between people and objects formed by work. As proposed below, this also led to a 
corresponding displacement of meanings. Like gold, money was also only one, if 
distinctive, form of currency among others that could be exchanged. It could only be 
made unique by its recognition as such, and the ways that this was made 
possible can be illustrated by highlighting the similarities and differences between 
money and other currencies. If money’s value changed by being sought after and 
substituted for labour under the head tax, its meaning was also informed by its 
equivalence for life. The question of money as compensation for life is central to 
Simmel’s analysis, who showed a historical process of ‘man being compensated for by 
money’ (2004:359), in slavery and ‘blood money’ (for example, Weregild). Whereas in 
ancient law, monetary fines were compensatory, under modern law they were punitive, 
intended to ‘affect the subject himself’ (2004:364;cf.355) who would be sent to prison 
in the event of insolvency. Christianity was crucial to these processes, in which Simmel 
saw the emergence of ‘individualism’ in 18th century Europe caused by the spread of the 
Christian doctrine of the indivisibility of the human being. This gave rise to ‘human 
rights’ and ‘human dignity’ that made either the sale of human beings or ‘atonement for 
their death by money impossible’ (2004:362-3). The emergence of these liberal norms 
indicated, according to Simmel, a more advanced ‘stage of culture’, seen in the 
development of punishment in modern law, which still bore traces of a fundamental aim 
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to satisfy the desire for protection and revenge. 
 
Foucault located money’s meanings ‘in the ancient world’, seen as a way to ‘stabilise’ 
society, which through proto-systems of taxation and redistribution (2013:135), were 
intended to avoid against either excessive poverty or riches. This redistributive system 
originated in religious ritual, and was prefigured by sacrifice. The circulation of money 
furthermore could be seen as commensurate with two fundamental things: taxation and 
written law (nomos). The advent and inseparability of taxation, money and written law 
is significant to Foucault for two reasons. First, these processes articulated political 
power in relation to the individual (thus prefiguring Simmel’s connection between 
Christianity and individualism). Specifically, political power in the ancient world 
regulated death by establishing monetary equivalents for murder in written law, thus, 
‘replacing’ like-for-like blood feuds, previously carried out by bereft families in the 
name of restoring equilibrium. By placing a value on homicide, and imposing values on 
other forms of death, such as taxing funerary rites and inheritance, Foucault believed, 
was to ‘regulat[e] the event and consequences of death’ which ‘delineat[ed] the form of 
individuality’ (Foucault, 2013:175). Money was not a sign, but a substitution for an 
object, a ‘simulacrum’, creating ‘fixation, not representation’ (2013:141). In other 
words, money was qualitatively different from other goods that were subject to 
exchange, in that it had to represent something that it was not (Foster, 1999:226). 
 
Despite the insistence that the acts which money brought into focus superseded its 
effects (forming the individual), money’s significance is to be found both in its meaning 
and causality. In this respect, although unique for assigning values rather than 
representing objects of exchange, its effects are the same. Aside from money, other 
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valuable objects have created effects of ‘fixation’ and ‘stability’. The equitable 
distribution of harvest proceeds are perennial rites of pre-monetary societies or where 
money is in limited circulation, instances of which can be seen in East Timor5. 
However, the action of distribution in itself cannot always account for what meaning 
objects have. Addressing this, Keane points towards the effects of the colonial 
encounter on value. Missionary action ‘stabilized’ objects by ‘assigning values’ to them, 
thus disaggregating meaning from them in their indigenous contexts. Informed by 
semiotic ideologies that underpinned missionary work, this was part of a process of 
reprogramming objects with different (Christian) meanings, or ‘purification’ (Keane, 
2008: 224). For Keane, the changing meanings of objects are the barometers of changes 
in ‘regimes of value’ a phrase Keane borrows from Appadurai (Keane, 2008:284) 
triggered by purification. Money, itself an object with which missionaries, traders, and 
Christian converts intended to stabilise values of other objects, ‘in practice takes its 
place in a political economy of social signs and usable things’ (Keane, 2008:274). Thus 
money itself may stabilise the meaning of objects, and the origins of this action rest in 
missionary ideology, rather than its use as an equivalent with human life. 
  
In summary, two broad perspectives exist. In the first, the use of money accompanies 
state formation and formation of ‘the individual’, Changes in its meaning depended on 
its setting in the ancient world or Christian Europe. However, currencies beyond money 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  The civil war (1975) frequently belied divisions within villages between chiefs that supported UDT 
while the rank and file supported Fretilin. In Suco Maulau in Northern Manufahi (CAVR g.), the village 
chief instructed people to choose UDT, because he believed the help of foreigners [malae mutin] was 
required until people were capable [matenek] of ruling themselves. Fretilin’s local representative 
disagreed and animosities became obvious during an annual ritual known as kedei aifun, where each 
household divided and distributed profits from coffee growing equally among the suco, sacrificing 
animals and offering them to an ancestor called Lokbere. Although the community had become divided 
by modern political parties formed barely a year previously, the fact that another ceremony (Fadmar) 
ended in recrimination and threats [sadik malu] indicated that the ritual of distributing coffee profits 
would not have worked. 	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existed in East Timor and elsewhere, where a similar mechanism of exchange to 
guarantee ‘stability’ operated. As small communities maintained internal equilibrium 
through redistribution, the colonial state sought to emplace the indigenous population 
(cf. Robbins, 2004) and in this process monetization was one part. Paying taxes in-kind 
with labour was especially aimed towards this objective. The second perspective, where 
missionaries and colonial authorities displaced the meaning of valuable objects ties in 
with the first: objects could be imbued with meaning, while the circulation of a state 
sponsored currency ensured not just the common recognition of its value, but also the 
action of creating ‘fixation’ or ‘stability’ of both people and objects. The same could be 
argued for people’s relations with objects changing according to the context of power 
and work. The two perspectives are further examined together below. 
 
III. Caibada’s manganese: power, work and meaning 
 
Shortly after the introduction of the head tax, in 1908, a student at a mission school in 
Oecusse, Jose Jeronymo, brought a knife to school and killed a missionary who taught 
there, Father Miranda e Brito, for unclear motives. Jeronymo was from Laga, a ‘reino 
where salt existed that the state exploited, making the natives work, on the orders of the 
military commander’ (Correia, 1909). Governor Celestino da Silva’s response to the 
incident, knowing that the area was relatively rich, was to fine the reino 500 patacas. 
The imposition of fines may be interpreted as evidence of the accumulative instincts of 
the government (or, as the source in question suggested, Celestino da Silva himself). 
Colonial authorities did not directly approve the imposition of fines under indigenous 
custom, except, when it involved someone, such as a missionary, subject to colonial 
law. Simmel indicated that neither murder nor slavery was permissible to be 
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compensated. While the above case seems to show that the state cooperated in levying 
compensation for murder, the imposition of value on human beings has already been 
seen in other ways, via their work in lieu of taxes for example. The following two 
historical examples from Baucau district address further examples by suggesting that in 
practice, people and objects shape the meaning of the other through common 
experience. The below examines how far this meaning could be affected through 
historically contingent representations in colonial accounts. 
 
Besides the changes effected in taxation by the colonial government in the early 20th 
century, by the 1920s, the colony’s Republican government had started to court foreign 
capital. Numerous accounts have attested to the use of forced labour throughout the 
Portuguese empire, although there are few analyses of the ways and extent of the 
practice in East Timor. Furthermore, while certain patterns may be detected in 
Portuguese Africa, each colony was different, and as recent accounts have emphasised, 
forced labour practices changed over time (Ball, 2003). In East Timor, as seen below, 
foreigners invested in a number of small projects in the 1920s and 1930s, exploiting the 
colony’s natural resources. Foreign capital required indigenous labour for which suco 
chiefs were to be intermediaries, facilitated by the Portuguese authorities. 
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Map	  2	  Location	  of	  Laga	  and	  Caibada	  within	  Baucau	  district.	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During the period after the Boaventura rebellion and prior to the Japanese occupation 
in the Second World War (1912-1943), a number of licenses were granted to 
foreigners to exploit East Timor’s natural resources. By the mid-1930s, for example, a 
Dutch Mining Engineer from the University of Delft, owned concession rights to a 
deposit of Manganese in Uatocarbau in Viqueque district (Allied Mining Company, 
1937:30). Between approximately this area in the southeast and Betano in the south 
centre, twelve concessions of land were awarded to foreigners, mainly for agricultural 
use. This followed a nine-month surveillance of the entire territory by the colonial 
government in preparation for the exploitation, during which some areas of land are 
recorded as having been ‘cleared’ of inhabitants, for example, the first concession, a 
piece of land between Betano and Alas (Allied Mining Company, 1937:75). 
 
A memoir of Baucau’s administrator during the 1920s, Armando Pinto Correia, 
focused instead on another concession granted some years previously on the north 
coast, which he had supervised (1944). One of the concessions was located on the 
plain of Caibada, in Seiçal, nine kilometres to the east of Baucau town, and in Mount 
Birak, in Vemasse subdistrict. In March 1925, Franz van Klinkenberg, a naturalised 
Dutch citizen, originally from Aachen in Germany, arrived in Baucau from Surabaya, 
Java. A year previously he had been awarded two concessions to search for 
manganese deposits. Van Klinkenberg was duly shown some examples of deposits by 
a representative of the Governor, from which he extracted and sent back 50 tonnes to 
Surabaya, with the hope of securing financing for his planned venture. Pinto Correia 
meticulously documented van Klinkenberg’s actions, scorning what he perceived as 
his overly ambitious view of how much manganese could be acquired. 
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To realise his plans van Klinkenberg managed to enlist the support of half a dozen 
financiers from Surabaya in Java, who gave funding to van Klinkenberg’s Baucau 
Mijnbouw Sindicaat (Baucau Mining Syndicate). The money was used for the 
construction of two bridges over rivers next to Vemasse and Seiçal, and the laying of 
electric cables from Baucau town to Caibada, to generate electricity for offices and 
accommodation for at least 3000 Timorese workers, and their wages. Pinto Correia 
complained that van Klinkenberg’s requests for miners increased between March and 
April 1925 from 136 to 222, while no houses were constructed for them, and they 
were not paid on time. He contended that these delays were because the planned 
shipments of 2000 tonnes of manganese was missed by 200 tonnes. Although this 
shipment satisfied the Sindicaat’s financiers, between this and the next shipment, van 
Klinkenberg drastically reduced the workforce, dismissing four deportados1, who 
were permanently replaced in their roles as overseers [olheiros] with ‘Timorese and 
Arabs’. By September of the same year, following a hurried departure to negotiate 
more financing, van Klinkenberg returned to begin work on further mining, promising 
3500 tonnes to financiers by October2. By this time, accommodation had been 
prepared at Caibada for the workers, and a water tank installed. However the ship 
dispatched to collect the Manganese, finally arriving in November, was again 
provided with half the minerals promised, and was delayed from sailing, costing the 
Sindicaat 600 florins per day according to terms with financiers. The concession was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Native Portuguese that had been deported to East Timor, often for reasons of political opposition 
during the Republican, then New State period. 2	  A sizable amount of the capital that van Klinkenberg found came from offices of Japanese trading 
houses and state owned companies. Over a period of some years, representatives visited from the Naga 
Trading Company, Tokyo; the Mitsui Bank, and the Government Steel Iron Works, Kobe. The 
Portuguese military officer, Antonio Oliveira Liberato thought that ‘the Japanese infiltration began in 
the colony in 1936, with the Japanese acquisition of almost 50% of SAPT, which permitted them to 
unjustifiably maintain a number of employees, [who were] periodically substituted, without ever giving 
notice of the reasons for those substitutions…’ (Liberato, ca.1947:17) 	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transferred from van Klinkenberg to the Sindicaat, and was later passed on to another 
German miner, and the three mining projects were eventually abandoned in the early 
1930s. 
 
Pinto Correia emphasised the bad planning and feuds in the Sindicaat to explain its 
failure, but also a tawdry search for profit. van Klinkenberg ‘scented money’ after his 
first research visit, which after his return to Java saw him ‘hammering on the doors’ 
of Surabaya’s financiers. Among the many characters that populate Pinto-Correia’s 
account, van Klinkenberg received singular disapproval, particularly his attempts to 
appear as a ‘big and busy industrialist for whom time is money’. To this description is 
added his ‘vulgar attitude and gesticulations’ and ‘charlatanism’; having deceived 
investors with unrealisable ‘grand plans’; and escaping the taint of his nationality by 
hiding his previous career from financiers as a Captain in the German navy. His lie 
was allegedly betrayed by a ‘negligently rolled up shirtsleeve’ during a siesta one 
afternoon that revealed ‘complicated tattoos’ showing his wartime loyalties. 
While Pinto Correia’s account shows other characters (German mining engineers, 
British lawyers), notably absent in any substantive form is the population itself. 
During the last large shipment, the population is anonymous victims of brutal 
treatment at the hands of Europeans. According to Pinto Correia, this included the 
expulsion of a German miner, Hirschell, for ‘exercising violence on Timorese’ in the 
period leading up to the November 1925 shipment. Cumulatively, in the same period, 
59 miners died: 
 
The heat of Seiçal, combined with the proximity of the rainy season, became 
roasting, especially in the mines’ trenches, now bored more deeply. At night the 
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plain was swept by high winds like the upper deck of a ship on the high seas. 
Moreover, the water of Seiçal continued to be transported in gasoline cans [and] 
was insufficient and undrinkable…The mine had to close. It was already a 
slaughterhouse. The labourer who on the 23rd December died in hospital in 
Baucau had been the last of this tragic group of 59 Timorese, to whom I need to 
add those who, speaking out against the bad conditions of the mines, died there, 
ignored by the authorities, deep in their povoações, and sacrificed to the 
industrial mystification of a renegade German (Correa, 1943: 145). 
 
Interwoven into this is Pinto Correia’s uncomfortable qualification that he tried to 
limit the number of labourers that he supplied to the Sindicaat, and testified to a 
Governor’s investigation in Dili into bad conditions, which caused extra rations to be 
provided to the labourers. Despite publicising his attempts to limit state neglect and 
the Syndicate’s abuses, however, he was compelled to provide what was at best 
indentured labour3. 
 
After hearing a Suco chief’s complaint that labourers that he supplied had not been 
paid on time, he wrote that he recommended to the chief that the labourers should 
have been subject to a debenture bond signed with the Sindicaat. Recourse to 
contracts in commissioning labour was a common practice of colonial officials 
throughout the Portuguese empire when seeking to avoid accusations of its 
enslavement. Hence, Pinto Correia wanted the supply of labour to be understood as 
part of a lawful system of exchange, one that guaranteed protection and payment in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For an example see Pinto Correa’s recommendation (1943:140) to a Xefe de Suco to make the 
provision of labourers subject to a debenture bond, because the Sindicaat frequently did not pay 
salaries 
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exchange for bodies. To breach a contract, or to avoid signing one, had involved 
‘sacrifices’ to ‘industrial mystification’. 
 
The prevailing perspectives of Pinto Correia and the period in which he wrote inform 
the account. To this end, the relationship of those that worked in the mines 
with the manganese can be best understood in the context of their ‘sacrifice’ to it. 
Pinto Correia argued that colonial authorities took an indifferent attitude to these 
workers. This may have been informed by his view that the reforms of the early 
twentieth century disrupted proper relations with the Timorese ‘hierarchy’ (regulos), 
that as a result had lost its ‘prestige…fortune, and authority” (1934:272), through 
abolishing a ‘total system of exchange’ and therefore undermining the indigenous 
aristocracy’s autonomy (Davidson, 1994:129). Furthermore, by the 1920s the 
government had abandoned other older ‘conventions’ in its dealings with local 
indigenous authorities. At the time of the account’s publication in 1943, Republican 
policies of attracting foreign investment had long been discarded in favour of New 
State policies of nationalisation and economic integration within empire (Castelo, 
1999 27-33). 
 
The relative anonymity of the dead East Timorese presents a strange contrast with the 
rest of Pinto Correia’s account, in which the population is vividly described in its 
‘proper’ ethnographic context. Except through the value of their work and lives, the 
dead’s connection with the manganese deposits is not expressed. The following 
sections show how people articulated relations with other mineral deposits elsewhere 
in Baucau district, focussing on the practical, ritual and epistemological bases of 
meaning attributed to objects, focusing on divergences between colonial 
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representations and indigenous autonomy. 
 
IV. Laga’s salt: power, work and meaning. 
 
Laga was a small military post with access to the sea, to the east of Seical and 
Caibada. As seen in the killing of Father Miranda e Brito above, Laga’s salt deposits 
were of interest to the authorities by the early 20th century, but had been extracted 
since the mid- 19th century on the orders of the local military command in the 
Samalalu/Saelari area (Belo, 2012:143). However, since pre-colonial times salt had 
been exchanged between Laga and the uplands (Metzner, 1977:37). Salt harvesting 
was key in bridging gaps in food production in the interior ‘when harvests were poor’ 
(Davidson, 1994:225). This confirmed a pattern existing elsewhere: the population of 
Liquica district in the west produced salt that was transported to the interior by 
Chinese traders, and Chinese traders were also involved in salt’s exchange in Dutch-
controlled West Timor (Ormelling, 1957:140). From Laga, Chinese traders may have 
transported salt to market in Baucau town, but were apparently less involved in 
trading salt with upland areas. The government attempted to regulate production with 
quantities large enough to export to Macau from at least the late 19th century. The 
harvesting of sites such as that of the ‘salt rock’ (fatuk masin) in Laga was declared 
subject to the purchase of government concessions, and ‘the public treasury reserved 
the right to mine the salt’ (Davidson, 1994:225) by the early twentieth century4. The 
meaning of Laga’s salt is explored below in the context of three events: an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  In 1906, missionaries noted possible locations for salt production in Manatuto, the district 
immediately to the west of Baucau in rice paddies next to the sea (BGEDM, March 1906:234). Baucau 
with its greater humidity and elevation was more suited to rice production and was accordingly used 
for that purpose by the authorities, producing more than a third of the colony’s rice (1,840,160kgs of 
4,422,297kgs) by the mid-20th century. In the same period, meanwhile, Manatuto was producing 2100 
tonnes of salt a year. 	  
	  	  
155	  
ethnographic analysis from the 1950s; the harvesting of salt under Indonesian rule in 
the 1980s, and further extractions after 1999. 
 
Colonisation involved the production of certain cultural products taken to be 
paradigmatic of a colonising nation’s ‘ideological construction of itself’ such as 
Camoes’ poem the Lusiads (Helgerson, 1992:28), or through figures that resonate in 
the national consciousness, for example, plantation owners (chapter five). Another 
trope of colonisation, of renewed emphasis by the 1930s, was evangelising, which 
was ‘the result of a long and complex process of mythification of the place of 
Portugal in the World and of [its] relations with other peoples’ (Castelo 1998:131-2). 
For some, ‘mythification’ was an ideological ruse to conceal the prime motivation for 
having an empire, i.e. profit (Helgerson, 1992). However, for others, such as 
missionaries, profit was accommodated alongside other motives inseparable from the 
aim of gaining Christian converts and ‘civilisation’: 
 
For…the Portuguese, the discovery of the maritime route to India will be always 
remembered as the event that was, for Europe, the beginning of a new phase of 
commercial life, that opened to science new fields of investigation and to faith found 
theatres of new conquests, that very powerfully contributed to access to new peoples 
and races. Similarly, the death or birth of Camoes will never be erased from our 
memories, for his work represents the importance to Portugal of demonstrated social 
contact with civilised peoples (BGEDM July 1920:13). 
 
Scientific discovery, propagating Christianity as well as making profit encapsulated 
an idealised vision of empire. As part of this construction, East Timor was 
distinguished among other colonies by the reputed manner of its conquest. Christian 
conversion, rather than violence, so the story had it, had influenced indigenous leaders 
by way of baptisms and other Christian practices over the course of centuries, making 
them susceptible to colonial influence. Salt was an important symbol in this narrative. 
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Missionary and other accounts recorded the story of a regulo that was said to have 
defiantly told a Portuguese military expedition in the period after the first Portuguese 
arrivals, that the population had been conquered ‘for the Portuguese crown only by 
water and salt’ (BEDM Dec 1924:305). 
 
Whether this process is regarded either as ideological overlay or ‘purification’, the 
meaning of salt in these accounts depended on colonial representations. Salt was ‘a 
symbol of wisdom… [that] prevented the growth of the bad passions of the soul’. It 
was ‘…a symbol of alliance between God and the novice [neofito]’ (BEDM 1942; cf. 
Mintz 19865). With its innately beneficial properties, salt was ‘today in some parts of 
the Orient still offered to improve peace and friendship’. East Timor’s antiquity was 
therefore explained by its aristocracy’s conversion to Christianity, with salt a symbol 
of this ‘peaceful’ conquest. Looked back on from the early-mid 20th century, this idea 
was meant to assure the uniqueness of East Timor as Portugal’s ‘oldest colony’ in 
which the missionary work of vanquishing heathenism was made easier by the 
indigenous population’s embrace of Portuguese culture, seen, for example, through 
the hoarding of paraphernalia associated with the ‘conquest’, regarded as lulik or 
sacred. 
 
Salt was therefore imbued with a cultural logic that atomised relations between 
Portuguese and East Timorese when wedded to a narrative of conquest. However, 
During the 1950s, an anthropological mission examined the Fatuk Masin in Laga. The 
chief of mission, Antonio de Almeida, was interested in the novel method of salt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Sidney Mintz’s study of sugar (1986), by contrast, showed that its gradual introduction to western 
markets was subtly mediated by the representation of its desirability, transforming it from a luxurious 
condiment connected with temptation to a mainstay of British diets. 
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extraction, with salt-bearing water placed over a fire so that salt could be drawn out as 
the water evaporated (Almeida, 1960:8; Metzner, 1977:237,fn.96). Every year during 
the dry season a ‘lake of salt’ appeared which was a mainstay of the social lives of the 
area’s inhabitants and its economy. Given the importance of the source of salt, stories 
were recounted by different sucos that accounted for the salt’s origins. The team’s 
interpretation of these stories is significant for several reasons. It interpreted and 
accommodated the stories of Nunira and Saelari into an overarching narrative of 
Timor’s place within empire, described above. Its interpretation also later became of 
importance when the ownership of the salt was contested in the postcolonial period, in 
which claims over it had altered in the intervening years of the Indonesian period. A 
comparison of the two periods shows how different representations of the salt’s value 
were operative in either case. Almeida’s team noted that the first story of the salt’s 
origins recounted by the population of the suco of Saelari, was much simpler than the 
second story, which the population of the suco of Nunira took up (though it was not 
associated exclusively with them). In the Saelari story, their ancestors were 
undertaking a death rite called na’abasu in Macassae, which involved sacrificing a 
buffalo. The buffalo escaped, running to several locations with the villagers in pursuit. 
In each of the locations the buffalo slept before being awoken by its pursuers. Finally 
it arrived at a location called Lema Isi Dandagu where it vanished into the water, 
making the water turn to salt (TP 4 February 2004). The Nunira account by contrast 
made explicit the kin connections of the population of Laga with Larantuka, an ex-
Portuguese settlement in east Flores. In the Nunira account, a princess, an only child, 
lived with her father who closely guarded her. One night a young bachelor descended 
in a blue beam from heaven and slept with the princess, entering her room through an 
opening in the roof of the family house. This happened for two further nights until the 
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third night when her father confronted the princess and young bachelor. 
 
Both the young bachelor and princess declared their intention to marry. After 
eventually calming himself, the father eventually agreed to the marriage on the 
condition that the young bachelor brought horses and buffalo from Macassar6 and 
gold and silver jewellery. The young bachelor gestured towards the site of what later 
became the salt lake, declaring that although he had never brought such things from 
heaven before, he would bring them to that place tomorrow (cf. Forman 1980:153). 
The princess’ father duly arrived at the site of the salt lake on the day, bringing with 
him two slaves and hunting dogs, but the young bachelor did not appear. After hours 
of waiting the slaves picked up two pieces of strange yellow ‘fruit’ that sprouted from 
the parched ground to eat on the journey home, and the group returned to Laga where 
the old man was met by the apologetic young bachelor, who asked if they had brought 
anything. ‘Only this piece of fruit’ replied the old man dejectedly, realising that one 
had been lost during the journey. The young bachelor planted the fruit in the ground 
and to his astonishment, the next morning the fruit had been transformed into many 
kinds of gold jewellery. The young bachelor encouraged the old man to return to the 
location of the fruit the next day where he forecast that he would find a lake full of 
salt. The old man sure enough returned the next day to find a lake of salt water. He 
returned to Laga and confirming his discovery, gave his permission for the marriage 
with his daughter to go ahead.  
 
The narrative reveals themes common to narratives associated with the ethnic group 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Another area of eastern Indonesia that features prominently in among others, origin narratives in East 
Timor 	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that populate the area, the Makassae, among whom marriage involves the exchange of 
work animals for women and food, seen when the princess’s father demands ‘horses 
and buffaloes from Makassar’ (in Sulawesi, in contemporary Eastern Indonesia) from 
the bachelor. In Makassae ritual, this exchange of animals for food and women is a 
metaphor for the life cycle (Forman 1980:160)7. The food is transformed when placed 
in the fertile land, seen in the above account when the yellow fruit becomes gold 
jewellery.  
 
However, and in common with Pinto Correia’s account, another level of meaning is to 
be found in the account’s production. Almeida’s interpretation of the tale appears to 
reveal an analysis in keeping with the ideological orientation of the mid-20th century 
New State. For example, by focussing on the similarities between the story of how the 
Fatuk Masin came to be, and the Bible, Almeida confirmed East Timor as being 
subject to a Portuguese colonisation that distinguished itself from other European 
forms of colonisation by being ‘sociologically Christocentric’ rather than 
‘ethnocentric’ (Castelo, 1998:131-2). The Samalari story of the Buffalo’s escape and 
immersion in the salt water, for example, ‘evokes the story of Genesis’. The Nunira 
account also bears a resemblance to another section of the Old Testament: 
 
…Loth’s wife was transformed into a statue of salt for having looked back, 
[olhado para trás] disobeying the angels’ insistent recommendations, [and] 
destroying the cities of Sodom and Gomorra, ignited by a combustion of 
sulphur, kindled by a beam that fell out of the sky, like the groom of the 
princess! (Almeida, 1960:12)  
 
Almeida also detected other similarities between the Nunira story and biblical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Forman comments: ‘This exchange is a statement about the extension of life through agricultural 
production and sexual reproduction’ 	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references to salt which serve to highlight what he perceived as mimesis: 
 
…The Christian liturgy also considers salt an element of extraordinary spiritual 
value: the salt of the earth called Jesus Christ to the apostles; it enters into the 
composition of holy water and of Gregorian water with which churches and 
altars are consecrated, it figures in exorcisms and in the ritual of baptism – the 
Timorese boast [vangloriam-se] of being Portuguese, not through conquest of 
war, but through water and through salt! (Almeida, 1960:12) 
 
Thus, Almeida’s account constituted a kind of ‘purification’ insofar as it 
superimposed Christian meanings on Laga’s salt. Moreover, the observation of 
indigenous adoption (‘boasting’) of Portuguese Christian culture may have been 
informed by structuralist paradigms within anthropology at the time, in which 
indigenous populations accommodated foreigners as their leaders. This view was also 
amenable to the view of the Portuguese as being especially and uniquely attuned to a 
fraternal relationship with its subject peoples. Colonial sovereignty could be more 
easily explained and justified if it was accepted that colonial subjects were not only 
complicit in the presence of foreigners, but actively imitated their colonisers8. A 
distinction must be made between such representations of East Timor through the 
image of salt and other ways of ascertaining meaning. For Mitchell, (1988) 
representation was itself indicative of modernity. To ‘[hold] the world in front of 
oneself and [make] it the object of representation shows its historical character and 
reveals itself as characteristic of modern times’ (Han, 2003:57). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  In other contexts, the exchange of salt preceded closer colonial engagements. Robbins (2004:52) 
notes that initially, the Urapmin in Papua New Guinea accepted Australian salt in exchange for goods 
of relatively high value to the Australians. This became a basis for increasingly unequal exchanges so 
that Urapmin eventually received little in return, before the Australians introduced a monetized form of 
exchange. Each change in the exchange relationship corresponded to encroachments by Australians or 
accommodations by Urapmin, with these exchanges a precursor to the introduction of written colonial 
law. 	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By contrast, meaning could be practically constituted through work. Almeida did not 
mention that the colonial authorities had compelled the local population to extract the 
salt (this inclusion would have made his account very unlikely to have been 
published). 
Indeed, Almeida omitted more than this: as a participant in debates regarding the 
Organic Law of the Overseas in 1953, (Lei Organico do Ultramar), Ultramar being 
the new name for colonies, he successfully advocated that East Timor should be 
exempt from the indigenato forced labour regime (Castelo, 1998:59). Despite this, by 
the 1950s and 1960s, adult males were made to work at collecting the salt (raut 
masin) for one month every year (Francisco da Costa Belo interview). As will be seen 
in the final section, claims over the Fatuk Masin were articulated in narratives of the 
kind recorded by Almeida, but were also based on experiences of collecting from it. 
This again shows that while narratives of the salt’s origins were intrinsic to the social 
lives of the residents of Nunira and Saelari, their experiences of being made to extract 
it were equally features of this sociality. From the salt’s different meanings, different 
values can be seen: as exchange, profit, a representation of unchanging colonial-
indigenous relations, competing narratives. The next section explores whether its 
meaning changed under radically different social circumstances. This corresponded 
with the differing experiences of those that collected it, which occurred during the 
Indonesian period. 
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V. The Indonesian and postcolonial periods: a transformation in power and 
meaning? 1975-2009 
 
By 1975, the local (male) population’s collection of the salt rock to fulfil the state’s 
obligations was a well-established practice. The Indonesian invasion and occupation 
thereafter precipitated a long period of displacement of the population of Laga 
subdistrict until 1978-9. As seen throughout the eastern part of the territory, during 
this year, many of the population surrendered to the Indonesian military. Those from 
Laga, as well as the populations of several sucos from Quelicai and Laivai, were 
moved to a concentration camp9 called Mulia where they were watched over by the 
Indonesian military. This period (c.1976-82) created two abiding legacies in the 
present. One was connected with displacement. This issue has been analysed in a 
study of ‘settlers’ from upland Waitame in Quelicai and ‘hosts’ who lived in Wai’aka, 
the location of the Mulia camp. In this context, rituals such as the reconstruction of 
uma luliks were taken to reinforce land claims which prevailed in the absence of 
legislation on land ownership (Thu, 2008:144-50). The second legacy of the period 
concerned rival claims over the fatuk masin in Binagua. This section therefore 
concentrates on the second of these claims by tracing changes in meaning as a result 
of the Indonesian period. In contrast to the previous section, where meaning of the 
salt was represented in the context of tropes used to justify colonisation, claims to the 
salt were generated through narratives of the salt’s origin and the idea of resistance.  
Just as the issue of resettlement of land involved claim making, so the salt also 
involved similar struggles over value and meaning.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The suco of Guruca in Quelicai for example saw 500 people surrender in 1979 (CAVR e.:3-4) and 
installed in Laga’s camps shortly after. The military sometimes moved people to other locations before 
bringing them to the coast. Some were initially transported to Baguia, (CAVR a.:5) which gradually 
gave way to the formation of the camp in Laga. 	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Laga’s history as a coastal colonial base, combined with the military’s intentions to 
settle upland populations on the coast, made it an obvious choice for establishing the 
Mulia camp in 1979. It was also a port that served as a point of departure for 
detainees that were shipped to the prison island of Atauro (Taylor, 104). Atrocious 
conditions in the camp saw many of its detainees die from a form of diarrhoea 
(muntaber) and other preventable diseases. The military dispensed infrequent 
consignments of dried fish, rice and corn porridge (bubuk) (CAVR, e.), with the Laga 
church providing supplies of food and clothing. As Thu notes, under detention in the 
camp, the population were prevented from cultivating root crops that were a mainstay 
of subsistence (Thu 2008:144). The only way the camp’s residents could leave to try 
and find additional food was with an official document permitting movement (surat 
jalan) or if accompanied by a member of the civil guard (Hansip). Nevertheless, while 
the perimeter of the camp was policed, it remained open in parts so that residents 
could enter and depart while evading detection by the military. This allowed people 
who were separated from normal sources of subsistence and confined to the town to 
scavenge for discarded food, and hunt in the forests (CAVR b.). 
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Map	  3	  
Map of Laga subdistrict showing suco and subdistrict boundaries. The location of Binagua (the suco which is ‘nearest’ to the disputed 
Fatuk Masin) is approximate.	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During or after these foraging and hunting expeditions, some inhabitants of Beliwali in 
Sagadati suco were shot dead by the military (CAVR b:4) that suspected their involvement 
with Falintil. Such an occurrence took place in 1980. According to their families and other 
locals, three people had gone to extract salt on the night of 14th 
August 1980. That evening, the three, Dominggas da Costa, Dominggos Gusmao and 
Martina Pereira were ambushed and killed by the Indonesian military1 (Aureliano de 
Jesus interview). The son of Dominggas, Marcal, in Laga at the time of the killing, learned 
about his mother’s death while in school the following day. Three days later, he and others 
buried his mother, Martina Pereira, and Dominggos Gusmao at Binagua. 
Martina Pereira was then reburied in 1987 in her family’s aldeia, Alasafa, without the 
military’s knowledge (Marcal Cardoso da Costa, interview)2. The extent of deaths still 
occurring in 1981 can be seen through the military’s digging of several mass graves (kuburan 
massal) in this period in Ulabuti, also in Sagadati, and another area near Laga town 
(CAVR.b:4). As noted previously, salt was exchanged with upland populations when 
harvests diminished or failed. With the prohibitions on movement described above and the 
starvation and disease faced by many in the camp, the value of this exchange became more 
pronounced. There was a black market for food, farming tools and precious metals. In the 
knowledge that this was happening, the local subdistrict administrator decreed in 1981 that 
harvesting and trading of salt should be permitted so that it could be sold in Baucau (Atanasio 
da Costa Pereira interview)3. This episode marks another juncture at which the value of salt 
became inseparable from the experiences of those that harvested it. As argued below, these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  According to more than one source, Battalion 731 had been responsible for the killings at the fatuk 
masin, of which a majority of its soldiers were reportedly from Maluku. Other sources mentioned 
Battalion 141, reportedly also stationed in the area during the period. 2	  Dominggas Gusmao and Dominggos da Costa were from the aldeia of Sirebuu in Sagadati suco.	  3	  Later in the 1980s, the Indonesian authorities established a salt factory in Laga on the sea front.	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experiences later informed claim making over the salt connected with each suco’s experience 
between 1975-99. 
 
After independence, in 2009, the administrator of Laga, Francisco da Costa Belo 
described ‘two big public polemics’ in Laga subdistrict, in a public meeting with the 
Ministry of Justice regarding proposed legislation on land and property. One was the 
question of Mulia or Wai’aka, and the other was the Fatuk Masin. Both issues involved 
claims over land, yet there was no written law on land and property while records of land 
titles from the Indonesian era had been destroyed or removed in 1999. Therefore customary 
tenure claims were used to assert ownership of land. In the case of the Fatuk Masin, the 
inhabitants of Nunira and Saelari recounted its origins in order to claim it, but the meaning of 
the Indonesian period encroached on previous claims to the salt4. Although the events of 
2006 were not as acutely felt in Laga as in Dili or Baucau town, claims over the salt became 
contentious during this year, when it began to be collected [raut masin] and sold by the ex-
Falintil commander and native of Laga, L-7 (chapter two). L-7 was the brother of Mauk 
Moruk, also known as Paulino Gama, a contentious figure unable to be accommodated in 
official histories of the resistance movement. Villagers from Nunira were unhappy that L-7 
and another brother, Tomas Gama, had begun to mine the salt without their knowledge. 
Implicitly, the mining by L-7, they said, privileged the Samalari/Saelari narrative of the salt’s 
origins. 
Moreover, they claimed, L-7 had not distributed proceeds from the salt, except to his kin 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Others made attempts to revive administrative arrangements from the Portuguese period. The aldeia of Ueru 
Mata in Binagua, the location of the Fatuk, petitioned CNRT’s office in Laga in 2000, then the Fretilin 
government in early 2003, to be considered as a suco. It had been ‘demoted’ from being a suco 
‘in the Portuguese period’, after which it was incorporated into the suco of Samalari as an aldeia (Petition to 
government, 2003). 	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group in Saelari. The situation came to a head when Nunira villagers intended to confront L-7 
at a public meeting in February 2009, which he did not attend. They had also been aggravated 
by L-7’s claims that he was entitled to the salt because he had ‘liberated the people’ (Antonio 
de Castro interview). L-7 referred to salt’s use as a mainstay of exchange, for when ‘the rain 
stops and the corn and rice die, and the people fish in the sea. The salt is not just for me, but 
for people to work on and sustain their families’ (TP, 21 March 2009). Rather than being 
exchanged for produce from fertile upland areas, however, it was stored in Tomas Gama’s 
silo and reportedly exported, via an Indonesian company called ‘Hercules’5, possibly with the 
knowledge of the Ministry of Tourism Trade and Industry (MTCI) (TS, 27-4-09). During the 
following month, government officials from the MTCI made an early morning visit to the 
Fatuk Masin as part of an assessment of the feasibility of establishing a factory to process the 
salt. They were confronted by a group who reportedly demanded that the government 
facilitate dialogue between Nunira and Saelari. Later, L-7 complained that while bringing a 
machine to sift salt to the site, he had been confronted by a group ‘not representative of the 
people, but organised by the administrator [Francisco da Costa Belo]…who used harsh words 
to me, L-7, and committed criminal acts by stoning my car [tuda fatuk]’ (TP, 21 March 
2009). Villagers from Nunira calling themselves the Council of the elders, Suco Nunira, Laga 
(Konselhu Lia Nain Komunidade Suku Nunira, Sub-distritu Laga) then petitioned Xanana 
Gusmao, who ordered that mining should immediately stop (Francisco da Costa Belo 
interview). 
 
Other mineral deposits existed further along the coast at Laivai in Lautem district. L-7 
had also either investigated or prospected for manganese in the area, locals claimed, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  People that I spoke to in Laga were unsure if the owner of this company was Hercules Rozario Marcal, who 
had been associated with state-supported paramilitary groups during the Indonesian period. 
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and they had no problem with this, as long as it was first subject to an agreement 
and not taken covertly at night [tula nonook dadeer nakukun kalan] (Alcino Ramisa, 
interview). Manganese had already been extracted in 1974 in the suco of Euquisi. Like the 
Caibada manganese, its extraction had been funded by Japanese investment6 
(Duarte dos Anjos Marques, interview). At an annual meeting, people were resistant to any 
prospecting unless it involved consultation with them beforehand and agreement about its 
distribution. As noted above, the area of Vemasse, along with Caibada and Seiçal, contained 
deposits of manganese. It also contained magnesium. After the exploitation of Laga’s salt had 
stopped, L-7 asked parliament for permission to mine this magnesium. In justifying this, he 
reiterated the claim that as he had liberated the people, he could also liberate them from 
poverty, adding that he had a ‘responsibility’ to ‘check the quality of the magnesium so that 
the government can handle it’ (TP, 1 April 2009) Nunira residents’ disquiet continued, 
causing political realignments to be reconsidered. Nunira’s representative of UNDERTIM, L-
7’s political party, resigned in 2009 and pledged allegiance to Xanana Gusmao’s political 
party, CNRT (Atanasio da Costa Pereira, interview). Local support for L-7’s party throughout 
Baucau had ensured that it was among the most popular in the district during parliamentary 
elections in 2007 (Grainger, 2007). Yet, UNDERTIM had been “obliterated” [rahun] in Laga 
following conflict over the Fatuk (Antonio de Castro interview)7. There were also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  According to Duarte dos Anjos Marques, a guide to the Japanese that prospected for deposits, the 
Katuas of Euqisi had to pray [hamulak] and sacrifice sheep and goats before work started in order to 
guarantee an abundance of the deposits, but more importantly, to guarantee that there would be more in 
the future. The project was marred by controversy when the 45 workers from the area that extracted the deposits 
were promised 30 Escudos a day, but paid only 20 by the Portuguese Captain that was entrusted with making 
the payments. After a month, the workers were given 10 escudos extra directly by the Japanese prospectors. 
Marques said that 60 tonnes of the manganese was transported to the local posto in SAPT vehicles in order to be 
used in the construction of a bridge. 	  7	  Castro, Laga’s liurai, said: ‘there is still a problem with [L-7’s] brothers. They are absent. Perhaps 
they feel embarrassed [by the conflict]. Recently we heard that they were sad. Perhaps they want to look for a 
way to come back to the community again [buka fali meius atu besik fali]… we still recognize [L-7’s] suffering 
but these problems have made things worse. He wants to become rich quickly’. 
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increasingly vocal protests in Laga itself, a place that lacked many basic facilities, reportedly 
only having been connected to running water in 2004. L-7’s residence partly occupied a 
former primary school, leaving the town lacking in this regard. Some villagers claimed that 
L-7 had forgotten where he was from, and showed ‘arrogance’. His actions were indicative of 
remoteness8, they said, that became more than symbolic following his ascent to parliament in 
Dili in 2005. 
 
At the same time as tensions between leaders of Saelari and Nunira continued, others held 
different views. Under legislation to support the families of those that died while involved in 
resistance, Marcal Cardoso da Costa, the son of Martina Pereira who had been killed at the 
Fatuk Masin in 1980, applied as next of kin to have his mother 
recognised as a Martyr, and consequently to receive a survival pension from the RDTL state. 
At the time that we spoke, he was waiting for the outcome of his application, the 1305th 
considered by the Secretary of State for Veterans (Marcal Cardoso da Costa interview). In the 
light of events in 1980, da Costa wanted exploitation of salt at the Fatuk Masin to stop 
altogether. Coming from a different suco in Laga, Sagadati, he had not been involved in 
Nunira or Saelari’s claims. 
 
This section has shown that salt’s meaning was practically instituted through work on it 
during the Indonesian period. In contrast to representations of manganese and salt by colonial 
administrators and anthropologists, the value of the Fatuk Masin was contested on the basis 
of the local population’s experiences of collecting it across the Portuguese and Indonesian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Dook, or ‘far’ can mean aloofness as well as physical distance. It is seen as important to remain close to one’s 
kin group and the land that they are connected to, partly because returning regularly to appease ancestors is 
believed to prevent against sickness or misfortune. For example, families of Falintil guerillas that were in the 
jungles, sometimes held ‘séances’ before meals to commune with ancestors, apologizing for the absence of 
guerillas from these events (Felix Magalhaes interview).	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periods. These experiences were fused with local narratives of the salt’s origins to form the 
basis of claims made to it after independence. Such claims highlighted divergent 
understandings of what quality ‘resistance’ has, as L-7 and his Saelari kin group, or Nunira, 
used different understandings to justify claims to the salt (cf. Traube, 2008). Conversely, 
others made claims that did not connect the salt to ownership of a particular suco or kin 
group, by applying to the state’s pension schemes. On the face of it, as mentioned in chapter 
four, despite the state’s rationalisation of the resistance, it was shown how ex-combatant 
families used the proceeds of pensions to construct buildings that were affective or 
performative symbols to the dead. Yet at the same time, there is another dimension to 
considering how the state is viewed in such circumstances. On the one hand, the state’s 
levying of fines and taxes for life and death through the head tax, taxes on funerary rites, and 
forced labour, was consistent with the process of expansion of its ‘domain’ since at least the 
early 20th century. On the other, for Baucau’s most numerous ethno-linguistic group, the 
Makassae, death represents not a time for the dissolution of ties forged through marital 
alliance, but for their renewal.  
As Forman explains: The death of an individual is celebrated in a series of rituals in which 
his descent group, acting as intermediaries between its own wife-givers and wifetakers, 
coordinates exchanges between them and effects significant death ‘payments’ to the 
deceased’s closest matrilineal kin…The emergence of the descent group at centre stage in the 
immediate, obligatory, and relatively large mortuary exchanges is an overt statement that the 
system is supraindividual and that the bonds of unity remain strong. Descent is but the 
offspring of alliance, expressed in the idiom of exchange (Forman, 1980:153, emphasis 
added) 
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It is not impossible to imagine that the state is seen as occupying the same status as the 
descent group’s intermediary status in making death payments. Thus, rather than only 
usurping traditional rituals through regulating death, the postcolonial state may be interpreted 
as a locus of power through which ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ forms of sociality intersect. 
This can also be seen from a visit by Xanana Gusmao to Laga in 
2003, when local people appealed to the then president to be connected to clean water, but 
also to quickly locate and repatriate the remains of David Alex (TP, 29 September 2003) so 
that appropriate funerary rites could be observed. As noted in chapter one, the state instituted 
itself as much by honouring the dead as implementing a rational system of its evaluation. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that state formation in the early 20th century can, on one level, 
be characterised by attendant processes of monetization and taxation. At another level, these 
processes themselves show the extent of the state’s evaluation of life and death. Rather than 
demonstrating a direct linear progression between ‘bio-power’ in colonial and postcolonial 
contexts, marked divergences between these periods are evident. Partly, this is due to the way 
in which the postcolonial state has instituted itself through history, which has involved taking 
charge of the population’s claims. Just as rational calculation has been but one element 
characterising the postcolonial state, so the population has similarly not seen the state 
according to this characterisation. 
 
More particularly, in order to trace how divergences with postcolonial contexts can be 
explained I have sought to account for power relations at work in the course of the 
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colonial state’s modest expansion. At the level of objects and symbols, this involved 
tracing how their meaning changed in different contexts and across time. It has been 
coherently argued elsewhere that the colonial-indigenous relationship relied on the 
observance of rites and symbols key to its sustenance (Roque, 2010). I have argued that 
changes in meaning could also result from the practical engagements of work. In different 
temporal contexts, meanings changed according to subjects’ work on objects that they lived 
in the midst of. For example, the manganese extraction venture at 
Caibada illustrated the monetary value of the manganese, a system of value in the form of 
contracts (debenture bonds), and ultimately meaning as the value of ‘sacrifices’ of the lives of 
local manganese miners to the venture. This account and Almeida’s account of salt extraction 
in 1950s Laga show very different representations of two kinds of objects according to value: 
one as a commodity; the other as symbol and object in an ethnographic account. This brought 
to the fore a wide divergence between representation and practice, as well as historical 
contingency. That practice was more important in forging meaning beyond colonial texts is 
evident from the meaning ascribed to Laga’s salt both in terms of local narratives of its 
origins, and claims on the basis of work collecting it until 1975, then in very different 
circumstances during the Indonesian period. Thus, work has had profound bearings on 
changes in meaning, of which distinctions exist between its representations and practices. 
 
Other accounts have contended that ‘monetization’ is a central part of state formation. 
According to Norbert Elias, money made people, industries, and force coalesce around those 
that gained revenues from its use as a system of exchange (1994[1939]). Others by contrast 
viewed money as an instrument to create social stability and fixity of populations, much as 
indigenous redistribution of profits or produce was intended to. As a currency, however, 
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money, unlike barter, meant and represented something that it was not and thus the meaning 
of the thing to be exchanged was displaced. This displacement raises other elemental issues 
about exchange and meaning. For example, to a significant extent, colonial state formation in 
early 20th century East Timor involved taxation. This saw the meaning of money, with an 
extrinsic (relative, denominational) value become more widely recognised, if still in limited 
circulation. As I have argued, tax became associated with money, and usually, as a substitute 
in money’s absence, associated with work. Unsurprisingly, therefore, state formation can be 
seen as being dependent on the lives and work of the population. On the other hand, the state 
used similar monetary equivalences to regulate death. The origins of money’s use in the 
levying of compensation for murder was shown to have accompanied the state’s expansion, 
and intended to regulate exchange. Taken at face value, the state could change the meaning of 
things through imposing a system of exchange by instilling in objects extrinsic values, 
whether through regulating life or death.  
 
Yet while a systematisation of exchange that stabilised the fundaments of life and death 
appears to point towards increasing ‘rationalisation’ of the colonial state, if this was ever the 
case, a progression to a ‘modern biopolitical regime’ has not simply eventuated in a 
postcolonial context. The conferral of awards and pensions on families of the dead disrupts 
assumptions of a linear process of increasing rationality in two ways. First, after 1999, locals 
claimed ownership of Laga’s salt by invoking historical practices of work, as well as origin 
narratives. The struggle over resistance and sacrifice (or invocations of suffering, according 
to other accounts) was therefore as much a part of asserting a truthful version of history at the 
local level as it was in instituting the state. Second, both the state’s regulation of death 
through both survival pensions and handling the search, exhumation and reburial of the dead 
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and disappeared, and local views of the state’s role in the process, shows considerable 
overlap. On the one hand, the state evaluates, and makes awards on the basis of martyrdom. 
On the other (from the perspective of bereaved families, for example) the state appropriately 
regulates death through compensation and ceremony. These themes related to life and death 
and their divergent trajectories in colonial and postcolonial periods are further explored in the 
next chapter. 
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5. Plantation, house and family: from missionary modernity to postcolonial bio-
power? 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter showed how evaluations of death were evident in processes of 
state formation, such as taxing funerary rites, compensation, forced labour and 
debenture bonds. This chapter identifies and illuminates elements of missionary power, 
showing how they cultivated various aspects of life, in particular, suggesting that 
missionaries believed that ‘modern’ habitats and family were key ways through which 
populations could be made sedentary and converted. It therefore elaborates on the 
proposition made in the introduction to the thesis, that emplacement was central to the 
colonial project. It concludes that the merely partial ‘effectiveness’ of instilling 
‘modern’ forms of habitat and family can be traced to the nature of these attempts over 
the course of the 20th century. While this project was limited, the chapter also shows 
ways in which, latterly, the population has autonomously reproduced modern habitats as 
symbols of value connected with their affective and performative meanings.  
 
However, interwoven through this configuration is a series of paradoxes relating to the 
nature of missionary power and complicity and resistance to it. First, although from the 
early 20th century missionaries purported to ‘civilise’, and banish ‘paganism’, they 
continued to be perceived by populations where they worked as though wielding 
spiritual powers. Correspondingly, missionaries exploited these powers, seemingly at 
odds with their avowed objectives of eliminating superstitious belief and practice. In 
other words, missionary pretensions to spread modernity often contrasted with their 
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own continued use of established, older strategies of power. Second, missionaries 
focussed their conversion efforts on forming Christian families. With women as 
guardians of the family’s propriety, so the thinking went, civilised norms situated within 
modern habitats would take root throughout the Christian population and influence 
‘heathens’ to submit to Christianity. This did not happen on the scale anticipated, but 
instead, other legacies of this approach are shown - such as the care of children – that 
continue to inform missionary power in the present. Furthermore, motifs of 
contemporary politics, such as martyrdom, are legacies of missionary work explored in 
a case study of an aristocratic family of Christian converts. Lastly, while the ‘modern’ 
dimensions of plantation agriculture are explored - enumerating workers, establishing 
discipline, making profit – it is concluded that their significance lay at least as much in 
their interplay with a mythologised, idealised and antiquated image of plantations. This 
saw the promotion, under late colonialism, of agriculture together with the use of 
technology. As will be explored in chapter five, the promotion of agricultural and 
technical education was premised and promoted on the basis that they were ‘apolitical’. 
Yet, as will be shown, despite the sponsorship of avowedly apolitical missionaries 
during the Indonesian period, technology and agriculture could be politically powerful. 
This is evident in diverse ways. For example, houses built with materials provided by 
mission schools represented the population’s autonomy from the Indonesian state. 
These arguments are elaborated and shown to have relevance for postcolonial politics. 
For example, in chapter two, while the state was shown to have instituted itself through 
establishing a system of value by making awards to ex-combatants, the final section of 
the chapter shows how value might alternatively be perceived through the symbolic and 
affective meanings of material objects. This connects the previous explorations of 
habitats and families with its postcolonial renderings.   
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The terms used throughout this chapter, particularly emplacement, habitat and family, 
are used in specific ways, but as will become clear, are neither associated with 
‘modernity’ nor ‘tradition’. This is significant because I use emplacement, for example, 
primarily to describe strategies of settling populations, but this does not correspond to 
contemporary terms taken from the vocabulary of ‘development’ such as ‘reintegration’ 
or ‘relocation’, which imply a technical process and is sometimes contrasted with 
displacement as a result of violence. There are other conceptual difficulties with 
regarding emplacement as ‘modern’, because of evidence suggesting that indigenous 
strategies of countering unpopular colonial or indigenous rule have been traced to the 
earliest colonial contact with Timor (Hagerdal, 2012). For example, while colonial and 
missionary attempts to ‘emplace’ have ‘modern’ connotations, its converse of fleeing is 
not. ‘Emplacement’ is also used differently from the term ‘emplaced tradition’, used in 
recent scholarship to describe communities’ return to settlements from where they were 
displaced during the Indonesian period (McWilliam and Traube 2011). Notwithstanding 
the value of these studies, their explicit identification of the role of tradition in 
emplacement risks overlooking the agency of missions or the state except when 
concerned with displacement.  
 
Similarly, the meaning of habitat has been interpreted in a number of ways. 
Anthropologists of a structuralist bent have seen habitat, and indigenous houses in 
particular, as generative of their subjects’ social lives through which relations among 
kin are mediated and meaning instilled in relationships (Hicks, 1976; Traube, 1986) For 
the purpose of this study, a distinction exists between these analyses and habitats 
promoted by colonial authorities, or (re)produced with such aesthetic similarities in 
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mind. As such, the performative dimensions of colonial buildings and their associations 
with colonial knowledge need to be considered. Colonial buildings did not merely 
house people or materials, but as Stoler has put it, were ‘edifices of…stone’ and 
‘monuments to the asserted know-how of colonial rule’ (Stoler, 2009:2). Buildings, or 
other spaces designating territory as belonging to colonial authority such as plantations, 
were intended to order space, but as argued previously, also to sedentarise the 
population. Implicit in colonial designs for the built environment in other contexts, for 
example, were ideas of solidity, contrasted with the supposed fluidity of the tropics 
(Mrazek, 2001:43). Colonial buildings are viewed less as affecting structures therefore, 
and more as objects and symbols that were intended to display conformity, resistance, 
wealth, or some other relative value.  
  
Lastly, family is understood as missionaries understood its form – ‘modern’ and 
‘nuclear’ – and prioritised the conversion of its members, with women and children 
first. This allows a focus on how ‘modern’ families were understood as preferable for 
reasons of morality, but also as transmission points for colonial influence. It therefore 
follows other studies with similar perspectives (Taylor, 2009[1983]; Stoler, 2002). 
Other dynamics, also common to such accounts, such as East Timorese-Portuguese 
unions in marriage, have been dealt with extensively in other studies (Roque, 2012). 
Making the broader population receptive to the influence of these families, missionaries 
believed, was only possible in the context of wider evangelising that primarily targeted 
women and children, because missionaries experienced problems converting men. 
Women and children’s reputed diligence in maintaining Christian norms within families 
would, so the thinking had it, make population subject to missionary attentions. 
Missionaries perceived women especially as conveying modern ways of living to 
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prospective Christians, more so, so the thinking went, if their exemplars held higher 
social status. Qualities such as martyrdom and loyalty, part of the colonial-missionary 
lexicon, often associated with aristocrats like the Corte-Reals, outlived the Portuguese 
period (Alvarez, 1951). Through prioritising these groups, missionaries intended to 
ensure a durable basis for Christianity among natives, a strategy still evident on the cusp 
of decolonisation in 1975 (Sousa, 2003:8), just as it was in the early 1900s, as 
highlighted below.  
 
II. Missionising families 
 
As the anthropologist Shepard Forman proposed, missionary marriages among East 
Timor’s aristocracy were carried out with the objective of disrupting barlaki 
(Portuguese: barlaque) kin alliances, which the government and missions saw as 
compromising colonial security (Forman 1978:105). A sense of this objective is 
conveyed from accounts of marriages among the indigenous aristocracy in the late 19th 
century. Furthermore, marriages were rituals that reified a joint, public display of 
indigenous-aristocratic and missionary power. Public Christian ceremonies were not 
only a way of attempting to keep regulos in the fold, but performed in front of their 
people, missionaries thought that regulo prestige and authority could be enhanced 
(Teixeira, 1974: 219). 
 
At the same time, these ceremonies foreshadowed wider evangelisation in the early 20th 
century among the population at large, resulting in initially gradual but later steadier 
increases in conversions. Evangelising was intended to cement missionary influence 
among families. This became obvious when the missionary net was cast wider to take in 
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non-aristocratic families. There were particular difficulties with converting men, and 
thus efforts to surmount this were made by first converting children. An account from 
1905 attests to efforts to first convert children: ‘With a French horn…[the priest] played 
improvised airs. In a little time, he had been surrounded with children, small and large, 
in whom the sound of the instrument awoke first amazement, then curiosity and then, 
surrounding the player, complete hilarity and confidence. When he saw that the 
audience was already large, he stopped the concert and began the catechism’ (Teixeira, 
1974: 237; cf. Simbulan 2005:18). This strategy was intended to lead to children being 
entrusted to the mission, but also as a point of entry for conversion of families evident 
from an account from Manatuto a few years later:  
 
It started with one girl who was the first Christian in that area. A short time 
after, I admitted some four children from the majority of the povoações. Then 
the fathers started to come to our house, and seeing the children dressed by the 
European and well treated, lost their fear. Later came the mothers: here, led by 
other women, living closer to us, [they] visited the nuns and, being well 
received, lost the fear that had appeared in front of the malai [foreigner] 
(BGEDM 1908:193)  
 
The missionising strategy was above all however attuned to women, considered to be 
the lynchpin of families. Making a case for this in the few years before the Republican 
revolution in 1910, a missionary source records “a notable difference in that section of 
the people that have received the beneficial [influence] derived from the schools, 
especially [those] of the feminine sex” (BGEDM, 1906:234). This strategy was not 
without detractors, among them the province’s governor in the late 1920s, Teofilo 
Duarte. He believed that missions should concentrate on the rational, measurable results 
to be had from technical education. Explicitly criticising the missionary focus on 
cultivating Christian women, he wrote:  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
182	  
 
There are numerous girls educated in internatos, who after some years of 
learning and education, leave [and are] suited to make a civilised life. But 
accompany them for some years and it will be seen that they give in to 
European lovers, or in the case of those that marry, they regress to a kaffir-like 
[caffreal] state, rather than civilizing their husbands; there are exceptions to be 
sure, but in general, things happen like this (Duarte, 1928:367). 
 
To some extent this reflected typically but not exclusively Republican preoccupations 
after 1910, when the missionary role in education was temporarily suspended, only to 
be reinstated within a few years for want of alternatives. Indeed, missions later 
welcomed responsibilities that included technical education following the advent of the 
New State in the 1930s. Authorities and missions promoted the ‘correct’ internal 
dynamics of the family, providing the basis for continuing to pursue the strategy of 
putting women and children at the forefront of conversion, reflected in assorted pieces 
of legislation1 (Duarte, 1987:40). The emphasis on these particular dynamics of 
Christian families may have found more converts, but did not lead to the destruction of 
barlaki in all its various forms (Hicks, 2012: 124-5). This could already be seen in 1927 
when missionaries recorded that they carried out 233 weddings, of which the majority 
were not ‘fresh’ marriages but “between Christians that lived barlaqueados, that is, 
married in an indigenous way and living a life of perfect heathens” (BEDM, July Aug 
Sept 1927:391)2. As Roque (2012) has posited, differing views on marriage between 
mission and military in the late 19th century may have impeded missionary objectives. 
Yet, another aspect of missionary practice remained largely unchanged, with wider 
evangelisation leading to sovereignty over the family deriving from the care of children.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A 1926 decree had ‘domestic education’ as one of its aims understood to mean ‘…[making] of the 
indigenous woman a careful housewife [dona da casa] and good mother of the family’.	  2	  As the same source indicates, other things indicated more evangelising, such as a steep rise in the 
dispensation of the Eucharist. In 1924, 18,000 were dispensed, in 1925, 59,000 and in 1926, 93,000.	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As well as winning influence in families, missionaries attempted to define space and 
territory. With accounts that emphasise the ‘modernity’ of missionary action, however, 
are parallel processes that are potentially problematic for such interpretations. 
Indigenous beliefs that missionaries could consecrate or damn land and its buildings 
still existed. Missionaries made use of this power. Accompanying an account of 
attempts to win converts in Soibada in 1908, for example, a priest wrote that he had 
been sought out to make land free of danger by destroying ‘superstitious places’, but 
also ‘undoing sorcery’ [dezfazendo feitiças] (BGEDM, Jan 1908:194). In another case 
in Soibada, a disgruntled missionary, Father Ananias, put a curse on recalcitrant locals 
‘centuries before’. Only in 1933 did the mission superior agree to lift the curse ⁠ in a 
ceremony (Alvarez, 1951: 18; Teixeira, 1974: 500-1). These practices of claim-making 
over space, continuing in parallel with much-heralded attempts to win converts from the 
early 20th century under the aegis of modernity, were to some extent hollow, however. 
While missionaries appeased indigenous perceptions of their power, in the longer term 
this did not lead to the profusion of ‘civilised’ norms with which missionaries invested 
their work.  
 
In the thirty years between 1945 and decolonisation in 1975, the colony became 
gradually subject to more material attention as the regime in Lisbon sought to justify its 
rule, especially after encountering increasing opposition in Africa. In the 1960s in East 
Timor, there are indications of the use of long-established varieties of missionary power 
behind modern technologies of rule. Father Jorge Barros Duarte, then Governor of the 
Diocese of Dili, recommended the creation of rural schools to the Directorate of 
Education in Dili and proposed that these be the centrepieces of aldeamentos [village 
settlements] constructed by the state afresh, or as extensions to existing settlements, 
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which would be built around a school’s outskirts. Duarte promoted Church social 
programmes, including a literacy and house construction programme, directed by Father 
Apolinario Guterres, a young Timorese priest in the sub-district of Ai-Assa in Bobonaro 
district. The programme was intended to encourage new houses to be built with ‘more 
hygienic materials’, with chiefs leading the way. (Duarte, 1987:113)  
 
When villagers from Oeleu village expressed worry that a school had been built on 
land that was occupied by spirits [rai manas], Guterres assured them that it was ‘no 
longer under the influence of the demon’. Duarte hailed Gutterres’ ‘rare intuition of the 
Timorese soul’ in attempting to banish superstition and compared him with a 
‘modernising’ Portuguese priest who, centuries before, in Goa, had similarly 
encouraged the construction of native dwellings close to schools, a hospital, and piped 
water (Duarte, 1987: 127). Given the time period, furthermore, Duarte’s plan has 
resonances with the counterinsurgency strategy employed in Mozambique3 (Hall and 
Young, 1997:26-35). The East Timorese aldeamentos did not signal, as far as is known, 
state and mission attempts to stop anticolonial activities. Yet considerations of security 
were never distant. In the late 19th century, Ai-Assa was considered a perennially 
rebellious area. After Governor Forjaz concluded a military campaign in the area in 
1891 it was reported that ‘the terror that took hold of all that people was so great …that 
if the Governor would today send a force calling them to obedience, vassalage would 
immediately be rendered’ (Uma Guerra no Destricto de Timor: 46). The Ai-Assa case 
showed moreover that missionaries could promote putatively modern habitats through 
demonstrating varieties of pre-20th century missionary power. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Special aldeamentos were built to separate Frelimo, or Frente de Libertação de Moçambique 
[Mozambique Liberation Front] from its peasant base of support. 	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Expanding conversion efforts to a broader audience saw missionaries accommodate this 
paradox, however, and the idea of emplacing the population persisted. A significant, if 
unexplored origin of these ideas can be found in plantation agriculture in the early 20th 
century, further examined below. In particular, plantations provided ideal testing 
grounds for emplacing Christian families, where the reticence of potential converts and 
the implications for ‘security’ were not obstacles. Successive governors made this 
possible, some more vigorously than others, by following a parallel strategy to make the 
colony profitable. The attempts to produce Christian families in these spaces are 
suggestive of their importance as a strategy of rule, as explored in the next section.  
 
III. Emplacing Christian families 
 
Plantation agriculture was entwined with the prosecution of wars by the colonial 
government from the mid-19th century. Military stewardship of plantations was partly a 
necessity of the state’s meagre presence, and partly as a consequence of Governor 
Afonso de Castro’s original plans in the mid-19th century that permitted forcible land 
clearances and fencing off of cultivation areas, with produce sold to the government at a 
fixed price (Lains e Silva, 1956:33). Some plantations controlled by Governor Celestino 
da Silva’s plantation company, SAPT, Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho [Society 
of Agriculture, Homeland and Work] were emblematic of military victories, such as that 
of the sacred land at Talo in 1894 (Davidson, 1994:198), and defeated populations were 
conscripted to work on da Silva’s plantations. Historically, moreover, those accused by 
indigenous chiefs of criminality could be supplied as indentured labourers on 
plantations (Hagerdal, 2012), a way for fines levied by the state to be paid (Pinto 
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Correa, 1934:43). Although plantation agriculture continued to be pursued in spite of its 
unprofitability (Lains e Silva, 1956), plantations were also significant because they were 
places where the first steps were taken to assemble information on the population 
through censuses of the plantation workforce (Lains e Silva, 1956:31-35). Thus 
Portuguese strategies in East Timor, while clearly operating on a more modest scale, 
had this much in common with other southeast Asian colonial regimes that used 
‘increasingly sophisticated administrative means to enumerate populations, including 
the women and children (whom the ancient rulers had always ignored)’ (Anderson, 
2006:168)  
 
The interest of missionaries in plantations was not restricted to evangelising. According 
to one source, they attempted to ‘mitigate the worst effects of the forced labour 
introduced by…da Silva’ on the population (Carey, 1999:79). Missionaries also turned 
their attentions to the cultivation of coffee and other crops, seen as a way to be weaned 
off dependence on contributions from the China-based missions. Father Joachim 
Medeiros, Mission Superior, first introduced cacao in the 1870s (Rocha, 1914:4)4. His 
successor introduced Liberia coffee to the plantation at Dare and wrote guides on coffee 
cultivation in his spare time (Teixeira, 1974:208). Already having affirmed victories by 
establishing plantations on (sometimes sacred) land, Silva realised the value of 
missionary patronage and assisted the Jesuits with the construction of the Soibada 
school in 1899, (opened in 1904). Having established the SAPT company, moreover, he 
invited the missions to evangelise at its plantations. These close relations between 
mission and governor provoked the ridicule of da Silva’s detractors who suggested that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Pélissier (1996:94) presents circumstantial evidence in claiming that Medeiros’ interest in plantations 
was so great that he may have had the Regulo of Lacluta, Dom Custodio Valente Gaio, arrested and 
deported to Mozambique in order to take over his coffee plantation. 	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he had employed the missions on plantations to arrange marriages between workers and 
‘pupils’ from an adjoining missionary-run ‘asylum’ for girls, benefitting both the 
mission and Celestino, so that ‘…such weddings and consequent baptisms served to 
increase the statistics of the missions, demonstrating the progress of Catholicism among 
the natives’ (Correia, 1909:57-59).  
 
Da Silva was also alleged to have forced marriage on pupils that he disliked. 
Inflected with a scurrilous tone, it was implied furthermore that orphanages served a 
sinister purpose, with a second, alcoholic Jesuit priest drafted in ‘to care for the Micas, 
Luzias, and Inezes that Celestino guards in his harem [seralho].’ (Correia, 1909: 57-59) 
Despite their polemical nature, the claims are partly corroborated by a missionary 
source:  
 
…In a very picturesque setting of the extensive plantation there is a house that 
serves as an asylum for girls, orphans or children of prisoners of war that are 
sustained there, fed, clothed and educated at the cost of the governor. 
Ordinarily, those young women, reaching the competent age, are married to 
employees or workers of the plantation. It is in truth meritorious work, 
especially as those living in the asylum are made Christians through baptism 
and education…The Governor is godfather to all of the plantation workers 
(BGEDM Dec 1905:144).   
 
It is tempting to see these marriages merely as ‘acts of salvation’ that resonated with 
older tropes about rescuing the indigenous population (Alexandre, 2000:221). Later 
descriptions also reinforce the idea that life on SAPT plantations was better than living 
under the ‘yolk of the ferocious regulo’ (O dia de Timor, 1934:22). Yet equally, Silva’s 
God-parenthood might be understood in its original formulation, as symbolically 
establishing kin relations to the exclusion of natural parents (Bossy, 2010:15-16). This 
points to two implications in the longer term. First, the ‘exclusion’ of natural parents is 
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in a sense reflected in practices in the contemporary politics of parents entrusting 
children to Catholic Church orphanages, due to one or both parents’ deaths, but also if 
they were ‘divorced or too poor’ (Josepha Marques Boavida, interview). Secondly, 
retaining children of prisoners of war, or orphans, was a practice that persisted beyond 
the early 20th century, being a feature of the Indonesian occupation. For example, 
following the invasion, during the late 1970s, the Indonesian military used ‘orphanages’ 
in Dili to lure parents out of hiding from the interior (CAVR, h.:10; van Klinken, 2012). 
Thus missionary (and later Church) care of East Timorese children during the 
Indonesian period, whether orphaned or not, saw a profound intensification of this base 
of missionary power in competition with the Indonesian authorities.  
 
Beyond plantations, however, evangelising the aftermath of wars was not always 
feasible. An entire village took flight in 1906 because of the violent conduct, for 
unspecified reasons, of a detachment of local moradores, [indigenous colonial military 
auxiliaries] compromising missionary efforts (BGEDM, July 1906) Fleeing was still 
regularly practised by the 1930s. A military detachment sent to the Oecusse enclave to 
try to apprehend rebels involved two decades previously in the Boaventura rebellion, 
made the rebels - and the entire community - flee to Dutch-controlled Timor (BEDM, 
October 1933). By the mid-1920s Governor Teofilo Duarte stated his intention to 
‘group dispersed populations’ (Martinho, 1943:94). Plans to construct aldeamentos by 
the mid-1930s seem clearer in the light of these sentiments. House construction and 
village layout, it was thought, could mitigate the possibility of the spread of infectious 
diseases. Their location on the periphery of towns made them more costly to construct 
but ensured, in the thinking of their designer, that they could be subject to surveillance 
and serve as quarantine zones. Antonio Jacinto Magro, the same engineer that designed 
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a tuberculosis and infectious disease quarantine facility in Dili, selected the location of 
Aldeia Sapata, newly constructed in 1939 outside Aileu town (Fontoura, 1942:26-27).  
 
In the 1930s, the New State promoted missionary activity as a way to civilise far-flung 
populations throughout the empire. In a convergence of practice, the missions endorsed 
the organisation of aldeias according to whether they contained Christian or Heathen 
inhabitants. Missionaries suggested that a government decree for Mozambique and 
Angola5 was ‘largely adaptable to the conditions of Timor’, (BEDM April 1935). 
‘Christian villages’ were planned only to be composed of married couples that had been 
educated by the missions. Although the plans remained unrealised, they show the 
seriousness with which missionaries saw new opportunities to determine the ordering of 
space. 
 
By the 1930s, too, descriptions of SAPT plantations had changed. Workers’ huts were 
arranged as streets or in small clusters of houses. Men and boys of ten years of age went 
to the factory where they were distributed to various tasks ‘according to aptitude and 
work in progress’ (O dia de Timor, 1934:21), while women collected rations from silos 
for the family. References to the children of prisoners of war and orphans who worked 
on the plantation appeared only once, their care demonstrated not through Christian 
marriage, but through the special workers assigned to ‘cook and distribute food to them’ 
(O dia de Timor, 1934: 21). References to the monopoly of Catholic missionaries on 
marriage were absent6.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Entitled ‘the Basis for a New Social-economic organisation of the Population having the aim of fixation 
and development’. 
6	  A ‘long-established arrangement’ of supplying contract workers from Suai, Viqueque and Vemasse (O 
dia de Timor, 1934:22), where the regulos were said to have instructed their subjects to seek work further 
afield, may have originated with the sale of slaves from those areas.  
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These laudatory accounts of modern plantation regimes, written by an unknown author, 
have to be reconciled with three things. First, they were probably attempts to counter 
claims that slavery was widely practised throughout the Portuguese empire. Second, 
moreover, they promoted and justified the place of the plantation within colonial 
imagery. Thus, allied with aspirations to modernity were mythologised images of 
antiquity. European planters personified the ideals of hard work and courage and 
willingness to tame the jungle in order to establish plantations, and possessed of 
fortitude that protected them against the ‘sensuousness and perversions’ of the tropics 
that led the majority of their less strong-willed compatriots towards a ‘parasitic and 
debauched’ existence (Braga, 1936; cf.Comaroff and Comaroff, 1997: 121). In other 
words, similar to Silva, these men were conceived of as fathers of plantations, except 
that Silva presided over the reproduction of a brood of Christian converts.  
 
Third, as already noted, plantation regimes represented modernity as well as an agrarian 
idyll. As an aspect of modernity, technology was particularly appealing in the colonial 
view because, it was conceived of as apolitical, even depoliticising. The fertile plains of 
the South Coast were seen as places where, for example, colonial mavericks 
successfully evaded wrongful persecution by the state by establishing plantations 
(Gomes Silva, 1889: 15)7. Following the formation of political parties in 1974, the 
South Coast was similarly seen as a place ‘beyond’ politics. On a trip there in his 
capacity as Director of Agriculture and Forestry, Mario Carrascalao contrasted the area 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Gomes-Silva recounted the story of Raimundo Nonati, treasurer of the Customs House who was said to 
have fled Dili after bookkeeping anomalies had been discovered, without faith that his innocence would 
be proven. Welcomed by a community in Betano, so the story had it, he established a successful coffee 
plantation and waited several years before accumulating enough to pay off the missing monies, endowing 
the state with something that reputedly it was not due. Offered his job back, he chose instead to ‘taste 
exile’ again, but this time in Portugal.	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with a meeting of supporters of Xavier do Amaral that he had passed through in the 
highland area of Maubisse en route to the south coast. On the south coast, ‘agricultural 
machinery, ploughed fields, production units, production surpluses, crop disease, the 
pestilence of rats, drought, etc.’ was more likely to be discussed than politics (2005:82). 
This faith in technology can also be seen from the promotion of technical and 
agricultural education in the last decades of Portuguese rule. The question of how 
modernity and technology related to missionary work and politics are considered in the 
next two sections, by further elaborating on themes of the Christian family and 
emplacement.  
 
IV. The constituents of example: habitat and lineage 
 
Missionary accounts like ‘the Martyr Princess’ presented the cultural competences of 
aristocratic East Timorese families to infer an appropriate - though never total – 
reproduction of a ‘Christian habitus’. Key in this regard were examples given to 
prospective Christians among the population at large through the comportment, 
appearance and vocations of its members, and the environments in which they lived, 
mediated by missionaries. The backdrop to the creation of these competencies was a 
historical alignment with the colonial cause. The regulo of the southern reino 
[chieftainship] of Suro, Na’i Sesso, fought on the Portuguese side during the 
Boaventura rebellion (Marques Soares, 2003:109). His loyalty was rewarded when his 
son was sent for further education in Portugal. Suro, later known by the name of its 
capital, Ainaro, became a ‘full’ circumscrição civil [civil district] in 1934 during a 
territorial reorganisation absorbing parts of the reinos of Manufahi and Bobonaro. 
While a Portuguese administrator sat in the district capital, the family’s distinctive 
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ceremonial authority was mobilised.  
 
Na’i Sesso started attending church in the late 1920s, and was able to be baptised in 
1931, when in common with earlier missionary-engineered unions of the regulos of 
Turiscai and Liquica, he was persuaded to renounce all but one wife. He was thereafter 
known by the name of Dom Aleixo Corte-Real. Father Eusebio Arnaíz Alvarez’s 
account of his time ministering to the Corte-Real family in the 1920s, mainly records 
the life of Virginia, Dom Aleixo Corte-Real’s daughter-in-law. Given that the family 
died during the Japanese occupation, it is intended as a eulogy, and taken as a whole, is 
probably a case for Virginia’s beatification8. The memoir served to make the story of 
the family’s lives available to a Portuguese-speaking readership, and to crystallise a 
history of loyalty beginning in 1912. Published in 1951, the year of a tour to the 
colonies of the statue of Our Lady of Fatima, it shored up a cult first recognised by the 
Catholic church in 1930, and at a time when ‘re-evangelisation’ in Portugal was stalling 
(Castro Leal, 1998:832; Birmingham, 2002). During the period between 1912-43, the 
Corte-Real family is shown being transformed from loyal heathens, to Catholics, and 
finally to martyrs, accompanied and reflected in developments of appearance, bearing 
and habitat.  
   
The government or missions employed all Dom Aleixo Corte-Real’s three sons. Two 
began working in the civil administration in Ainaro as chief of post and secretary, while 
the other, Alexandre, worked as a catechist9. Alexandre married Virginia, the daughter 
of the neighbouring regulo of Samoro, also a Portuguese ally. The marriage was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As far as I can ascertain, this was not realised. 
9 Alexandre eventually acted as a permanent interpreter for his father who could not speak Portuguese. 
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encouraged by priests, who discouraged marriage to Luís, the son of the regulo of 
another loyal reino, Manatuto, who was believed, with dubious logic, to have become a 
‘heathen’10 after his return to Timor from Lisbon. Virginia by contrast reportedly had 
unshakeable faith, European social manners, a perfect understanding of Portuguese, all 
acquired at the Soibada school in her father’s reino of Samoro (Alvarez, 1951:75). 
Redolent of colonial racism, her ‘whiteness’ was described as ‘contrast[ing] singularly 
with the black colour of the indigenous’ (Alvarez, 1951:25-6). Alvarez later recalled 
however, that while whiteness was a ‘stamp of the nobility’, in contrast to the disdain 
that fair-skinned mestiças showed darker-skinned students at the Samoro school, 
Virginia did not display this haughtiness.  
 
Added to Virginia’s manners and blood, and Aleixo Corte-Real’s daily attendance of 
mass, other important demonstrations of living were expressed through habitat. Dom 
Aleixo’s modern house generated superiority among his subordinates. It is instructive to 
contrast the following description with that of the residence of ‘heathens’ such as those 
in Nari (chapter six), where traditional houses were potentially vulnerable to theft and 
arson (Rodrigues, 1962:172). Dom Aleixo’s house was  
 
… of modern construction, with a veranda around it, raised a metre and a half 
above the soil. Surrounded by orchards and fruit trees, with piped water, [the 
house] was almost a match for the best colonial residences. Through [the 
house], the vassals measure the power of the regulo. Outside the palace proper, 
were kitchens, dependencies, and the residences of workers… (Alvarez, 
1951:66)      
 
During a period in which Alexandre was employed as a catechist, the couple took up 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Since a priest made this observation at the beginning of a journey from Marseille to Singapore (and 
thus on the return journey to Timor) it is possible that Luís lost his faith as the result of his life 
experiences in Lisbon.  
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residence in a house in Balibo. Like the house in Ainaro, it was constructed along 
‘colonial architectural lines’, with ‘…the kitchen separated from…where they lived, and 
the school just in front. [The school room] is ample, which on the occasion of a 
missionary visit, is transformed into a chapel’ (Alvarez, 1951:67). In both Balibo and 
Ainaro, as well as in Virginia’s own family’s house in Samoro, the internal ordering of 
dwellings was marked by separation. Individualising functions associated with the 
space of the domestic environment – eating, worshipping and sleeping – gave the house 
internal order, maintained decency, and ensured that the kitchen remained separate from 
the main house, also a feature of some contemporary Timorese houses. It can be 
inferred from encouragements to live separately that this was intended to counter the 
‘utmost promiscuity’ (O dia de Timor, 12) of close cohabitation, even though 
anthropologists later showed Timorese houses’ meaning and order [atoran] 
(Cunningham, 1964:46-57).  
 
If the internal order of houses was thought to be key in affecting mentalities, so too was 
this reflected in the exterior built environment. Marking the period following Dom 
Aleixo’s conversion, Ainaro was described as having taken on a different appearance, 
with the regulo energised to change the environment of Ainaro town, with coffee 
plantations cultivated, a clinic built and streets constructed that stretched into the 
mountains. Priests noted a ‘markedly Christian influence’ in Ainaro town (Teixeira 
1974:511). Echoing missionary interest in building new houses in Ai-Assa with durable 
materials, Dom Aleixo was reported to have been “the major assistance in transforming 
the old povoação [village] from huts into a delightful town, with houses of always white 
brick, an unforgettable beauty spot surrounded by the highest mountains in Timor…” 
(O Lusitano, 1990). 
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Dom Aleixo was thought to have influenced the appearance of the town following a 
visit to Portugal in 1934. Indeed, so transformative was this event thought to have been, 
that almost 80 years after, some Ainaro residents believed he converted to Christianity 
in Portugal (interview, 5 May 2010). At a time when Christianity was being made a 
thematic centrepiece of colonialism, the visit also appeared to demonstrate the limits of 
how far Christian subjects could be regarded as anything except indigenous, as Dom 
Aleixo and other East Timorese were subject to bodily examinations by anthropologists 
at the colonial exhibition in Porto who made use of theories of race and physical 
anthropology (Mendes Correia, 1943:66).  
 
The story of the Corte-Reals is concluded by their demise, depicted as martyrdom, at 
the hands of Japanese soldiers and indigenous collaborators in 1943. The meaning of 
appearance in Alvarez’s account foretold this development. As a theme of postcolonial 
politics it can consequently be traced to configurations of loyalty found in faith, 
comportment and habitat. The following section considers how martyrdom provided a 
means for the postcolonial state to assign value to ex-combatants (chapter two). First 
consideration is given, however, to how the missionary promotion of habitats during the 
Indonesian period mediated relations with local communities where they were based. 
 
 
V. Missionary power in colonial and postcolonial perspective: Technology, 
territory and resistance  
 
This section considers how claim making over space and family can be further explored 
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by considering the work of the Salesian religious order. At issue is how relations 
between the Salesians and the local community can be understood in the context of late-
colonial Portuguese education, then the transition to the resistance politics of the 
Indonesian period. Two forms of power - distributive and disciplinary – are compared 
as a way to understand missionary-indigenous relations and political transition. Along 
with aspects of the ‘modern’ family already discussed, this section suggests a 
previously unexplored way through which missionary power may be understood to have 
endured in the postcolonial period.  
 
The Salesians first took over an experimental agricultural school in Dare in 1924, 
originally opened by Father Joachim de Medeiros in the late 19th century. They 
transformed the school into the Colegio de Santo Antonio (Teixeira, 1974:95) in the late 
1920s. Following these first engagements in East Timor, after the Second World War, 
the order moved from Dare and Dili to the eastern districts in an area otherwise 
regarded as previously having been ‘outside religion’ (Pélissier, 1996:27). The Salesian 
order is distinctive because its presence in Baucau and Lautem districts is underscored 
by a practical and rational ethos. This is at one level reflected in the Salesian origins in 
the area, a response to a colonial demand for technical schooling. It was also motivated 
by the Salesian belief that their presence in communities helped prevent sinful acts (Rui 
Gomes, interview). On another level, it has been derived from intensive interactions 
with the local community born of conditions associated with war. A fourth significant 
element of this interaction is the order’s association with the armed resistance, 
particularly that of the Fatumaca school.  
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Opened in 1968, the Dom Bosco Technical College at Fatumaca was supported through 
a government dispensation of land, as was the Fuiloro school in the 1950s (BOCT, May 
1953:352). Both schools attained varying degrees of self-sufficiency, with Government 
civil servants proudly declaring that Fuiloro was the only mission school entirely 
capable of supporting itself (BEDM, Feb 1975:168)11. The Fatumaca school became 
renowned for the resilience of its Italian priest founder, Father Eligio Locateli, who 
progressively pioneered technology on the site – wells, piped water, tractors and a 
mobile health clinic. With the Indonesian invasion at the end of 1975, the Salesian 
reputation for resilience was further enhanced. In keeping with earlier forms of 
missionary power through the care of children, the order retrieved orphaned children 
from forests in the surrounding areas in the 1980s (Eligio Locateli, interview, 9 March 
2009). A mythology has built up around Salesian actions during the Indonesian period, 
and Locateli’s charisma - for example relayed by locals through stories of his magic 
invincibility in the face of Indonesian maltreatment – is a feature of local relations with 
the order (interview, Vemasse). On the part of Salesians, they have accounted for their 
origins at Fatumaca by referring to children whose path towards conversion started with 
being shown a miraculous image of the Virgin Mary (nain feto) (Timor Post, 28 May 
2009).  
 
Locateli’s actions during the Indonesian period have been acknowledged by the East 
Timorese state, a reflection of the esteem in which he is held among former members of 
the armed resistance. Fatumaca served as an unofficial staging post where guerrillas 
recuperated and the current head of the armed forces (F-FDTL), Lere Anan Timor, 
described in 2009 how he ‘learnt war with the Salesians’ (Timor Post, 28 May, 2009). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This self-sufficiency later allowed the Indonesian military to use Fuiloro as a concentration camp 
(Mattoso, 2005:62). 
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Those that would later lead the resistance movement, including two of its ‘troika’ of 
leaders in the 1990s, Konis Santana and Sabalae, educated at Fuiloro, were able to 
access other educational opportunities in Dili as a result of their formative experiences 
with the order (Mattoso, 2005:41-2). The Salesians were embedded in both the wider 
milieu of late-Portuguese colonial institutions into which a small elite fed, and local 
communities where they were based.  
 
As well as caring for children and the infirm, and educating the local population, the 
Salesian order produced technologies of value to ex-combatants and the local 
community, for example providing materials to Falintil soldiers after their release from 
imprisonment with which to construct houses (Albino da Silva Surea interview)12. 
Indeed, it has taken a keen interest in the built environment. Local residents at Fatumaca 
cultivated the school’s fields of corn and rice using mechanized equipment, and sourced 
piped water (Collino, 1996:159-160; 167).  
 
The order’s interest in the built environment is also evident from a brick factory at the 
Fatumaca school in the Indonesian era. This was intended to teach bricklaying, but also 
had the effect of ensuring the reproduction of a particular built form. The bricks were 
characteristically large and white and became popular with local people who worked at 
the mission to the extent that they often acquired them as part of their payment for use 
on the construction of their own houses (Collino, 1996:160-161). The bricks both 
altered the physical landscape around the school and symbolised rectitude and 
propriety. Their value was can be seen in that they were an alternative method of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  The ex-Falintil guerilla Surea (‘Sacoco’) said, ‘when I was released, I had nothing, no things, and no 
money at all. Locateli gave me materials and helped me build this house’. 	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payment, but they also signalled a degree of autonomy from the Indonesian state. 
Further exploration of the kind of power at work in these relations between mission and 
population can illuminate how much autonomy was involved. On one hand, as 
indicated, power can be seen through construction of houses through the mission’s 
bricks. The population was indebted to the mission. Technical and agricultural 
education were seen as means of bringing about technological advance and material 
productiveness. On the other hand, in these mission-population relations, another 
process involving ‘disciplinary power’ can be seen (Foucault, 1991 [1977]:224) 
whereby the school’s workshops were used as a means to cultivate  its subjects, seen not 
only through what they produced, but also how they were made productive. The form of 
power at work was therefore not only distributed in the form of bricks through which its 
producers would be indebted; but also through the school’s regime that cultivated its 
subjects. This form of power is to some extent of a piece with claims made of plantation 
regimes in the 1930s that reputedly made workers’ lives better than living under 
‘ferocious’ regulos: each involved a degree of autonomy in exchange for being subject 
to formation and moulded into productiveness. 
 
The endurance of habitats forged by missionaries must therefore be explored in more 
ways than one13. This includes contentions that have arisen in the Salesian order’s 
dealings with communities that have sometimes involved habitat. After independence, 
the local community at Fuiloro began to complain that the size of the area of land on 
which the mission was based had increased, compared with before 1975. The details of 
this are complicated, so that the local community had not felt ‘brave enough’ to broach 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The cases may not warrant a direct comparison, but it is worth at least considering Levi-Strauss’s 
observations of the work of the Salesians in other contexts (Levi-Strauss 1976:286) ‘Salesian 
missionaries were quick to realise that the surest way of converting the Bororo [in Brazil] was to make 
them abandon their village in favour of one with the houses set out in parallel rows’. 
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the issue during the Indonesian period because some felt indebted to the order. The 
grandson of one of the liurais that ‘gave’ land in the 1950s was dismayed, above all, 
that both the local community and the Salesians had reached an impasse with neither 
side prepared to negotiate (Arlindo Dias Sanches interview14). In Fatumaca, despite 
generally good relations with the local community, after independence, the order 
wanted to extend piped water across neighbouring villages, but was rebuffed by one 
family. Father Locateli used this example to convey his perception that some locals 
were using independence and the contemporary language of rights to make claims that 
were not for the ‘common good’ (Eligio Locateli interview) ⁠.  
 
Beyond the Salesians, the Catholic Church has also been involved in land disputes of a 
different order. Father Duarte’s protégé in Ai-Assa in the 1960s, Father Apolinario 
Guterres, now Vicar General of Dili Diocese, is alleged to have ordered two families off 
their land in the Balide area to make way for a new Catholic University, UNICA, and 
during Holy Week 2013, is also alleged to have sent unknown individuals to destroy a 
border wall between this land and the University building. When two local priests 
relayed their concerns to the Diocese, they were reportedly called ‘subversive’, and one 
was sacked and transferred (TS, 17 May 2013). Thus tensions exist both in religious 
orders and the East Timorese Church’s relations with the population on one hand, and 
an ‘improving’ orientation implicit not only in the idea of modernity but in missionary 
work in general on the other. Claiming space through buildings or technology and the 
disputes these have given rise to, also illuminate the broader issue of the state’s 
codification in law of land questions, something delayed until recently because of 
complicated legacies of successive colonial periods.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 I was unable to establish if the interviewee was the grandson of the ‘Rei of Nari’ (chapter five). 
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While resolving land questions has been delayed, the state has given more attention to 
awarding the population for resistance against Indonesia. Following the widespread 
displacement of the population after the Indonesian withdrawal in 1999, for example, 
aid agencies’ primary objective was to emplace the population. Such schemes were 
intended to ensure the population’s prompt acquiescence, including those that had most 
recently been armed. The ‘Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Program’ (FRAP), for 
example, established by the World Bank, was intended to reintegrate 1300 guerrillas 
back into civilian life while the creation of a new military employed 600 remaining 
Falintil troops. From a broader perspective, and after independence in 2002, a series of 
small houses were built for ex-combatants of the resistance movement, with corrugated-
iron roofs, flimsy wooden front doors streaked with creosote, and uniformly painted a 
white colour. Neither large enough to accommodate a nuclear, much less extended 
family, nor numerous enough to accommodate all ex-combatants, the houses 
accordingly remained largely derelict. Kammen (2009:391) has suggested that in the 
Indonesian period, the resistance movement made promises to construct ‘white houses’ 
as an inducement to potential conscripts, situating this promise within a general scheme 
of postcolonial modernity to be pursued after independence. Pictured below in Ainaro, 
an example of such houses may well represent symbolic fulfilment of a quid pro quo.  
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Figure	  5.	  Ex-combatants’ house. Author’s photo, May 2010.	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It can also be noted that uniform habitat has represented aspirations to emplace and 
enumerate subjects that have appeared in other colonial and postcolonial contexts. 
Hence, in post-1975 Mozambique, a ‘villagisation’ programme carried out by Frelimo, 
involved the construction of standardised houses in quadrants, intended to ‘render rural 
Mozambican society more legible and, thus, more amenable to state intervention’ 
(West, 2005:176). Improving missionary and governmental projects have persisted in 
East Timor, moreover, with bases established in the colonial period until 1999 being 
used as springboards for such projects. This can sometimes involve ‘rescue’ of the 
population, seen where effects of the state’s authority are diffuse or disappear, as, for 
example, during the 2006 political crisis when Catholic Church personnel oversaw 
several camps for tens of thousands of displaced people. The Canossian-run clinic in 
Ainaro for example, serves as a base from where the Church plays an active role in a 
programme with the Ministry of Health known as Sisca, where ‘remote’ villagers have 
ailments and diseases treated during regular visits. The visits also provide an 
opportunity to dispense advice to people in villages about correct ways of living, 
including encouraging people to create partitions in their houses. As a nun at the clinic 
reported, ‘housing reflects people’s mentality. People that live in one room do not think 
scientifically’ (interview, 5th May 2010)15.  
 
As argued in chapter two, the state has also attempted to formulate, as the wording of 
legislation suggests, a ‘quality of resistance’. It has materialised postcolonial hierarchies 
by using the resistance as a touchstone of contemporary politics: medals, Combatant ID 
cards, diplomas of honour, and burial in special cemeteries with presidential approval 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This view is not universally shared within the Church. For example, Baucau Diocese’s mobile clinic is 
accompanied by a former Falintil nurse and practitioner of East Timorese medicine (cf. Tomasz, 1969) 
who conducts one-month long training sessions in the same each year and treats both chronic and less 
serious illnesses (Apolinario Sarmento interview).   
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show this (Decree laws 2006/3:22;29). In 2009, revised legislation was passed that 
sought once again to account for participants in the resistance against Indonesia, 
broadening considerably the definition beyond the original armed resistance. This had 
been done with a view to providing Combatants with financial support for their 
resistance. The new law supported previous legislation that decreed that participants 
would receive more money based on the amount of time they had been involved in 
resistance organisations, although it was at the state’s discretion to effectively waive 
qualifications for meeting criteria to be recognised as a Combatant (Osorio Florindo 
interview).  
 
A category of Martyrs exists within this legislation, whose names, as those of 
Combatants, have become capitalised. This category included the families of those that 
had died while involved in resistance, who were awarded a special ‘survival pension’ 
(sobrevivência). If the pension was conceived as a form of compensation for the deaths 
of ex-combatants, it may be viewed in one way as a surrogate of pursuing reparations 
from Indonesia, which has been repeatedly stalled by the state and its institutions16. Into 
the category of beneficiaries of the pension falls a family whose house was under 
construction in Ainaro town, adjacent to the derelict veteran houses. The family’s father 
and brother had been killed in the first months after the Indonesian invasion, and the 
eldest son, a civil servant in Dili, intended that the proceeds of a survival pension would 
memorialise their lives, funded by revenues from the state petroleum fund (Lefolino 
Magno interview). The family’s house partly reflects the idea that money for martyrdom 
can be made material, but implicitly too, illustrates hierarchies, signified through the 
relative grandeur of a colonial-style house made of stone from the local river.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For a closer analysis of this issue, see 
http://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/Reparations/10ReparIndex.htm. Accessed 14 November 2013.  
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Distinguishing these hierarchies is significant, because it shows that mere ‘recognition’ 
for participation in the resistance movement is not all that is at stake when houses are 
constructed, and habitat formed that is, however distantly, associated with the colonial 
period. By conferring value the state affirms a version of history with which it is 
instituted. At the same time, the reproduction of colonial-vernacularized house styles 
also shows their residents’ affective imaginings, whether as monuments to the dead, or 
as recent work has suggested, the absent living, especially the increasing number of 
overseas East Timorese whose remittances fund their construction (McWilliam, 2012). 
State evaluations have therefore allowed a performance of a ‘quality of resistance’, and 
a relative place within a system of value. Such forms mark contemporary landscapes of 
the postcolonial state, in which semi-autonomy may be signified by state conferral and 
the meanings of objects constructed with its proceeds.   
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Figure	  6.	  A house being built from the proceeds of a survival pension. Author’s photo, May 2010.	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VI. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has elaborated on emplacement as an aspect of missionary power. This 
emplacement was a precondition for more evangelising, which revolved around 
converting women whose Christian influence would spread through their families. This 
strategy could also be seen through the portrayal of loyal indigenous aristocratic 
families as leading exemplary lives to which heathens could aspire. On the face of it, 
these bio-political strategies had a limited immediate influence. However, they brought 
into view themes such as martyrdom that subsequently became important in the context 
of sociality and politics in the ensuing decades. Strategies of emplacement also show 
that children were considered to be important receptors of missionary influence. The 
intertwining of emplacement with evangelisation attests to the continuing importance of 
women and children as an element of missionary power in the present.  
 
Beyond this, as suggested in the introduction, this chapter has explored power in a 
relational and qualitative sense, suggesting that categories of modernity and tradition 
often present problems for understanding power within these frames. For example, one 
source of the power of missionaries was contingent on their ability to use a spiritual 
power to consecrate or damn land, sometimes as a means to prepare it for ‘modern’ 
usage. The Corte-Reals could channel ceremonial authority as authentic ‘heathens’ 
when required to be subordinate to ‘modern’ and secular colonial authority. As objects 
of scientific enquiry in Portugal they were East Timorese, yet as exemplary modern 
subjects in East Timor their house ‘almost competed with’ Portuguese residences, as if 
emblematic of relations with client vassals. Furthermore, plantations could be ‘modern’ 
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insofar as they shaped subjects, created profit and pioneered techniques of government, 
or mythologised and suggestive of the hardiness and overtly masculine qualities of 
Portuguese settlers when required. These paradoxes suggest that rather than identify the 
points at which modernity and tradition are unable to explain power configurations, 
what is required – and what has been shown - is how power reflexively operates to 
produce these categories and then continues to operate through them.  
 
As such, an exploration of agricultural and technical education has revealed both the 
colonial belief in its effectiveness in averting rebellion, and also its quality of inducing 
change in its subjects through schooling. The application of technology to land rendered 
subjects productive but not political. Yet the Indonesian period appeared to produce a 
peculiar inversion of this logic as missionary educators were avowedly apolitical yet 
produced devoutly loyal guerrilla leaders. Part of this can be explained in that the 
Salesians were in effect by no means apolitical, if by political what is meant is the 
provision of moral and logistical support to an anticolonial movement. On the other 
hand, however, this perspective overlooks subtle, quotidian, even prosaic movements of 
power at work in the midst of more noticeable events. A technical education formed 
productive subjects, evidence of which could be seen in changes in the habitat 
surrounding the mission. It is as much the dynamics of this missionary formation of 
subjects as well as indebtedness from exchange that shows a pattern of the population’s 
semi-autonomy from conditions of both oppression under military rule and proximity to 
missionary influence. Similarly semi-autonomous power configurations can be seen at 
work, I have argued, in the postcolonial period, as the conferral of pensions may be 
elaborated as memorials or symbols of status.  
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6. Reifying difference: education 
 
‘Timorese who at meals, cut meat with a knife, started to cut it with a spoon, and those 
who drank coffee substituted it for tea served in a glass and not in a cup or mug as 
previously.’  
Mario Carrascalao, Antes do Futuro 
 
‘Through the table and play, people know us better’  
Antonio de Conceicao, interview 
 
‘Clothes are powerful things’.  
George Orwell, Down and Out in Paris and London 
 
 
I. Introduction – Habits and norms 
 
This chapter proposes that the inculcation of norms and habits by missionaries has 
informed indigenous elite agency and contemporary politics. This form of bio-power is 
a key element of what I have called ‘missionary power’, together with sedentarized 
converts, explored in the previous chapter. This chapter shows how comportment and 
appearance were central to missionary power by examining a Jesuit missionary school, 
the Externato de São José in Dili, where the language of instruction was Portuguese, 
and crucially, which remained in operation during the Indonesian period. It is shown 
how the school cultivated an elite ‘habitus’, and in the process maintained and built on 
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already strong ties between missionaries and elites. In existing accounts, the school had 
been seen as significant because of its associations with the resistance movement and its 
operation outside the jurisdiction of the Indonesian authorities under Dili Diocese (Pinto 
and Jardine, 1999). The overall picture, as suggested, is more complicated. On one 
level, practices of ‘good comportment’ were underpinned by discourses of cultural 
distinctiveness from Indonesians and of commonality with Portuguese, yet the student 
body also remained aware, and sometimes resistant to overtones of ‘old colonialism’ in 
such practices. On another level, the school was the subject of controversy within Dili 
Diocese, with many of its personnel disagreeing with its continued existence as much as 
the Indonesian authorities did.  
 
This point underscores the chapter’s second argument relating to the embeddedness of 
missionary power in colonial power. I argue that elements of this relationship can still 
be seen in the postcolonial period, as the Church protested against its lack of 
participation in government. The dynamics of this in the recent past are explored by 
examining demonstrations organised by Dili and Baucau Dioceses against the proposed 
removal of religious education from the state school curriculum in 2005. Thus far, these 
demonstrations have been interpreted in three ways. One view has it that the 
demonstrations changed church and state relations and preceded the events of 2006-8. 
In this view, the demonstrators were dismayed not only with the Church’s relatively 
‘subordinate’ role to the state, but also held deep antipathies to personalities within the 
government. A second interpretation argues that while the demonstrations prefigured 
fractious events of the following year, demonstration leaders’ speeches suggested that 
Church grievances stemmed from the past, not the present per se, in particular, that 
Church believed it had not been adequately recognised by state for its role in the 
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Indonesian period. A third position sees the demonstrations’ significance in terms of its 
elite agents, asserting that some did not, contrary to what had been claimed, ‘take 
advantage’ of the shifting power configurations of the period to undermine the 
government in the following year. 
 
I suggest that while the demonstrations were the harbingers of events of 2006-8, they 
did not decisively determine their trajectory. More importantly, the historical position of 
missionary work as deeply implicated in colonial power relations rather suggests that 
the Church’s own invocations of its ‘uniform’ – the priest robes – should be examined 
by tracing their performative and symbolic significance. In common with military 
fatigues (chapter two), priest robes were both intended to be evocative of resistance 
against Indonesia, but were also part of a longstanding formation of power derived from 
the Portuguese colonial period. This analysis therefore shows that an alliance existed 
not only between priests and colonial authorities, but also between indigenous chiefs 
(liurais) and missionaries. Indeed, the durability of this relationship points towards 
constraints on the introduction of ‘modern bio-power’. In short, missionaries relied on 
liurais and despite avowed aims to the contrary, could not expect ‘tradition’ to be 
supplanted in the name of modern civilised practices. Thus, a wider diffusion of norms 
of appearance among the population, signifying both elite formation in missionary 
hands, and latterly, power involved in resistance against Indonesia, must be mediated by 
these considerations. 
 
The analysis begins with a history of comportment in mission schools and its 
association with ‘scholarly’ and ‘religious and moral’ education, before showing 
instances where norms associated with missionary education could later be seen among 
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the armed resistance. The context of late-colonial missionary education also explains 
conditions for the continuation of the Externato during the Indonesian period. A 
comparison of other colonial contexts indicates how gestures served to index changes in 
power relations over time, while noting the limits of a too-schematic analysis along 
these lines. The same section also situates an analysis of comportment among other 
analyses. The following section focuses on events of the year 2005, during which 
disagreements between the Externato founders and Dili Diocese came to a head over the 
Diocese’ ending of co-educational arrangements at the school. This event coincided 
with Church demonstrations of the same year. A brief description of the demonstrations 
is followed by a historical analysis suggesting the significance of appearance as well as 
comportment, rounded off with examples of how wider dissemination and inculcation 
of norms of appearance accompanied more Christian conversion between the mid-20th 
century and the Indonesian period. 
 
II. The relationship of ‘comportment’ to power and resistance 
 
The significance of comportment to the resistance movement derives from the structures 
of education and missionary authority in this field in the late Portuguese period. A brief 
outline of these two factors helps explain its later appropriation to represent elite East 
Timorese cultural distinctiveness from Indonesia. Until 1911, Missionaries had been 
responsible for all education of the sons and daughters of liurais. Under these limited 
arrangements, missionary education consisted of ‘scholarly’ education. After the 
Boaventura rebellion in 1912, the newly installed Republican authorities became 
concerned that scholarly education was ‘dangerous’, because of its alleged potential to 
create educated indigenous opposition to colonial government. Alongside attempts to 
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make East Timor profitable, especially through coffee cultivation schemes, the 
Republican authorities expressed preferences for ‘agricultural education’ (Pimenta de 
Castro, 1944:202; 193n.1).  
 
Missionaries also had strong views about their educational role. In 1924, the Mission 
Superior, José da Costa Nunes cited the British-educated elite in India whose ‘literary 
courses’ had created ‘great difficulties’ for the colonial government, warning against 
similar outcomes in East Timor:   
 
That [graduates of mission schools] have no jobs and judge themselves to be 
humiliated in doing manual labour, is itself to see the results [of their 
education]: the formation of a class of useless beings [entes inuteis] and 
possibly, damaging in the future…To prepare the indígena for literary careers 
without creating for him conditions to make a living produces grievances in 
him that he will later transform into an instrument of combat… I want an 
instruction above all professional, which educates to turn over the land, to 
transform produce, to explore natural wealth, which always finds an honest 
occupation and makes a living by the sweat of the brow.  (BEDM Oct-Nov 
1924:xxv) 
 
The debate, still being had 10 years later, was not only about the functional outcomes of 
education. East Timorese students of missions schools should not receive either an 
‘excessive’ literary education, nor should missionaries aspire to make the children of the 
indigenous aristocracy like their European counterparts (fidalgos): 
 
The mission does not pretend to make the simple Timorese ‘fidalgised’ 
[afidalgada]. It is an error to instil luxury habits and grandness in these 
indígenas, destined, almost entirely, to pass their lives in bamboo and palapa 
huts. We create in them habits of hygiene, we teach them to look after their 
health, and defend them from 1000 sicknesses that attack them - this is a duty 
of the missions, side by side with the duty to instruct them and form the heart.  
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(BEDM, Dec 1934:492)1 
 
Education was therefore as much a delicate exercise in cultural calibration as 
instruction. Too much literary education and ‘fidalgising’ risked creating educated 
rebels2. From the late-1920s, Governor Teofilo Duarte created ‘Reino schools’, which 
were independent of missionary control, some of which, like the later Salesian 
establishments, had their own ‘farms’ [granjas] (Grade, 1973: 220). In 1941, the 
Estatuto missionario (Missionary Statute), a piece of legislation signed between the 
Vatican and the New State regime, gave Catholic missions responsibility for educating 
colonial populations, although while the missions were given more resources and 
‘protected’, and the first Diocese in the territory created in 1940, the structure of 
education in East Timor remained essentially the same (Pimenta de Castro, 203). Yet 
residual worries about the ‘dangers’ of a ‘scholarly’ education did not abate, and 
following the Portuguese reoccupation in 1945, Governor Oscar Ruas, inaugurated a 
two-tier primary education system. In the first tier, the state was responsible for two day 
schools (externatos) in Dili, for the education of European, mestizo and ‘civilised’ 
(civilizado) Timorese children (Felgas, 1956: 377-387) and another in Liquica (Grade, 
1973:221). These institutions, schooling only 60 students in the early 1950s, privileged 
those educated in Dili. It also reflected the aims of educating an ‘assimilated’ 
(assimilado) class of elites who held a ‘respectable’ profession, spoke Portuguese 
proficiently, and otherwise displayed behaviour deemed to be ‘civilised’. Missionaries 
educated by far the majority of students in 28 rural boarding schools (internatos), where 
                                                
1 This commentary accompanies the report of a government health inspector who visited the Soibada 
school (Servico de República, Delegação de Saúde da Zona de Leste. Viqueque, 8 Junho 1934. Nota 
N.51). 
2 A similar argument was used by the British colonial authorities in Malaya. Roff thinks that this was 
driven by the Malay realisation that only in education lay opportunities to compete in Malaya’s plural 
society. Yet “at the same time, or so the British argument ran, they could not be increased too much or 
peasant society would be disrupted” (Roff, 1995:138) 
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the curriculum consisted of agriculture education for male students and ‘domestic 
arrangements’ for female students (Grade, 1973:221).  
 
Missionaries thereafter continued to teach in externatos, with their work directed by the 
Diocese of Dili created in 1940. In urban areas in the 1960s, missions had responsibility 
for teaching at the primary level and ‘moral education’ in state schools, while training 
catechists in a special training college in Dare in the hills to Dili’s south, and running a 
primary school called the Externato of Lahane based in Dili. In 1970, the state approved 
Church teaching at ‘pre-secondary’ level, for which it opened the Externato de São 
José, that took students that were ‘too old or for other reasons’ had not been admitted to 
secondary schools (Costa). Thus, a division of responsibilities between church and state 
developed before 1975 based on space (boarding or day schools in rural or urban 
settings) in some cases mirroring a curricular division (technical/agricultural or 
scholarly) that was prefigured by an earlier debate informed by fears of rebellion. With 
the Portuguese departure in 1975 and the Indonesian invasion shortly thereafter, some 
missionaries schooled a small number of existing elites at the Externato de São José in 
which they integrated a mainly ‘scholarly’ curriculum. The section below examines this 
school as a case study. However, first consideration is given to the reception of moral 
education among resistance leaders.  
 
According to José Mattoso, historian of the resistance movement, the idea of ‘good 
behaviour’ was taken up by one of its leaders, Konis Santana, who had been educated in 
a missionary school in the late Portuguese period. The term ‘moral’ education, as noted 
above, had become associated with missionary education, particularly so in state 
schools in Dili. It was long considered to have been a key part of a student’s ‘formation’ 
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(a term with a wider meaning and different connotations to the English word 
‘education’), which was intrinsic to the aim of producing ‘civilised’ subjects. ‘Good 
behaviour’ (bom comportamento) was considered to have been part of an education that 
included a ‘moral’ and religious component. This form of education was given to 
students in missionary schools that fought in the East Timorese resistance after 1975, as 
noted. However, less explored are claims that ‘good behaviour’ was viewed as 
distinguishing elite East Timorese from Indonesians or other East Timorese. According 
to Mattoso, Konis Santana’s education by Salesian missionaries allowed him to 
communicate with the outside world while he led the resistance movement internally: 
 
Although he was not [at the Salesian school] for more than 3-4 years, he was 
marked by this humanist education, learning “boa maneiras” [good manners] 
and the rules of courtesy which many years later, permitted him to send letters 
to the Bishop, to the president of the Republic of Portugal, and to the Secretary 
General of the UN. The conviction that civility was an integral part of 
“civilisation” brought him to write a detailed text about courtesy and about the 
discipline that the guerrillas had to observe, despite having to live a life 
deprived of everything (Mattoso, 2005:41, emphasis added).  
 
Besides these observations, Mattoso went on to propose that ‘civility’ differentiated 
East Timorese from Javanese who, so an exaggerated stereotype had it, ‘ate with their 
hands, defecated in public and made tea with foot-wash’ (Mattoso, 2005:41). Evidently, 
some guerrilla leaders’ formative experiences with missionaries created convictions that 
personal conduct was important. While this passage could also be seen as a Portuguese 
historian’s attempt to make figures of the resistance more comprehensible to a 
readership unfamiliar with East Timor, ‘boas maneiras’ were later reproduced on the 
initiative of East Timorese elites, after the departure of the Portuguese authorities in 
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19753. Indicated in one of the epigraphs at the outset of this chapter, Mario 
Carrascalao’s regret at the passing of an old colonial (Portuguese) order in the 
Indonesian period was signified in changes in ‘civilised’ eating habits. Carrascalao and 
other elites viewed these customs as part of the elite habitus, which, as argued below, 
was constructed and reproduced as part of resistance to Indonesian rule.  
  
i. The Externato de São José: ‘The last outpost of Portuguese language and 
culture’ 
 
The reopening of the Externato de São José after the Indonesian invasion in early 1976 
continued a pattern of missionary tutelage of the Timorese elite. All other schools were 
abandoned as the population fled to the territory’s interior. Despite damage to its 
buildings from Indonesian bombings and the earlier civil war, the Externato’s directors 
persisted, relocating to nearby buildings owned by the Church. They continued to hold 
‘informal activities’ for young people such as sports and choral singing, even in the 
month after the invasion (Costa). The school was restarted by four Jesuits, two East 
Timorese priests, da Cunha and Costa, and two Portuguese, Felgueiras and Martins, 
who started teaching classes in 1978, a period when, in the interior, the population was 
being subjected to aerial bombings, internment in concentration camps or summary 
execution. The school continued to operate after the establishment of the Indonesian 
state school system in the 1980s. By 1983, the Indonesian authorities had made it clear 
                                                
3 By the mid-1990s, the armed resistance movement depended more than ever on the support of East 
Timor’s population to prosecute its struggle. These sentiments were reflected in ‘Guidelines’ issued in 
1996 by the secretary of region 3, Riak Leman. Aside from confirming a continuing strategy of violence, 
countering Indonesian propaganda, and identifying and punishing spies among the population, Leman 
devoted the last part of the instructions to a section on ‘behaviour’ of which he wrote “…All guerrillas 
and leaders must show the utmost respect in their general dealings with the People …Guerrillas and 
members must set a good example by their own behaviour, speech and attitude towards our People, 
because we are sons of the People and are part of that same People. WE MUST, therefore, be absolutely 
correct in all our behaviour!” http://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/1997/05/07/0101.html (downloaded 
16 August 2013) 
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that the Externato could no longer operate because of its Portuguese curriculum, the 
Portuguese language and because it was staffed entirely by the Catholic Church’s 
personnel and associated volunteers. The school’s directors avoided capitulating to 
these demands immediately, and were at the same time allowed exemptions from the 
infamous military operation pagar betis into which most adult males were conscripted 
(Pinto and Jardine, 83)4.  
 
The Indonesian authorities suspected that the school harboured anti-Indonesian 
sentiments and pressured staff to accept a curriculum in Indonesian. By the mid-1980s, 
the school accepted some of these demands, so that teaching in Indonesian was 
introduced, although priests continued to teach in Portuguese in secret. Subjects 
involving the teaching of ‘patriotic’ versions of Indonesian history, and the state 
ideology, Pancasila, were put on the curriculum. Morning Indonesian flag-saluting 
ceremonies were introduced towards the end of the 1980s, and in 1989 a pro-regime 
Indonesian Jesuit priest, Father Marcus Wanandi, was installed as the school’s 
principal. In November 1991, the Santa Cruz massacre precipitated a crackdown by 
Indonesian authorities on the resistance movement. This included targeting perceived 
centres of resistance activity of which the Externato was one: within 18 months the 
school was closed.  
 
During its existence, Externato students had become renowned for being active in the 
clandestine resistance movement. Messages were brought from the school to the armed 
resistance. The school provided a place where students could express their sentiments 
                                                
4 Pinto and Jardine wrote that ‘the school was not well respected, [but] it still had some influence and 
successfully petitioned the military authorities for exemption for all students’ (Pinto and Jardine: 83).  
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through group discussions or other ways. Students’ theatrical performances, for 
example, had storylines from East Timor’s pre-colonial past in which imagined 
confrontations were recreated between East Timor’s povu and liurais (Pinto interview, 
31 August 2009), as well as containing political allegory suited to the circumstances of 
the Indonesian occupation. Constancio Pinto, both student then teacher at the school, 
recalled a play that fitted this description in which he played a prisoner (Pinto and 
Jardine, 1997:83). Student paintings depicted torture and disappearances (Dias 
interview, 8 August 2009). The school premises were used after hours to organise 
resistance activity, passed off as recreation among students.  
 
The school’s continued existence for 16 years has been explained by reference to the 
politics of the Indonesian state’s accommodations with the Catholic Church. Pancasila 
required all Indonesian citizens to believe in one of five state-approved religions of 
which Christianity was one. The state nevertheless continued to bestow patronage in the 
form of material support and privileges in the field of education on the Church. One 
source claimed that by the late 1980s the Church had ‘complete authority in the school 
system and considerably expanded its educational activities’ although this assessment 
must be considered against the background of the author’s positive view of Indonesian 
occupation (Rocha, 1988:171). The school was also the training centre in Dili for 
seminarians, all of whom were taught in Portuguese (Felgueiras and Martins, 
2006:122). As long as this policy continued, so the argument went, Timorese priests and 
nuns would receive a Portuguese language education maintaining a tradition beyond the 
control of both Indonesian Catholic Church and state. This created a schism between 
priests within the diocese that favoured integration, with some wanting the Externato 
abolished, and those in favour of its continued existence, so that it became ‘the most 
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important problem of the life of the diocese in Timor’ (Felgueiras and Martins, 
2006:87). Unnamed members of Dili diocese tried to have Felgueiras and Martins 
retired in 1985, then wrote to Felgueiras when he was in Portugal the following year 
barring him from re-entry on grounds that ‘Portuguese was not spoken anymore and 
[Felgueiras] was an obstacle to relations between the clergy and the Bishop’ (Felgueiras 
and Martins, 2006:123)5. 
 
Evidently, the closure of the school was partly stalled for institutional reasons: it was a 
matter for the Diocese, where some priests argued that it had ‘created divisions’. The 
school also survived because it was conceived of as representing the inner core of the 
old (pre-1975) education system, being described by its Jesuit sponsors as ‘the last 
stronghold [reduto] of Portuguese education and culture in East Timor’ (Felgueiras and 
Martins, 2006: 89). After the Externato’s closure, the Portuguese language reappeared 
as one of the school’s Portuguese Jesuit directors, Felgueiras and other volunteers began 
to teach it in Dili in classes intended for the young, which had 3,000 enrolees. In 
Felgueiras’ account, the re-emergence of Portuguese was a ‘seed…[that] waited in the 
hearts of people, children and the young, for the moment to germinate’ (Felgueiras, 
2001:48-49). This rather lyrical description can be contrasted with the material objects 
of textbooks used to teach a pre-1975 curriculum to students. The latter disintegrated 
when buried to avoid seizure by the Indonesian authorities. Language could be 
immaterially instituted in the body, which also appealed to parents of students that saw 
an Externato education as an ‘investment for the future’ (Angelina Sarmento interview). 
According to the East Timorese Jesuit, Leão Costa, the school was as oversubscribed as 
                                                
5 Father Jose Antonio, Bishop Belo’s deputy, then Vicar General after independence was East Timor’s 
Minister of Education during the Indonesian era. When asked if the church became an instrument of the 
state he replied: “[the state] also gave money for books like the New Testament that were distributed to 
communities for free. And also hymn books in Indonesian…we can’t judge [whether the Indonesian state 
used the Church] because they never said that, did they?” Interview June 2007. 
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the Portuguese courses that followed it, ‘perhaps from the just cause that defended 
gallantry and national heroism’ (Costa). The school was evidently seen as a way to 
maintain ‘Portuguese language and culture’. A key element of this culture was ‘civility’ 
and ‘courtesy’ that made elite East Timorese distinctive. 
 
ii. Della Casa in the tropics: civility through practice? 
 
Colonial-indigenous relations in East Timor in the 20th century involved gestures such 
as greetings by liurais towards colonial officials. According to one source, these had 
begun to change by the 1930s. In Baucau, for example, when the indigenous population 
greeted liurais they had previously used a ‘handkerchief kiss’, but this had all but died 
out in the eastern districts and was only in limited use in the west. However, it was still 
used exclusively for interactions with Europeans (Pinto Correia, 1934:46). The 
population continued to ‘put the left hand to the side of the head’ or remove their 
‘conical Javanese-style hats’ when greeting liurais, but when greeting Europeans - 
priests, the governor, the military commander - they kissed their hand (1934:272). 
These greetings also varied by region so that in Aileu and Liquica (‘the most servile 
populations’) indigenous chiefs greeted the governor on their knees (1934:274). No less 
than in East Timor, in other colonies, gestures indexed relations, and were subject to 
diffusion more widely. Denys Lombard has noted of Java in the same period that the 
handshake became common in cities, while in rural areas touching the ends of fingers 
and placing a hand on the heart was maintained as a greeting (1990:132). The seating 
position in villages – cross-legged on matting – differed from urban areas where tables 
and chairs could be found, although 'the ritual of the table was not as rigid as in the 
West; one ate quickly without waiting and without speaking to neighbours’ (1990:132). 
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Yet at the beginning of the 20th century, all Javanese people had to squat in front of 
colonial officials (see note seven) and in such settings only Europeans and Javanese of a 
high rank could use chairs. In both contexts, customs involving comportment differed 
among indigenous populations, or when greeting colonial officials.  
 
Gestures cannot serve as a schematic means of gauging colonial-indigenous and intra-
indigenous relations, and there is a risk in making a too-stringent association between 
gestures in rural or urban areas. It seems especially important to recall this of East 
Timor where differences between the urban and rural may have been less easily 
materialised than, for instance, in Java. Nevertheless, when changes in customs take 
place over time, they reveal important aspects of their meaning in a wider constellation 
of power relations. As seen above, the colonial authorities strategized differentiation 
through the education system and aspired to do so through the urban environment. 
Moreover, ‘formation’, as a key element of the education system, was a key way 
through which a distinction between mission-educated students and others was 
structured. One of the key elements of formation was ‘moral education’, involving the 
diffusion of ‘civility’ and ‘courtesy’.  
 
Although this was seen as an important part of missionary education in general, the 
Jesuits were most associated with a combination of scholarly and moral education. In 
1722, the Portuguese crown put two orders in charge of Macau and Timor, the Jesuits 
and the Padres da Cruz dos Milagres, effectively ending the monopoly of the 
Dominicans ‘who could not provide the island with sufficient numbers of missionaries’ 
(Morais, 1934:41). Throughout the remainder of the 18th century, the Church and 
Crown clashed over issues such as the departure of the Dominicans (1720s), the 
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procedure on installing a new governor (1765), and the decision to move the capital 
from Lifau (presently Oecusse) to Dili, (1769) (Morais, 1934:112-116). There appeared 
to be broad agreement on one matter after the departure of the Dominicans however: in 
1738 the Jesuits and Padres da Cruz dos Milagres opened the first missionary school, 
marking the beginnings of Jesuit responsibility for education6.  
 
The Jesuits association with both ‘moral’ and ‘literary’ education has long been evident. 
The Florentine, Giovanni Della Casa published ‘Galateo’, shortly before the founding 
of the Jesuits in 1558, which instructed its readers on norms of civility and courtesy 
such as table manners and one’s bearing in the company of others. More than any other 
religious order, the Jesuits used Della Casa’s Galateo as a ‘textbook of behaviour’ 
(Bossy, 2010:120). The significance of these behaviours can be seen far beyond their 
texts, however. Norbert Elias thought that they accompanied state formation in Western 
Europe. For Elias this was a deeply complicated process, the salient aspects of which 
were that monetization in place of barter, and taxes, provided levies to feudal lords in 
the pre-medieval period, who with these resources were able to accumulate enough 
martial force over a territory. Over the course of several centuries, this reversed the 
centrifugal motion of power away from lords whose vassals were not bound to loyalty 
through oaths (Elias, 1994:276). Instead, power in the form of money, people and 
goods, was drawn towards these elites. This surplus of labour included that of the upper 
classes, and small armies and industries emerged from the courts of feudal lords (319). 
It was only after the ranks of these small court-societies had been swelled later that 
differentiation on the basis of comportment took place. The courtesies (courtoisies) of 
                                                
6 The Jesuit responsibility for education reached a high-water mark more than two centuries later, when 
they were put in charge of the seminário menor in 1958 after it had been moved from Soibada to Dare in 
the hills above Dili (Grade, 1973:239). Until 1964, the majority of Jesuit priests were from Taiwan, the 
Philippines, and Spain because East Timor fell under the Jesuit’s Eastern province administered from 
Manila. In 1964, a ‘large contingent of Portuguese Jesuits’ arrived (Araújo, 2012:62).  
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courts later changed as one feudal lord came to predominate in a given territory, or 
state, among feudal monarchies, coming to be regarded as the King. This paved the way 
for a wider dissemination of ‘courtesies’ in the form of ‘civilities’. Elias qualifies this 
point by emphasising that power did not only exclusively diffuse from top downwards, 
but worked dynamically through a subject’s self-regulation and restraint. Manners were 
one manifestation of this, which, coming to operate at an unconscious level, were 
enacted by subjects in the knowledge that a centralized state had a monopoly on force, 
therefore discouraging arbitrary behaviour (450-1). 
 
Bourdieu has a similar view of these dynamics of formation, but does not attribute them 
co-temporally to state formation. Bourdieu employed the concept of the habitus, to 
explain that the body ‘remembered’ past experiences, with gestures and bearing 
reproduced from previous historical periods and reinforced through practice: 
 
The habitus, a product of history…ensures the active presence of past 
experiences, which, deposited in each organism, in the form of schemes of 
perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the ‘correctness’ of practices 
and their constancy over time, more reliably than all formal rules and explicit 
norms (1990:54). 
 
The primacy of reproduction through practice rather than the observance of formal rules 
is evident in the above, thus distinguishing Bourdieu’s view from Elias’s, whereby there 
was an interplay between the will of the subject and unconscious assimilation of court, 
then state-defined limits of acceptable public conduct. Yet Bourdieu’s account also 
contains a Marxian division of perception, thought and action, indicating that the bodily 
assimilation and reproduction of manners may not only take place at an unconscious 
(‘pre-reflexive’) level.  
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It is suggested below that both Elias and Bourdieu’s views are applicable. In other 
words, it is possible to see that the uptake of certain behaviours was a result of a 
didactic process of classroom learning but also practical institution through assimilation 
and association. In the Externato, a diffusion of manners by way of religious and moral 
formation were delivered in the classroom but also elsewhere. Especially, the 
environment of the school instilled differentiation between its students who regarded 
themselves as resistant to the influence of the environment forged by the Indonesian 
authorities in Dili (chapter seven).  
 
Thus, moral and religious formation had come within the remit of the clergy in the late-
Portuguese period, while instruction in other subjects had passed into the hands of 
‘secular’ teachers. Especially important in the teaching of the first generation of 
Externato students, courtesy [courtesia] classes were also referred to as ‘civility and 
politeness’ [civilidade e urbanidade]. These classes involved simulating a range of 
social situations in order to prepare students for these occasions. Including such 
formalities as maintaining correct posture, manner of address and seating position in the 
company of ‘important people’, conventions differed according to whether an 
interlocutor was ‘a priest, a liurai, a diplomat, or others’ (Jose Amorim Dias, interview, 
9 August 2009). The correct way to welcome people into a house was conveyed by 
instructions on opening doors, welcoming guests, knowing how to manage eating 
utensils, how to cut bread, and what to eat with food. Instruction was dispensed for less 
formal occasions, too; if students were at the beach, they were shown how they should 
behave if they were playing football; men shown, if walking ‘with a lady’ what their 
‘attitude’ should be (Jose Amorim Dias interview, cf. Elias, 1994:333). Students were 
sometimes aware of the practices’ origins in the colonial period:  
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How to pick up our spoons, give plates to others, we used Portuguese culture 
for everything, because those teaching [formadores] were usually padres. We 
used the culture that they received [hetan] during their formation…so in this 
period they transferred all that back to us (Tome Xavier Jeromino interview).  
 
Social etiquette was used by students among themselves to counter Indonesian 
assertions that Timorese were incapable of self-governing. As Pinto remarked, “we 
wanted to show them that we were not backward like they said” (Constancio Pinto 
interview). One set of practices was pitted against another. Students used a fork, knife 
and spoon when eating, and were accordingly “shocked when we saw Indonesians 
eating with their hands” (Constancio Pinto interview). This was elaborated by way of 
rumour so that a story of an Indonesian dining at Hotel Turismo who didn’t know how 
to use a fork and spoon quickly circulated among students. Other more common 
distinctions were practised daily in the school. Students did not crouch (hakruuk) – a 
Javanese custom7 - when either excusing oneself from a social gathering or walking 
between or in front of other people, assumed to be part of social etiquette practised in 
the presence of Indonesian migrants in public.  
 
In the distinctions contained within these practices however, ambivalence emerged; 
students experienced similar taught practices in Indonesia, where they found Indonesian 
priests dispensing advice about courtesy: 
 
Some Indonesian priests said that [courtesy and civility] were international 
values, but that we shouldn’t forget Javanese [values]…so that if we did a task, 
                                                
7 This practice is known in Indonesian as Jalan Jongkok (lit. ‘squat walk’). It was and is usually evident 
in studied displays of deference in Java. Sutherland remarks about Java that ‘the priyayi [Javanese upper 
class] emphasised that specific forms of behaviour, manner, language and dress were appropriate to 
particular social situations, and that it was imperative the forms used reflect the social ranks of those 
involved’. See Sutherland (1979:36)  
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we could adapt to Indonesia’s culture so that they would accept us (Jeronimo 
interview).  
 
While students found variations on such practices in unexpected places, in other 
instances, to the dismay of others, the didactic nature of instruction was replete with 
overtones of colonialism. One recalled that while with the Escuteiros, the Catholic 
‘scouts’ founded by Fathers da Cunha and Costa, 
 
Father Ricardo [da Silva] told us when we ate together to eat in a certain way. 
He said that we should ‘eat like Portuguese, use a knife and fork, sit correctly, 
and eat more quietly.’ That put me off participating, although some friends 
continued to be very involved in it (dos Santos interview).  
 
However, norms of comportment required not merely the reproduction of ‘Portuguese’ 
behaviour. While missionary education of an urban elite was intended to cultivate 
norms that distinguished students as civilised, paradoxically missionaries also attempted 
to instil in students ‘simplicity’ associated with the districts. The Externato’s 
reconstruction in Balide in the 1970s and early 1980s by the hands of its students, 
volunteers and the local community, their cleaning of its grounds, their engagement in 
‘rustic pursuits’ such as keeping birds and growing trees in school grounds to prevent 
soil erosion, meant that they could not be confused with ‘modern youth of Dili of 
advanced means’ (Sousa, 2003:7). The East Timorese priest Dominggos Sousa 
explained that in pre-1975 East Timor, these youth were referred to as Ba’i No:  
 
…a word in Tetum that is a bit pejorative. It is said to be a person, usually a 
youth with some education, who likes to dress well and rejects physical work, 
for example farming…through shame [they] think that this kind of work is for 
people of a low social category (Sousa, 2003:7). 
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Indicating the significance of appearing modestly, Externato students were different in 
appearance by being dressed informally while state schools had uniforms (Felgueiras 
and Martins interview; Branco interview, dates)8. Other Dili elites were also called forth 
to differentiate Externato students. According to Father Costa, Externato students were 
‘non-conformists, and not merely the pitiful and disillusioned that had been led astray, 
as they called the elite of those devoted to the integration of [East Timor] into the 
‘great’ nation of Indonesia…’ (Costa).  
 
On the face of it, two things account for the persistence of the Externato for so long 
during the Indonesian occupation. Didactically and practically, the school cultivated a 
habitus in students. Institutionally, the school’s autonomy was maintained through 
being governed under Dili Diocese. Seen in a longer-term perspective, the practical and 
institutional are so connected as to be inseparable. For example, the view above that 
Indonesians were culturally different was for some underpinned by the view of East 
Timorese culture having a commonality with Portuguese culture. As Father Dominggos 
Soares (Father ‘Maubere’), a priest closely associated with the resistance movement, 
expressed it after independence: 
 
The reason to ‘bring people to resist’, to not like Indonesia, we can say that this 
was primarily because of a political reason [pauses]…Or primarily a cultural 
reason. The contact between Timor and Portugal produced a culture that was 
much higher than Indonesia’s. I think that the European culture is more open. 
Secondly, religion: the majority of Indonesians are Muslims. And in Timor, the 
Catholic religion entered people’s hearts [tama sira nia fuan], in that it was 
centred on love, and put people into meeting together with God [so that] love 
can enter them… Islam puts people in the position of fearing each other, people 
are scared of God, thinking that God threatens (Dominggos Soares interview).  
 
                                                
8 Branco recalled he and fellow students being laughed at by young children who called out: ‘look at the 
Portuguese school’s clothes!’  
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If the idea of a superior ‘hybrid’ culture was set in stone in the minds of Church elites 
(cf. Silva 2012), as a legacy of the Portuguese educational system, the position of the 
school was more ambivalent. Partly this was related to language. According to Taur 
Matan Ruak, former leader of Falintil, F-FDTL and after 2012, President, Portuguese 
was used to ‘oppose the Malay [Indonesian] language in the ambit of cultural struggle’ 
(Carrascalao, 2012:350), but at the same time, after East Timor’s independence, he 
opposed it as a hindrance to the justice system. His sentiments were not unique, as 
many of the population also disagreed with having Portuguese as an administrative 
language. Thus, when the Externato was reopened in 2004, it carried with it a similar 
double-edged legacy. As the current principal indicated, its alumni had assumed 
positions in government and other influential professions: 
 
Externato students made a contribution to independence; those in the 
government, not all, but many were students at the Externato…A Minister, a 
Secretary of State, President of the Republic, [we tell current students that] with 
the interest and the will, they can [become these people]. We say, in the past, 
your maun boot [big brother] who was here is now a minister. You can be the 
director of this school or you can be a teacher here (Fatima de Conceicao 
interview). 
 
Yet the school also carried with it the burden of language. Although Portuguese was 
advantageous in gaining employment with the government and elsewhere, the school 
was trumped in resources, popularity, and exam performance by Dili’s new lusophone 
school, Colégio de São Pedro, attended by children of East Timorese and foreign elites. 
Thus, while some thought that use of Portuguese was an indication of a higher, hybrid 
culture during foreign occupation, and despite the adoption of Portuguese after 
independence, its legacy was mixed.  
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Another part of the school’s institutional legacy had implications for relations between 
Church and state. In the Indonesian period, cooperation between Dili’s seminary and the 
Externato allowed trainee priests to attend classes at the latter, alongside its male and 
female students. Dili Diocese suddenly ended this arrangement without consultation 
with any of the school’s Jesuit founders in 2005. In the same year, the Diocese 
demonstrated, ostensibly against the removal of religious education from the state 
school curriculum. The Jesuits were the only religious order not to participate in the 
demonstrations, which they considered a political matter and outside the Church’s 
remit9. As David Hicks (2011) has noted, the 2005 demonstrations led to an alteration in 
relations between Church and state in which the church amassed many thousands of 
supporters in Dili. As I argue in the next section, there was indeed a significant 
alteration in the Church’s relations with the state as a result of the demonstrations. 
However, to understand what the demonstrations foretold for the events of 2006-8, they 
should be seen in historical perspective. For example, the church invoked missionary 
power that had been historically allied and symbolically inseparable from the power of 
East Timor’s liurais. Conceptually, missionary power is implicit in relations between 
liurais and priests. This is reflected in both the strong bonds between priests and the 
children of elites at the Externato on the one hand, and on the other hand, the idea of a 
superior culture forged through this colonial-indigenous interaction seen in Father 
Maubere’s remarks above. Secondly, missionary power and colonial authority were in 
practice seldom separated. This theme is described in the Church’s approach to its 
relations with the state seen during and after demonstrations against the government 
below. 
 
                                                
9 I have been unable to establish if the Diocese’s decision to halt co-educational arrangements in the 
teaching of seminarians was revenge for the Jesuit refusal to participate in demonstrations. 
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III. The 2005 Demonstrations and their meaning  
  
The Church is not preoccupied with recognition from the state. What is 
important is that the state recognises the Church’s right to its work. [the state] 
must not coordinate everything…it must recognise the Church as an institution 
with rights, and that the Church has obligations to the state. What the Church 
already knows is that the Church and state are not two things. The state is an 
institution and the Church is also an institution that serves the reality of 
humankind. The Church and state must not fight. They cannot be separated 
[haketak] nor only come together to compete with each other over work [labele 
kahur para hadau malu servisu]… But if the state can’t give recognition to the 
Church, I personally don’t really understand this, because [the Church and 
state] are the same. They both serve the people. For example, in a family, the 
mother and father both look after their children. It should not just be that father 
is stronger than mother or that mother is stronger than father (Dominggos 
Soares interview).  
 
The Church-led demonstration in 2005 provide a way to understand how the Church 
viewed its relations with the state as indicated from Father Soares’ remarks above. 
These events point a way towards a more in-depth historical exploration of missionary 
power, and its key symbolic and practical bases, elaborated from the previous section. 
The schooling of elites was not only a formalisation of missionary relations with elite 
families, but intrinsic to it, and in that relationship the family was key (Hagerdal, 2012). 
The family was a key basis of missionary relations with indigenous elites. Although 
references to ‘Christianized royalty’ only appeared in the first half of the 18th century 
(Hagerdal, 2012:31;317), the Portuguese strategy of converting rulers’ sons and 
daughters had been operative since the 16th century. Indeed, familial metaphors, as seen 
from Father Maubere’s remarks above, point not only towards the nature of relations 
between Church and state after independence but also the inseparability of liurais and 
missionaries. Second, understanding the relationship between missionaries and 
indigenous elites requires understanding the part that knowledge played between them. 
Again, and as shown in the following sections, this was not only formalised through the 
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‘transmission’ of knowledge to the children of liurais in the formal settings of 
classrooms. A negotiation of knowledge took place as priests catalogued indigenous 
customs10, and served as intermediaries with colonial authorities. Third, the relationship 
is symbolically represented through dress. Just as uniforms became an important 
symbol of the resistance for the postcolonial military, F-FDTL, so priests’ uniforms 
were similarly important11.  
 
The Church’s April-May 2005 protests were prompted by a decision taken by the 
Fretilin government in November 2004 to ‘remove the teaching of catholic doctrine’ 
from state schools. The decision was accompanied by a series of other regulations, 
including giving parents and school staff responsibility for teaching religious education 
at no extra cost to the state, and in a way that did not ‘prejudice’ mandatory subjects 
(Hicks, 2011:121). Implemented initially in a pilot scheme beginning in January 2005, 
it was seen by East Timor’s two Bishops, Ricardo da Silva and Basilio Nascimento, as a 
removal of the Church’s prime method of maintaining influence among the population. 
Their response, to draft a pastoral note condemning the policy, became a lightning rod 
for opposition political parties that invoked the Church’s role in the nation’s 
development. The moment also served as an opportunity for the Church to leverage 
other issues that would lend weight to its calls to have the government’s plan revoked. 
For example, shortly after their issue of the pastoral note, the two Bishops produced a 
broadside against the failure by the government to pursue justice against the authors of 
crimes associated with the Indonesian period. Their strongly-worded calls were timed to 
                                                
10 As priests had catalogued indigenous medicine in the 18th century, so they continued on this trajectory 
by publishing dictionaries of indigenous languages (Tetum and Galoli) and ethnographic accounts in the 
19th and 20th century. 
11 During the Indonesian period, a well-known priest that had been active in the Portuguese period, 
Father Carlos da Rota Matabean Pereira, preached against use of the Indonesian language and expressed a 
dislike of batik [Indonesian fabric] (Antonio Moniz Male, interview).  
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coincide with the publication of a report by a UN-appointed panel, the Commission of 
Experts, that solicited opinions from members of the East Timorese public, politicians, 
and ‘civil society’ including the Church (Hicks, 2011:123). This call for justice was 
then assimilated into the vocabulary of priests that led crowds during the 
demonstrations, when protestors were encouraged to chant “justice, justice and truth”. 
Priests from Dili Diocese also incited protestors to “fight against the Alkatiri regime”.  
 
At issue, then, was both the subject of demonstrations, and more broadly relations 
between Church and state. As Hicks notes of the former, neither priests’ public 
addresses to crowds, nor crowds’ banners broached the issue of the educational 
curriculum. Indeed, they were more likely to address ‘justice’, which became a byword 
for the resignation of the Fretilin Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri, one of the key aims of 
the protests (Hicks, 2011:126). Partly, Alkatiri’s brusqueness had hardly endeared him 
to the Church. Partly, too, however, those leading the demonstrations had personalised 
their attacks against Alkatiri and his faith of Islam. Also at issue was the question of the 
Church’s relations with the state. One of the most interesting responses of opposition 
parties that aligned with the Church was to accuse the government of trying to separate 
religion from the state, although East Timor does not have a state religion. The view of 
their inseparability can be compared Father Maubere’s familial view of Church and 
state.  
 
Despite Father Maubere and other priests’ rhetoric, the two Bishops appeared to soften 
their stance at the beginning of May by ruling out the demand that Alkatiri’s resignation 
was a requirement for their negotiation with the government (Hicks, 129). An 
agreement, brokered in early May by then president Xanana Gusmao, essentially 
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signalled an end to the policy of removing religious education from the curriculum 
(Hicks, 2011:131) and at the same time appeared to commit the government to ban 
abortion except where a mother’s life was threatened in the new draft penal code, and to 
introduce new measures to fight prostitution and child exploitation. Therefore, as the 
demonstrations dissipated, the intensity of grievances against the government and the 
person of Alkatiri subsided, and the focus on policy as a way out of the impasse became 
more prominent. 
 
The demonstrations have been interpreted in three ways. In a detailed analysis, Hicks 
saw the protest as a ‘defining moment’ in postcolonial church-state relations, 
underscored by a confrontation between sacred and secular spheres. The demonstration 
was powerful for symbolic reasons, being an unprecedented performance of the 
Church’s ability to mobilise crowds to the capital on a large scale, as well as asserting 
its stance on ‘political’ issues. Silva posits that the protests showed that the Church was 
attempting to shame the government into recognising it by invoking its struggle during 
the resistance period. Using the theme of reciprocity, Father Maubere’s accusation that 
the government was a ‘bad payer’ alluded both to the halting of funds to the Church in 
the months before the protest, but moreover denied the Church’s historical ‘importance 
in the achievement of independence’ (Silva, 2010:117). Both scholars interrogate the 
protests’ implications for the ‘crisis’ during the course of the year that followed it. The 
eventual unseating of the government – the avowed aim from demonstration leaders’ 
pronouncements and shown on their placards – was realised when Alkatiri resigned in 
July 2006. The demonstrations therefore unavoidably foretold the hardening of 
opposition to the government. By contrast, Nixon (2011) analyses the protests’ 
significance to the events of 2006 by referring to its agents. Xanana Gusmao’s defence 
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of the government against the Church in the demonstration’s later stages ‘proved’ that 
he had not been involved in attempting to unseat the government in 2006. This followed 
accusations that some Church leaders had allegedly entertained the possibility that, 
under the circumstances, the government could be overthrown by soliciting the 
military’s assistance12. Even while such an eventuality did not come to pass, its 
discussion indicates the strength of opposition that lay behind the demonstrations, 
manifested over the course of the following year.  
 
Besides indicating a shift in state-church relations and foretelling opposition to the 
government, as indicated, the demonstrations showed a struggle over the past. Father 
Soares made explicit connections between past and present by explaining Fretilin’s 
‘sabotage’ of a national unity government led by CNRT (without any opposition 
parties) after independence: 
 
While other parties began to move forward, Fretilin told their people not to go 
with CNRT. Fretilin has had in its structure since 1975 the idea to bring all the 
people to independence, so all the people followed it. That Fretilin could be 
Marxist-Leninist was not thought about, [the people] didn’t think about that. 
But in the jungle [in the 1970s] they began to open their eyes to see that Fretilin 
were communists, and then in 2000, they didn’t admit to being a communist 
party. They said to the people ‘we are struggling. We are winning. We will 
bring the nation forward’…So the people’s desire was for national unity and the 
CNRT congress aimed to achieve this, but Fretilin sabotaged this, and now they 
are paying for what they did to the people, they have encountered a heavy 
burden (Dominggos Soares interview).  
 
Thus, as outlined in chapter two, at stake was forging an ‘authentic’ version of history, 
by revealing its ‘truths’. Establishing this authenticity can also be seen from symbols 
                                                
12 For example, Taur Matan Ruak was approached by one of the demonstration’s organisers, Father 
Apolinario Guterres (chapter four), who arranged a meeting between Taur and two unnamed ‘political’ 
figures, of which Taur claimed to have had no advanced warning. These figures reportedly wanted Taur’s 
support to topple the Alkatiri government (Carrascalao, 2012:376-7)  
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used by the Church during the demonstrations. For example, in a pamphlet published by 
Dili Diocese to coincide with the protests, the Diocesan priest, Father Dominggos 
Sequeira, wrote a wide-ranging tract condemning the government. One passage dwells 
at length on the Church’s role during the Indonesian period. As is obvious from its 
opening lines, it is a response to Alkatiri’s charge that the Bishop’s pastoral note 
showed the Church to be acting as if it was a political party (Hicks, 2011:125). It is 
worth quoting at length principally because of its detailed record of priests’ dealings 
with the armed resistance, as well as its repeated invocation of the priest’s ‘uniform’, 
the robe, as a motif of resistance: 
 
[the government says] ‘Priests cannot do politics, it’s better that they take off 
[kolu] their robes [batina],’ and that ‘they have only recently become involved 
in politics’…in the resistance time padres also wore robes to confront the 
political situation, as follows: Father Dominggos “Maubere”, as everyone 
knows, wore white robes together with the leaders and the clandestine youth, 
organised, coordinated and carried out activities with many political 
demonstrations in Dili, made contact with the people and the resistance in the 
jungle, received a mandate from the supreme leader Xanana Gusmao to 
establish an organiser’s commission in Lisbon (Nov 1987), to [have] a general 
meeting of the political parties in the diaspora, in Peniche, Portugal 
(31/1/1998); Father Mario Belo wore robes to transport Xanana in his car from 
Tibar to Ermera, (April 1986) and bought guns to give to the resistance in the 
jungle; Father Sancho wore robes to transport Xanana from Dili to Ossu and hid 
him in his residence (Sep 1991); Father Rafael dos Santos wore robes when 
receiving a very important document from Xanana in Same, in order to give to 
Pope John Paul II, through Monsignor Marini, during his visit to Timor-Leste 
(Oct 1989); with robes, Julio Crispim bravely transported guns from Baucau to 
Ermera (1996), it was only because of his robes that the Indonesian military 
didn’t stop Julio Crispim who, with selfless bravery [aten-brani] held a 
meeting, drank and ate, went to the fields to harvest with Lu-Olo, Falur, Eli 
Foho Rai, Riak Leman, Sabika, in his residence in the Paroquia [Parish] of 
Soibada, (1997-1998); Father Jovito, wearing robes hid Taur Matan Ruak in the 
Seminario Maior in June 1998; with batina matebian [death robes] Father 
Jovito hid Taur in the Paroquia of Manatuto (1998-1999), with robes Father 
Jovito and Father Luis Bonaparte brought Sumucho to Ermera-Dili-Baucau, 
bringing him back to Ermera; wearing robes Father Locatelli (Italy), Father 
Joao de Deus (Portugal), Andres Hane (Indonesia), Father Andre Hama 
(Indonesia), brought things to the jungle, food, clothes, medicine, for the people 
and the resistance forces (1976-1999)…with great bravery [ho hahalok brani 
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tebes] Father Julio lent his robes to David Alex, who was sick, so that he could 
wear it to go and receive treatment.” (Sequeira, 2005) 
 
For Sequeira, the priest’s robe (batina) became inextricably associated with ‘politics’, 
as a result of the Indonesian period. The analysis below however argues that priests’ 
uniform was powerful before 1975. Two ways in which ‘missionary power’ was 
rendered are suggested: one fostered in educational and health institutions, and the other 
displayed symbolically and contextually through family, knowledge and appearance. In 
the following, these latter three themes are explored as it is argued that the robe has 
represented an important symbolic and performative element of ‘missionary power’. 
The robe signifies an apparent unity both between missionaries and spiritually powerful 
liurais, and colonial government. This in turn points towards, but does not determine, 
wider developments connected with missionary work. In the 1930s, for example, more 
missionising took place, and a further requirement (apart from close proximity) was that 
native Christians had ‘correct’ attire. Appearance was a requirement but also conferred 
‘value’ on its bearers as converts. In other words, to become Christian meant both to be 
encouraged to convert, but also to bear a sign of social status.  
IV. The contexts and symbols of missionary power  
The importance of Catholic missionaries to the Portuguese presence on Timor Island 
prior to 1975 is frequently suggested in Portuguese accounts. These account argue that 
missionaries brokered relations between indigenous and colonial authorities and that the 
conversion of regulos or liurais and lower-ranked datos and suco chiefs to Christianity, 
created a more ‘stable’ basis for the Portuguese colonial presence. By contrast, 
‘unstable’ periods in the eighteenth century are attributed to problems with indigenous 
leaders’ loyalties. In the following section several examples from Portuguese historical 
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accounts show that indigenous leaders’ loyalties were perceived as strong or wanting by 
reference to their comportment and appearance.  
Throughout the 18th century, the Portuguese vied with the Dutch for ‘control’ of Timor 
Island through forming alliances with local leaders. Although a treaty was signed in 
1859 demarcating land borders, finality was not reached on this issue for another five 
decades. Competition persisted that involved Dutch and Portuguese attempts to sign 
vassalage agreements with local leaders. In short, powerful families were conscripted 
through these agreements which held the key to colonial ‘sovereignty’. In 1766, two 
regulos on the south coast, Samoro and Lacluta, decided to hold church services in 
which they assumed roles as priests, without being ordained (the Jesuit establishment of 
the Soibada school is dealt with in chapter four and shows the continuing significance 
of this area). Dom Bernardo was invested as regulo of Samoro in 1766. In the same 
year, he mimicked a priest and is described as having sung ‘the alleluyah in priest’s 
clothes, without a missionary in the church’ (Alvarez, 1951:19). Meanwhile, the regulo 
of Lacluta separately also gave a church service dressed in priest’s robes, using ‘sacred 
images and books’ (Ibid, 19). Gathering together all of his people, he then tore up 
missals of sacred images and put them next to seeds planted in fields and  
invit[ed] the images to prove their miraculous power, so that [they] should 
prevent losses of seed caused by wild animals. Because during the night the 
seeds were destroyed, the regulo of Lacluta also destroyed the images. (Morais, 
1934: 112-116) 
Due to the indispensability of his family connections, his infractions were attributed to 
‘good intentions’ and ‘weak knowledge of doctrine’ and the diminishing influence of 
Dominican missionaries. Dom Bernardo was descended from among the most powerful 
topasses, the Hornays (Teixeira, 1974: 567). It is also discounted that these events could 
have been carried out ‘exclusively’ by Timorese, with the author citing ‘the cold hate 
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the Lutheran contains, for all that is Catholic, and in these abject deeds, it is certain that 
[the hand of the Dutch is evident]’ (Morais, 1934:116)  
This incident shows a sense of precariousness about Portuguese sovereignty. In 
‘excusing’ Dom Bernardo’s actions, good relations with ‘loyal’ regulos are prioritised. 
It also shows that missionaries were seen as worthy of imitation by donning vestments 
to ape their appearance. Priest and liurai power was intended to be seen as 
complementary or of a similar quality, a power represented in the performance of 
missionary rites and encapsulated in the robe.  
i. Father Jacob’s robes  
By the late nineteenth century, the colonial state had fought dozens of rebellions in the 
preceding 50 years against regulos unhappy with terms of tax, or for more complicated 
reasons sometimes only distantly related to regulos ‘disobedience’. Unlike previous 
periods, however, plans to bring recalcitrant regulos to obedience were accompanied by 
attempts to make the colony profitable. Second, the missions had been reorganised in 
1879. Whereas making the colony profitable was seen as an objective of ‘pacification’, 
the Mission Superior Father Joachim de Medeiros blamed the outbreak of rebellions on 
‘paganism’, in turn caused by ‘bad and ignorant clergy’ (Teixeira, 1974: 55).  
 
These areas of pacification, profit and paganism converged, curiously enough, in the 
event of a search for gold in 1891. Seen in an international context, by this period, 
world gold prices were high, Portugal was effectively bankrupt, and in 1890 had 
received the infamous ‘ultimatum’ by the British in Africa (Clarence-Smith, 1985:83). 
Combined with rumours that gold was abundant in the south central mountainous and 
coastal areas of East Timor, and centuries-old memories of imperial greatness sustained 
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by gold, (Schwartzmann, 1989: 52) the plan to prospect for gold seemed like an 
attractive proposition. It was also appealed to missionaries that through their presence 
outside Dili had access to information on rumoured locations of gold deposits, which it 
passed on to the search team. The Mission provided its only native priest, Jacob dos 
Reis e Cunha, as a guide. Father Jacob was one of the only Timorese ever to have 
graduated from ‘superior courses’ in Portugal, and was related to regulos of the south 
coast. Thus he seemed to personify colonial-indigenous relations by vassalage and 
missionary work. His family also owned land on which gold was said to be located. Yet 
his conduct irked the government and missions. He claimed to have carried out up to 
100 baptisms in a month from a neighbouring Reino, in 1887, but rather than endearing 
him to the missions, this made them suspicious that he was using his position to settle 
local scores and planning to expand his own ‘fiefdom’ (Teixeira, 1974:196). 
 
The search for gold took place in late 1891, but resulted in negligible quantities being 
found, even after several months’ searching. The government’s chief medical officer, 
José Gomes da Silva, who had been designated as an observer, made excoriating attacks 
on Father Jacob in his report. Gomes da Silva thought Jacob wanted to ‘annex’ 
Maubessi and Tutuluro, rivals to his own Reino Bibico, so that it would have access to 
both ‘bread and gold’. No mention is made of Jacob ever contemplating or promising 
this to the inhabitants of his Reino, although sometime in the previous century they had 
been driven off their land by an attack by the regulos of Tutuluro. The context bears out 
colonial reactions: in imagining Jacob’s designs to make a Reino of ‘notable importance 
in the future’, (Gomes da Silva, 1891:10) he was expressing anxieties about the 
Portuguese position in East Timor, against the backdrop of numerous rebellions and 
more distantly, empire-wide bankruptcy.  
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The remaining accounts indicate that Jacob died shortly after the search for gold on his 
family’s farm. Pinto Correa wrote that ‘Jacob had been sent to Alas, on the south coast. 
He let himself be corrupted by ‘tuaca’ [palm wine]; proceeded to dress himself as and 
live as a native…’ Based on a report made of a visit by a Portuguese priest Padre 
Sebastião, Pinto Correia wrote that Sebastião listened to Jacob ‘confess…that he didn’t 
possess a robe’ (Pinto Correia, 1934:200, n1). One can focus on a number of aspects in 
this and other accounts: Gomes da Silva’s description of Jacob as ‘like a Bismarck’ 
(Gomes da Silva, 1891:10), skilled in political machinations; the absence of 
companions or kin; the sense of abandon in references to his alcohol consumption; and 
ultimately his death shortly after. To observers reporting on this ignominy, the absence 
of priest robes correlated completely with Jacob’s ‘paganisation’. The robes that had 
made him appear civilised were missing. On a normative scale of civilisation, he was at 
the bottom, and worse, a disloyal local leader dressed as a priest. Unlike the regulos of 
Lacluta and Samoro, who had strayed temporarily into the domain of the priest, Jacob’s 
‘treachery’ was represented through his abjection. Made a priest for apparently 
instrumental purposes, he was neither permitted to be a leader that fought and forged 
alliances, nor a missionary in an ideal paragon of a moral arbiter. After the Mission 
reorganisation had begun in the 1870s, Medeiros’ view that missionaries were morally 
corrupt was personified in Jacob13,14. 
                                                
13 Despite his unpopularity with Portuguese, Jacob was highly influential among the indigenous 
population in some western districts of East Timor. One of his acolytes, Tat Felix, possibly a catechist, is 
still recalled and venerated in Aileu through the origin house called Hohul/Hoho-ulu. See Duarte, 1987 
and Traube, 2008. 
14 Another episode In World War two, showed the robe as a symbol of priestly authority. Father Abilio 
Caldas died during the Japanese occupation, apparently killed by another East Timorese. Following the 
earlier killing of two priests in Ainaro by Japanese troops, the head of the Diocese, Father Jaime Garcia 
Goulart, decided that its European personnel should retreat to Australia. A single East Timorese, Father 
Abilio Caldas, like Jacob, was ordained as a priest, and asked Goulart if he could stay in Timor, because, 
‘being of the same colour he would be able to more effectively administer priestly ministry…[Goulart] 
had been of the same opinion’. Accordingly, Goulart’s only condition was that Abilio should not wear his 
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ii. Deathbed conversion in Nari 
 
By contrast, O Rei de Nari, [the king of Nari], a memoir of a Salesian priest, José 
Rodrigues, showed a liurai’s moral soundness by way of charting his conversion. The 
memoir also exemplified the significance of family to this conversion and establishing 
the missionary presence. Rodrigues recalled his time attempting to convert the 
aristocratic family of Nari while based at the newly established Fuiloro mission in the 
easternmost Lautem district in the 1950s. Starting with the ‘pacification’ campaigns of 
Celestino da Silva in the early twentieth century, the family lost its land over successive 
generations. Rodrigues noted that Governor da Silva - known locally as Sawarica, or 
scorpion – had terrorised the population on arrival, after which the intervention 
purportedly brought ‘peace and wellbeing’. This lasted until the Japanese occupation of 
1943-5, when Nari served as a refuge for the surrounding population. After these years 
of hardship the Rei ‘was left poor and without resources’ (Rodrigues, 1962:128). The 
details of the entire population’s relocation to the post of Parla after the Portuguese 
reoccupation in 1945 remain obscure, with Nari representing a place of unrealised 
return.  
 
This deracination was an allegory for a void that Christian conversion eventually filled, 
with the king converting on his deathbed. Prior to this, Rodrigues had already called on 
                                                                                                                                          
robes or cape, ‘so that he could be better hidden’ (Alvarez, 1951:83). In March 1943, Abilio was attacked 
while on horseback by a former student from the Soibada school, and accomplices, while returning from 
conducting a service. Alvarez describes how having been shot, the priest was seriously wounded in the 
shoulder and fell from his horse: ‘The criminals ran in the direction of the victim, one firing again. 
Another hurled a stone at him saying, “go and listen to a confession”. It is believed that the person that 
proffered these words was a student that had disappeared, while the others were pagans’. The explanation 
for the attack, in which Abilio died, was that the ‘murderer had already shown strange mental anomalies 
in the boarding school of Beato Nuno’ (ibid, 83), though it is not known if Abilio knew the former 
student. The killing of a Timorese priest otherwise nominally subject to Portuguese protection can be 
viewed as the result of his appearing without a robe, and thus being the same as other East Timorese.  
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a time-honoured strategy, by baptising the Rei’s grandson, Zevatau, who attended the 
Fuiloro mission school. Zevatau succumbed to a serious, unexplained illness, dying 
despite the Rei’s sacrifices to ancestors. In preparations for his funeral, and in contrast 
to the discretion apparently enjoyed by missionaries in Samoro and Ainaro, some 
relatives were upset to find that Rodrigues had been informed of the death, and had 
insisted on a Christian burial. With some angrily resisting the idea, it seemed that 
Rodrigues would be shunned, although the family later relented. The Rei pondered the 
response from the family to his question of why missionaries were informed of the 
death: Hai Sarana! Hai Sarana! [He was a Christian] – murmured the old man, 
amazed…He continued to repeat ‘Sarana, Sarana’, and went into the house without 
saying another word’ (Rodrigues, 1962:150). Even while it seemed that the king was 
lulled into agreeing with a Christian burial by the aura surrounding his deceased 
grandson, the resistance of the wider community – and his own family - continued. 
Zevatau was given a Christian burial, but Rodrigues pretended not to notice when he 
was intentionally diverted so that food could be secreted into Zevatau’s grave to prevent 
‘hunger’.  
 
The relationship between missionary and liurai can also be seen through the negotiation 
of knowledge. One area for this negotiation is indigenous legends [lendas], which 
Rodrigues embedded in his memoir. These also served a performative function, as 
Rodrigues’ knowledge of them showed his mastery of indigenous culture. This 
knowledge was used to challenge what is presumed to be the Rei’s feigned ignorance 
when cross-examined about legends. Rodrigues’ rebuttals (‘you lie!’) were based on his 
own accumulated knowledge, on subjects such as the whereabouts of severed heads of 
enemies, ostensibly from pre-colonial wars (cf. Roque, 2010). When Rodrigues’ 
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knowledge was displayed, the Rei’s retinue gasped reverentially. Rodrigues noted ‘a 
certain parallelism’ between some legends and biblical stories (Rodrigues, 1962:240), 
while their symbolic props, for example a seventeenth century book of prayer in 
German and Latin, were both an object of indigenous veneration and a reified form of 
missionary knowledge (Rodrigues, 1962:266). In one lenda, a childless family were 
helped by a crocodile, which was really a white man, to whose ‘very tall and white’ 
house on an island the husband was taken and which was the repository of cures of 
every kind. An image of a colonial building that houses cures is suggestive of how 
missionaries saw the potential for Christianity to take root from indigenous perceptions 
of colonial technological and epistemological superiority.  
 
In other words, a mutual recognition took place in which the Rei recognised missionary 
power through conversion, while missionaries coveted the Rei’s power. This was 
expressed through a symbol of enduring relations in the dénouement of the account. The 
‘truths’ that the community protected (the whereabouts of heads) had been unearthed by 
Rodrigues. Against the backdrop of this earlier display, the King decided to be baptised 
on his deathbed in early 1957. Rodrigues carried out the baptism, giving the Rei the 
name of José Maria. As he was about to leave, the Rei requested that Rodrigues give 
him his priest robes: 
 
…I was not astonished when the Rei asked for my stole [estola] and surplice 
[sobrepeliz] because they were very nice. In view of the impossibility of 
satisfying his request, he was content with the smock [guarda-po] (Rodrigues, 
1962:274)  
 
Thus, the robe was evidently seen as a powerful symbol to liurais and priests, 
accompanying their interactions and representing their alliance, while the family and 
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knowledge were to be mastered or ‘won over’ to the missionary cause. Each account 
represented its subjective context, whether related to Lutheran subversion, missionary 
decadence, or the resistance to and burgeoning of missionary activity during the 1950s. 
Beyond these contexts, the next section considers how correct appearance was diffused. 
Focussing on the decades prior to the Indonesian invasion, it notes how the appearance 
of converts both showed their social status but later indicated resistance to Indonesian 
rule.   
 
iii. Missionary power: comportment and appearance 
 
The previous section showed that priest’s robes were used to represent relations at 
different times between East Timorese leaders and missionaries. The varying degrees of 
steadfastness of this relationship could be seen in one way by the extent to which 
indigenous leaders were represented as adhering to Christian norms, in another through 
a negotiation of knowledge and family. By the same token, East Timor’s population of 
Christian converts who were not all descended from liurai families were expected to 
adhere to norms of ‘civilised’ appearance. As I argue below, the Indonesian occupation 
later caused a partial transformation in the meaning of these signs of Christianity. 
However, appearance continued and continues to bear traces of hierarchies associated 
with the Portuguese period. On one hand, Portuguese writers contributed to a canon of 
effusive treatments of tropes such as Portugal’s historical ‘duty’ to ‘civilise’ indigenous 
peoples (Castelo, 1998:86) during the 1930s: 
 
At the doors of the church can be seen groups of natives masquerading as 
devout people, dressed in black, moving lasciviously with bright eyes of pagan 
lewdness. The natives dressed in black! They are…iconoclasts, such vile 
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hypocrisy the singular work of current missionary action, different, very 
different from that which Bishop Medeiros exemplified (Braga, 1936:10).  
 
This passage shows a clear connection between comportment and appearance. ‘Current 
missionary action’ had permitted the ‘immoral’ behaviour of ‘pagans’ to be masked by 
the misappropriated attire of Christians. On the other hand, missionaries themselves 
viewed dress as a precondition for Church attendance and consequently, conversion. In 
common with the state’s acknowledgment of those working on its projects (chapter 
seven), a step towards subjecthood, the Canossian sisters, who had returned with the 
Salesians in 1927 (Teixeira, 1974:441), reported telling East Timorese women that they 
believed in equality between Europeans and Timorese, and that ‘there are no 
distinctions between races, but only of work’. The same account demonstrates a 
prominent preoccupation with standards of appearance for new converts. The Canossian 
nun, Rita Cassati, reported that:   
 
Missionaries…distributed clothes sent by our benefactors in Italy, because 
many of our novices [neófitos] could not present themselves in church because 
they didn’t have clothes to cover up with (BEDM July 1933: 42).  
 
Later in the same passage, requirements of being a Christian were decidedly difficult for 
the poor to overcome, a problem again solved by missionary beneficence: 
 
A tiny girl…responded promptly “I am Christian”. But to the question of 
fulfilling her religious duties, she responded, showing the poor rags that 
covered her: “I don’t have clothes to go to church!” We invited her to church 
the next Sunday where she was given all that she needed (Ibid). 
 
Later accounts demonstrate the same assertions of a fundamental equality of Christian 
subjects. The visit of the image of Our Lady of Fatima in 1951 show initially, 
depictions of a uniformity of appearance between children of the rich and poor, a 
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seeming manifestation of the doctrine of equality of all in the eyes of God. Later in the 
passage the children of rich families are elevated, who are better disposed to fulfil the 
desired appearance of communicants: 
 
The baptised were the first to appear in the church…even the poorest were 
dressed in white. More it seemed than by clothing, they distinguished 
themselves through an air of satisfaction that showed through on their faces… 
After being baptised, a group of new communicants gathered. Some of the little 
girls, daughters of public servants and merchants, with their immaculate veils 
that gave them a delicate and angelic note…will receive the Bread of Angels 
for the first time (SEARA May-June 1951:147). 
 
Assertions of equality among humans were tempered by requirements made of a 
convert’s appearance. In short, until 1975, appearances displayed social hierarchies as 
much as they represented enduring relations between missionaries and indigenous 
authorities. Later, fleeing Indonesian persecution, the morality of pre-1975 converts’ 
appearance became connoted with resistance: 
 
…the military sprayed the long grass with gasoline and set fire to it to drive 
people out. Unable to run due to hunger, the elderly were left behind and died 
where they sat, defiant and dignified, dressed, she said, as if they were going to 
Sunday Mass (Walsh, 2012). 
 
The meaning of converts’ appearances changed in radically different circumstances. 
Beyond the formalities of the last rites (Chapter two), in death, appearance signified the 
morality of resistance and martyrdom, contrasting with Padre Jacob’s wretchedness in 
death after abandoning his robes.  
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V. Conclusion 
 
This account has suggested that the inculcation of norms and habits was central not only 
to evangelisation and elite formation, but to missionary power. The resistance 
movement had attempted to emulate aspects of this power as a way to maintain cultural 
distinctiveness from Indonesians, and order. Other analyses have shown how, in the 
postcolonial period, an indigenous and Portuguese culture has been constructed in 
retrospect, casting Portuguese colonialism in a positive light. This analysis has shown 
that elite comportment with which this commonality was associated was the result of 
formation in mission schools, but was also maintained during the Indonesian occupation 
as a way to forge cultural distinctiveness. The Indonesian occupation presented limited 
opportunities for the diffusion of norms specifically associated with this form of elite 
comportment, but as noted elsewhere, propagated other norms through the education 
system, often with unintended consequences. In this regard, other accounts have shown 
the significance of young resistance activists educated in the Indonesian school system 
(the ‘New Generation’) who were often engaged in resistance activities alongside 
Externato students (Carey, 2003). This account has not attempted to show the extent of 
these relations. Instead, against accounts that stress that the distinctive feature of the 
country’s lusophone elite is that they were not present in East Timor during the 
Indonesian occupation, it has shown that an element of this elite remained and was 
significant in that it constituted a ‘civil(ised)’ element of resistance.  
 
By proposing that an elite habitus was transmitted and reproduced through bodily 
disposition, conduct and appearance, this account has considered how certain aspects of 
‘missionary power’ were transmitted beyond the decolonisation of 1975, being 
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subsequently constructed and reproduced through an elite habitus. Yet on another level, 
the school existed under the institutional protection of the Catholic Church, the same 
source from which the school’s founders encountered opposition. The configuration of 
power in this institutional relationship therefore demonstrates the limits of biopower. In 
this regard, the account has showed other ways that the postcolonial Catholic Church 
propagated missionary power, through symbols. The robe, for example, invoked both 
missionary-elite relations and acted as a justification for the Catholic Church’s formal 
involvement in politics, once it had been refracted through resistance against Indonesian 
rule. Like symbols of the resistance, such as military fatigues, used to institute the state, 
robes indicated missionary power. Their invocation for example accompanied the public 
and performative disclosure of ‘truths’ during the 2005 demonstrations, indicating both 
past involvement in the resistance movement and a justification for continuing 
proximity to formal political power.  
 
The events of 2005 therefore show other parts of the modalities of missionary power. 
The demonstrations showed that the claims the demonstration organisers made were 
directed towards the unseating of the Prime Minister, and were prospective insofar as 
they foretold the emergence of serious opposition to the government in 2006. However, 
they also signalled the recalibration of relations between Church and state. To this end, 
assertions from the Church of their inseparability from the state originated not through 
happenstance but from historical power relations. Relations between liurais and 
missionaries, and the symbolism of uniforms demonstrated this. Moreover, missionary 
work in the 1920s and 1930s and beyond signalled a wider diffusion of norms of 
appearance among more of the population. To this end, a subjective reflexivity to norms 
at both didactic and practical levels is evident, in that the meaning of appearance in 
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these contexts was connoted with ‘civilisation’ and morality. The following chapter 
considers further elements of missionary power aimed at securing broader allegiances to 
Christianity among the population. 
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7. Reifying difference: health and hygiene 
 
I. Introduction – Habitats and norms 
 
When approached from the elevated, winding roads that led into Dili from its southern 
outskirts in the early 1970s, the city seemed carpeted with vegetation. Occasional 
vehicles - military vehicles, private cars, Chinese-owned buses – followed roads near 
the city’s waterfront, their movement barely perceptible from a distance. The roads, 
only one of which was paved, were dotted with even more occasional government 
buildings, clustered around the seafront and straddled by trees, which gave the city its 
green aspect. At night, the city was consumed by darkness: some of the few buildings 
with electricity were to be found on the hillside at Lahane, among them the Australian 
consulate (Araújo, 2012:53). By this period, Dili was increasingly subject to migration 
from the districts, people drawn by promises of trade, education, and jobs. East Timor’s 
different ethnic groups mixed in markets, farmed plots of land, and for a small number, 
went to mission schools or worked in the civil service. 
 
Whether from within clusters of palapa houses, the courtyards of convents or barracks, 
or from atop the hill hospital at Lahane, this view of Dili, an accidental garden city, 
changed markedly after the Indonesian invasion. The subsequent killing, and 
destruction and looting of property was a familiar theme in the last quarter of the 20th 
century and might be expected to have changed this view of the city most. Yet it was 
changes wrought in re-making the city as ‘Indonesian’ during the 1980s after its 
destruction, that most affected its appearance. This involved the population as well as 
the built environment. The transmigration scheme was a hallmark of New Order-era 
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attempts to spread, stem, and replace populations. Vendors from Sumatra and Makassar 
sold food from small stalls to civil servants from all over Indonesia, accommodated in 
government buildings that sprung up over a city increasingly recast in concrete. Bulls 
from Surabaya were led along Dili’s dusty roads. Many of the entrances to government 
buildings took the form of traditional East Timorese houses from Lautem district. This 
was, however, less a concession to East Timorese culture, and more a statement of how 
this state-approved emblem of culture took its place in the Indonesian nation (Kipp-
Smith, 1994). 
 
Two Portuguese Jesuit priests who witnessed the transformation, Fathers Felgueiras and 
Martins, observed that as the city accommodated more people, the authorities dealt with 
public sanitation by hollowing out open sewers at the sides of roads, which filled the 
environment with ‘a nauseating odour’ (Felgueiras and Martins, 107). It is a peculiar 
irony, therefore, that at the end of the 1980s, Dili won an award for being one of the 
‘cleanest cities in Indonesia’ (Adipura). Students and civil servants carried out a 
cleaning of the city’s streets. This practice also followed similar government-approved 
practices in the rest of Indonesia, of Kerja Bakti, where residents cleaned their 
neighbourhoods prior to Independence Day celebrations (August 17) or other public 
holidays, intended to reflect the Javanese-conceived duty of mutual help, gotong 
royong, which, although voluntary, few thought it wise to avoid. In the context of Dili’s 
reconstruction as an Indonesian city, its cleaning was a performance of East Timor’s 
provincial status within Indonesia. 
 
In chapter two, it was argued that official history was used to govern. Though it was 
unrealised in the postcolonial period, to its supporters, military service was a civic duty. 
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Given its objectives of preventing disorder, moreover, it was also evidently an attempt 
to make a part of the population recognise and interact with the state in this regard. It 
invoked Portuguese colonial government: many of the state’s elites undertook military 
service. This chapter considers ‘General cleaning’ (Limpeza geral) in the postcolonial 
period, whereby the adult population, then civil servants, cleaned streets on Friday 
mornings. Like military service, Limpeza was posited as a civic service. Unlike military 
service, its historical origins are not immediately obvious. Its formal, civic dimensions, 
pointed towards what the relationship between the state and its citizens was, or should 
be. It was a policy to be devised and implemented to improve the hygiene and aesthetics 
of urban areas, from which state and citizenry could benefit. The effects of the policy 
could be seen, so it was argued, in both the urban environment and in an enhanced 
relationship between state and its citizens, and in the benefits it would bring by way of 
tourism. The effect of the policy defined its meaning: the transformations that it 
wrought were ideal demonstrations that East Timor was modern and past colonialism. 
 
Against this view, Limpeza can also be seen as an example of the kind of practice that 
characterised relations between sections of the population and colonial authorities in the 
capital Dili under successive periods of colonial authority. The dimensions of this are 
complicated. Before 1975, to varying degrees, forced labour was still part of 
interactions between state and population. On the other hand, East Timor had not been 
formally subject to the Indigenato, the forced labour regime in operation across most of 
colonial Portuguese Africa until the early 1960s. In part, the practice of public cleaning 
defined an important part of what a city was: an area inhabited by citizens as opposed to 
the districts, occupied by subjects. Yet as others have indicated, the distinction dividing 
city and districts, citizens and subjects was more fuzzy than distinct (O’Laughlin, 2000; 
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cf. Mamdani, 2000). By definition, although such distinctions could be expressions of 
differences in topography and ecology, they were also designated by colonial 
authorities. Using the theme of health and hygiene, this chapter argues that a modern 
bio-political regime was invariably tempered by colonial ambivalence about recognising 
subjects, but also by indigenous resilience against colonial strategies. The gap between 
indigenous evasion and colonial ambivalence in recognising subjects except where 
work was involved, was to some extent bridged by Christian conversion, which 
similarly sought to make the population sedentary (chapter five). Nonetheless, certain 
aspects of these colonial practices and indigenous responses have persisted to the 
postcolonial period, suggesting not a social contract between citizen and state, but a 
practice that has coalesced around longstanding ideas, and has been mediated by the 
intervening years of the Indonesian occupation. 
 
II. Dili: city without subjects 
 
Perhaps the first instance of the city’s place in reflecting colonial prestige occurred in 
the early 1830s, when Dili had only been the capital of Portuguese Timor for 60 years. 
The colony’s political class had recently been effectively subject to a coup attempt by a 
priest, Padre Varella. In its wake, a new Governor, José Maria Marques, introduced 
plans to improve the city. At the time, wrote a later Governor, Afonso de Castro, Dili 
was a ‘city with a miserable aspect, built without plan or method, with tortuous paths 
instead of roads that opened through thick palm trees that shadowed the entire 
population, preventing air from circulating’ (Castro, 1869:129). Marques’ re-alignments 
of roads cut across indigenous farms, mostly running parallel, a few constructed sitting 
at right angles to others. Constructed on Dili’s marshy terrain, the project reportedly 
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raised few objections. After all, new roads performed the function, wrote Castro, of 
connecting the government with its subjects in villages in the south and west parts of 
the city. In contrast to the districts, a place where local authority could be subcontracted 
but not subordinated, an ordered city was a space where distances were bridged between 
coloniser and colonised.  
 
In the 1890s, East Timor’s longest serving Governor, Celestino da Silva, commissioned 
the design of sewers in Dili. Yet it was not until the aftermath of the 1912 Boaventura 
rebellion that further ideas of order in this connection clearly emerged. Celestino’s da 
Silva’s tenure, which ended in 1908, saw coffee-growing schemes intensified, intended 
to make East Timor profitable. This was taken further by the Republican government 
after 1912 when the population was forced to participate in mass coffee-growing 
schemes (Clarence-Smith, 1992). At the same time, the Republicans made Dili a 
municipality. The military posts established in the wake of the 1912 rebellion were 
ceded to civil posts by 1920, accompanied by the establishment of ‘health delegations’ 
in Baucau in the East, Bobonaro in the west and in Manufahi - the centre of rebellion – 
‘for reasons of political order’ in 1918 (Costa-Barbosa, 1953: 2518-9). Thus, out of 
rebellion came remedy through both forcibly conscripting the population into 
cultivation schemes and installing outposts of the state in their midst.   
 
In Dili, in the same period, Governor Eduardo da Camara established a Municipal 
Council in 1916, charged with inventing schemes for the hygienic improvement of the 
city, but which was disbanded in the 1920s. The Council’s re-constitution in the 1930s 
coincided with further territorial reorganisations, and the advent of the New State in 
Portugal. The first thing the Commission did was order ‘a cleaning of all of the city, 
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with cleaning of the roads, ditches, trenches and canals, repairing some roads and 
aligning others, at the same time as which various plots of the terrain and farms 
[quintais] of indígenas, residents in the east of the city, were drained’ (Moura, 
1942:193). By this period, in the name of improved sanitation, the Council was 
overseeing attempts to widen canals that brought more water from the mountains1, and 
the draining of ponds on indigenous farms. It initiated a major programme of swamp 
drainage in the Caicoli and Balide neighbourhoods and passed regulations obliging 
‘occupants and owners of urban buildings to keep the roads and the areas around their 
buildings in a state of cleanliness’ (ibid:190). With Hippocratic conviction, the Council 
proposed reducing vegetation in properties on public roads in Dili that stopped light and 
air circulating.  
  
If sanitary interventions of the period seemed to represent a shift away from the forced 
mobilisations in the 1910s, traces of it still remained. One of the original provisions 
made by Camara’s Council had been the establishment of a Sanitary Brigade, paid for 
by the Municipal Council. It was composed of prisoners and ‘those condemned to carry 
out public works’ (Moura, 1942:190). Yet by the 1930s, no reference is found to prison 
labour in public works projects2. On the contrary, and similar to accounts emphasising 
humane conditions on plantations (chapter five) in the same period, ‘care’ for labourers 
who constructed the new military headquarters (Quartel Geral) was shown through 
health treatment available to them in the event of sickness (ibid). This shift in portrayal 
– whether among plantation workers or construction labourers – is useful in 
understanding attempts to ‘reach’ native subjects that Governor Castro had hailed in his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Much of the stone used to widen and lay beds on canals was sourced from the quarry at Fatumeta in the 
west of Dili. 
2 However, the colonial government appealed for funds for a prison hospital and the building of 
segregated quarters for the insane [alienados] from the normal prison population (Figueiredo, 2004:625) 
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predecessor’s work in the 19th century. Rather than being derived from hollow-sounding 
Republican declarations of equality through indigenous citizenship, a city-dwelling 
native’s presence could only be acknowledged when they worked.  
 
If the appearance of healthy native subjects became more important in limited 
portrayals, so too did the appearance of hygiene in Dili’s environment. A.A. Moura 
reported that the Municipal Council’s work helped ‘establish principles of the aesthetic 
city, that properly improved the nosological conditions of the environment’. This idea 
appears in Moura’s account several times, when asserting that ‘beautification’ 
[embelezamento] of the city was inseparable from ‘improvements to sanitation’ (Ibid: 
196). Yet he also unwittingly drew attention to the incompatibility of this pairing. For 
instance, the wrong kind of trees was selected to line the road running adjacent to the 
seafront, from the Palacio do Governo towards the ‘indigenous’ neighbourhoods of 
Bidau and Becora, their roots invading nearby dwellings and their circumference 
threatening to take up the entire walkway. The clogging of this road with aesthetic 
objects – connecting the seat of government with the eastern ‘suburbs’ – serves as a 
metaphor for the state’s protracted attempts to ‘reach’ the native population in the city, 
one begun a century earlier under Governor Marques.  
 
Aesthetics, then, did not merely signify the construction of environments according to 
colonial tastes. To designate an environment as aesthetically pleasing marked proximity 
to colonial power. Like a ‘civilising light’ shining from remote missionary stations in 
the same period, portrayal of the hygiene and health of subjects and their environment 
were indicative of colonial power (BEDM 1938). Patrick Joyce argues that aesthetics 
were a ‘mode of indirect governance’, through which the ‘sanitary city’ was conceived, 
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and a hallmark of ‘liberal governmentality’. It is also clear that the same might be 
argued of colonial governmentality, where sanitation and aesthetics were also wedded. 
Constructing sewers, fighting back foliage, and organising sanitary brigades, was at 
once a performance of technological superiority and moral intent, and indicative of 
uplift and improvement (Joyce, 2001:144-5) Yet making Dili stand apart from the 
districts was tempered by slow progress. The same halting approach to the production 
of an aesthetic environment can be seen in the ban on the native population’s huts. 
While the location of the housing of civil servants in Lahane had been established for 
two decades, plans mooted in October 1935 for a neighbourhood where natives would 
live [bairro indígena], were not realised by the decade’s end (ibid, 196), nor were 
similar arrangements for Dili’s Chinese and Arab communities. Similar schemes to 
emplace the population beyond Dili (chapter five) got further, in prototype, but not 
scale, and then not by much. The overarching point, however, is that from the mid-
1920s, colonial authorities had begun to conceive of the possibility that the native 
population could be subject to intervention through its health. This was closely 
associated with the forging of limitations on territory, such as municipalities, civil 
districts, and the renaming of ‘cities’ in the following decade.   
 
This reorganisation of territory was but one indication of the increased attention given 
to accounting for the native population. It took the ruptures of the Second World War, 
the Japanese invasion and then Portuguese reoccupation in 1945 to further ‘reach’ 
subjects. As Castelo put it, by this period, Portuguese rule had not moved towards 
recognising natives as subjects on cultural grounds because they lacked requirements to 
assimilate, nor on ‘political’ grounds because their ‘conquest’ as citizens remained 
incomplete (Castelo, 1998:47). Due to the impossibility, as the authorities saw it, of 
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bringing the population to the state’s attention on the basis of citizenship, other ways, 
such as exemplary punishment, emerged. In 1945, newly arrived Portuguese authorities 
launched a ‘hunt’ for collaborators with the Japanese, of whom an unknown number 
were detained on Atauro Island. Moreover, they also intended to intervene in the 
population’s health. Doctors described native reluctance to receive medical treatment in 
starkly pathological terms, as a ‘stubborn new psychology of fleeing in the face of the 
doctor’ (Barbosa, 1953:2520). This could no more be regarded as new, however, than it 
could a medical condition (chapter five). As a means to encourage native use of health 
institutions, the authorities made a number of reforms in the late 1940s and 1950s. As 
the Chief of Health and Hygiene, António de Sousa Grandão reported, these reforms 
included, inter alia, ‘free healthcare’ by 1949. Additionally, the creation of small ‘guest 
villages’ [aldeias-albergarias] temporarily accommodated the families of the sick that 
travelled long distances to be treated. Each of the 35 clinics in the districts outside Dili 
had such an installation. The aim of bringing the population closer to centres of colonial 
authority is evident in all of these schemes (Grandão, 1958).  
 
Together with the re-organisation of six sub-delegations, stationed in district capitals, 
the health network was made more ‘extensive and dense’. In Dili, by the end of the 
decade a new maternity ward at Dr Carvalho hospital saw 300 internees a year. From 
these installations, and despite only having some 40 nurses, including 10 trainees and 
seven doctors, significant numbers of treatments were dispensed3. Outbreaks continued, 
with Asian flu claiming 66 lives, and malaria a dozen or so more in 1956. A report into 
a possible malaria eradication programme by a team from the Institute of Tropical 
Diseases in Lisbon estimated that its cost would be extremely high, and on these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 By 1957, 91,000 consultations were carried out, 647,695 medicines, 367,000 injections, 46,000 parasite 
treatments, and 20,000 vaccinations dispensed (Grandão, 1958). 
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grounds, as well as claiming that mosquitoes would eventually develop resistance to it, 
Grandão rejected the plan. Accordingly, the cleaning of the city, begun in the 1930s, 
was continued.  
 
While doctors presented evidence that mortality rates were reduced as the result of 
natives being interned, the logic for intervention among the population was broader, 
being envisioned as improving the health of the native body. They described legions of 
‘peripatetic corpses’ covered in sores that emerged from hiding at the end of the 
Japanese period, caused by inadequate habitat and ‘an aversion to the use and cleaning 
of clothes’, insect bites and exposure to inclement weather. Native chewing of betel or 
intoxication by palm wine resulted in depressed immune function. The chances of 
overcoming a fever in this state, so European doctors believed, were remote. These 
explanations were also used to explain not only susceptibility to sickness but native 
‘idleness’. Medical personnel accordingly prescribed not only medicine but also 
encouraged the government to vigorously enforce regulations centred on native housing, 
food and clothing (Barbosa, 1953:2531). To understand how cleanliness became key to 
emplacing the population, it needs to be understood in the context of native Christianity, 
especially how conversion required the initial and continuing observance of rites.  
  
III. Living and dying as a Christian 
 
As ideas of how to reach subjects changed according to the logics of colonial rule, so 
too did thinking in this regard change in mission schools. This can be seen in a 
comparison of reactions to outbreaks of disease over time. During the cholera epidemic 
that swept into Dili following the siege of Maubara in 1894, for instance, the mission 
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school sent students and staff home from the school at Lahane4. Three decades later, by 
1927, two outbreaks, first of conjunctivitis, then flu, transformed the Internato at 
Lahane into ‘a veritable hospital’, which saw attempts instead to contain the disease:  
 
The habitual bustle of recreational hours changed into silence, punctuated by 
moans and incoherent phrases, the administration of sacraments, and frequent 
medical visits during the night, producing an oppressive atmosphere…Only two 
students died, but many of them I judged to be lost (BEDM July Aug Sept 
1927:393)  
 
Sometime in the interim, a different approach to treatment - quarantining - had become 
acceptable. The interim had also seen vaccination campaigns of students outside Dili 
against smallpox on the instigation of the missions in 1909 (Davidson, 1994:219)5. 
Moreover, it was also evident from the missionary perspective that to die as a Christian 
was as important as to live as one. Missionaries approvingly commented on the sick’s 
‘diligence in not being long without receiving the sacraments’. This attests to the 
effectiveness that socialising ‘Christian’ norms could have in the environment of 
internatos (ibid). 
 
No rite of institution was as important as the last rites, although the observance of other 
rites continually was important for the living. Moreover, for these to have power and for 
their establishment as norms, missionaries had to sanction them, and one of the ways 
that this could be achieved was through invocations of mortality. As missionaries saw 
it, a triumph of Christian belief in a contest with indigenous belief over concepts of life 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 After student deaths, the mission head sent students home and divided Canossian nuns between the two 
mission stations in Dili in the town and Dare in the mountains. The epidemic killed about 300 people in 
Dili. The military action that preceded it left several hundred dead bodies in Maubara district, with the 
outbreak of cholera that ensued sweeping towards Dili. In the capital, several students at the school in 
Dare died, and much of the population congregated in the praca, in an attempt to avoid the disease. 
(Teixeira, 1974:211) 5	  In 1928, the authorities dispensed 7,479 smallpox and 3,718 yaws vaccinations, but persistently lacked 
enough medicine for tuberculosis (Figueiredo, 2005:628)	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and death, required native presence and study of doctrine. As a missionary wrote in 
1925, ‘one of the biggest difficulties for the missionary is managing to make 
[Christians] meet constantly for the catechism, without which there is no possibility for 
them to change [their] lives” (BEDM, March 1925:3). Among converts confronted with 
sickness, missionaries encouraged a certain sequence: prayer first, without which they 
would ‘not be dispatched in the court of the King of kings, and in the final recourse to 
earthly medicine [medicina terrena]’ (BEDM, Feb 1939:531). Prayer and sacraments 
were a way of upholding the duties of a covenant with God, but also a way to 
familiarise converts with the spiritual authority of the priest, rather than spiritual 
healers, matandook, in matters related to the body.  
 
Moreover, just as mission schools resembled hospitals during disease epidemics, 
missionaries became insinuated into a growing number of government clinics. This 
provided opportunities, for instance, for religious personnel – catechists and nuns - to 
remind nurses to ‘call a priest to be with the dying, in the same way that they would call 
a doctor’ (BEDM, May 1939:794; Instruccoes 1931:16). The catechism could be 
learned to prime a novice’s soul prior to the administration of the last rites. In Dili’s Dr 
Carvalho hospital, (named after the colony’s Chief Medical Officer who perished in the 
1894 cholera epidemic), missionaries recorded that the sick, without prompting, 
‘educat[ed] their friends in the formula of the catechism, so that if the worst came, they 
already had an awareness of the mysterious principles of faith in order to receive the 
baptism at the hour of death’ (ibid).  
 
As shown above, the ability to confront death as a Christian was initially predicated on 
knowledge of ‘mysterious words’ of (i.e. ability to recite) the catechism. But this seems 
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also to contrast significantly with other forms of knowledge. For example, the rites of 
conversion on which the spiritual authority of missionaries was based, were not open to 
all. An account from 1932 in Ainaro records attempts to convert the loyalist Corte-Real 
family (chapter five). The account also emphasises the population’s fervour for 
conversion, but priests refused to baptise many of the local (Mambai-speaking) 
population, who didn’t understand Tetum:  
 
My conduct has given occasion to edifying scenes of many weeping people that 
has conserved my resolve. In these cases there is kindness in cruelty…seeing 
that [if they don’t know Tetum], they will not be able to conveniently confess, 
nor will they understand the divine word” (BEDM March 1932:542).  
 
Yet the missionary assumption that doctrinal knowledge would supplant existing 
concepts of the divine within the native cosmos were clearly misplaced. Contemporary 
anthropological accounts suggest that indigenous agency has allowed and even 
encouraged Christianity to be accommodated into the native cosmos (Bovensiepen, 
2010), with a certain degree of reciprocity. This was not always the case. Historical 
accounts suggest that the moral sanctions of Christianity may have enhanced indigenous 
beliefs such as ancestral worship. Father Jacinto dos Campos, a priest based in Lahane 
in the 1930s, wrote of a man who was burdened by ‘the disgrace that his ancestors had 
died as heathens’ (BEDM Sept/Oct 1938:224)6. Even though this shows an acceptance 
of the Christian precept of the sinfulness of heathenism, ancestors were clearly still 
accommodated in a convert’s conscience, with irrevocable damnation tempering 
messages of salvation. There were other accommodations. Whereas missionaries 
believed that sickness could be countered with prayer and sacraments to protect body 
and soul, Timorese believed that sickness indicated the soul’s displacement by spirits. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Cf. Peake (2000:102) who writes that converts in Nias were ‘so appalled by their new awareness of 
their sins, and consequences of them to come, that they committed suicide’. 
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By the 1930s, missionary instructions decreed that the soul was still present for a period 
in dead bodies before it went upwards to heaven or purgatory, with priestly blessings. 
Yet for Timorese, death would have meant the soul had been ‘wrenched from its body’ 
and that ‘the dead soul flits back and forth between two worlds’ until a ritual known as 
Kore Metan after 12 months intended to put the soul to rest (Hicks, 1976:24-5)  
 
For all this eschatological preparation, missionaries portrayed their work as undergirded 
by western science. By all accounts, this had had a gestation period of some decades. 
There were important institutional reasons for the integration into church doctrine of 
contemporary sciences with the Vatican-approved advent of neo-Tomism after 1879 
(Alexandre, 2006:15). The rise of anthropology in Europe and Portugal in the mid-19th 
century and its growing respectability and patronage by elites also account for this 
development (Roque, 2010). However, if extensive and formative missionary use and 
cataloguing of East Timorese indigenous medicine in the 18th century is considered, 
then the donning of western ‘scientific clothes’ by missionaries seems to represents less 
of a marked change (Tomász, 1969). Although their concern was with indigenous 
medicine, the practice of cataloguing can be seen as associated with deciphering 
medicine in terms of its uses and efficacy, i.e. how these things comprised a field of 
knowledge, characteristic of colonial practice. In parallel to similar scientific 
explanations among colonial authorities for perceived problems relating to the 
population, the elaboration of scientific beliefs and methods among missionaries 
continued apace through the 1930s. In this period, the priest-ethnographer Father 
Ezequiel Pascoal portrayed missionaries as promoting ‘the light of western medicine’, 
against a native ‘fear of the European doctor’ and a preference for matandocs. This 
scientific position was also written into the handbook on missionary practice published 
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in 1931. In it, missionaries were instructed to discourage native ‘surprise’ for their 
actions by prefacing extreme unction with a brief explanation about the ‘scientific 
foundations’ of the procedure	  (Missão de Lahane, 1931:16). Although the possibility 
that the dying would flee would have been remote, the injunction against making 
natives ‘surprised’ is informative of a belief that science would provide reassurance. 
The instructions also contained directions based on the most recent ‘theological-
psychological studies’ decreeing that there was time between apparent death and real 
death7 (Missão de Lahane, 1931:16), allowing priests to administer sacraments where a 
native Christian had, for example, died suddenly in an accident.  
 
As conversions increased, so supervision of native Christians challenged both native 
and missionary perceptions of survival and mortality and its spiritual fundaments. East 
Timorese Christians were served by thinly spread mission stations, and supervision of 
the sick required long journeys to remote locations to administer the last rites, often for 
what were minor ailments8. Missionaries complained that these callouts resulted from 
native misunderstandings or deviations from doctrine. Yet missionaries also encouraged 
native Christians to summon priests when they became sick outside clinics, as well as 
cautioning against resorting to traditional medicine. While incomprehension of doctrine 
may account for being summoned to read the last rites ‘because of an abscess on the 
finger’ (BEDM January 1934, Uma consoada em timor [a Christmas supper in Timor]), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The difference between, respectively, ‘the disappearance of respiration and circulation’ and ‘when the 
soul separates from the body’, a distinction to be taken into account by a priest especially in the event of 
‘extrinsic’ events such as electrocution or drowning, or ‘intrinsic’ events, such as death from cholera 
infection. 
8 In a Christmas dispatch from 1934, a missionary wrote: ‘I had on one occasion walked 20 kilometres in 
rain, called by a sick person who had not spoken…on arrival, he gave me a confession: - ‘Senhor Padre, 
it’s not needed, I received Holy Communion the day before yesterday and no one has accused me of any 
sin.’ It was like that with Timorese: it was so easy for them to telephone [fazem zunir os arames] the 
Priest for reason of having a headache, obliging him to travel 10, 12 and more hours by foot, and not 
always free from danger through rivers - as [priests] expect that the infirm is in agony…[and] only to 
verify the death.’ See BEDM January 1934 ‘Uma Consoada em Timor’, p.570. 
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it also suggests that missionaries were seen as occupying the places of spiritual 
guardians against sickness as traditional healers. In other words, native Christians 
evidently continued to want protection against sicknesses, and observed procedure 
required of Christians in doing so.  
 
Following their wider admittance in the 1930s, missionaries catalogued a period of 
indigenous conversions. These show the rites that were involved for East Timorese in 
becoming Christians. I have shown how some rites could be accommodated into native 
belief but also how in some instances, the observance of Christian belief such as sin 
caused anxieties. The overarching point is twofold: that this process constituted both the 
benefits and hardships of investiture as native Christians, which were conditions on 
which recognition as Christians depended. Secondly, these benefits and hardships were 
comparable with work, which, as noted earlier, was a proxy for subjecthood in the city 
(the status of East Timorese assimilados - no longer subjects but Portuguese citizens - 
was significantly defined by their ‘respectable’ professions). Health was a common 
feature of the way either missionaries or colonial authorities interacted with converts or 
subjects. As shown previously, this depended on their emplacement to ensure a 
regularity of interaction. The intent of making the population sedentary in the wake of 
the Portuguese return after the Japanese occupation had also been prefigured by 
territorial divisions. These were subject to designation in plans and maps, but moreover 
could be realised through the practical dimensions of emplacement or altering the 
environment. Aspects of this pattern are also evident in the Indonesian period, under 
very different conditions.  
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IV. The city from Indonesian to postcolonial rule  
 
Normally, strange things circulate discreetly below our streets. But a crisis will suffice 
for them to rise up, as if swollen by floodwaters, pushing aside manhole covers, 
invading the cellars, then spreading through the towns’ (de Certeau, 2000:1). 
 
Following the Indonesian invasion, the population’s separation from Fretilin and 
surrender in the late 1970s initiated an Indonesian military programme of emplacement. 
As Taylor has described, this involved initially the creation of concentration camps to 
‘resettle’ the population in lowland areas. These camps saw famine, disease and 
malnutrition. These were transformed into more permanent villages, with the rationale 
of being easily supervised by the military and separating the population from the armed 
resistance, and adjoining agricultural plots producing crops for export (Taylor, 
1991:159). With the resettlement of the population, other strategies were introduced to 
emplace the population. The establishment of a network of health clinics (puskesmas) at 
the sub-district level were intended to compel the population into accepting the state 
through its installations. And as noted in numerous instances, from these clinics nurses 
administered a contraceptive drug, Depo-Provera, without the permission of women 
subject to the treatment, a means of controlling birthrates among elements of the 
population since seen in other contexts9 and regarded by the Catholic Church as 
contributing to the ‘genocide’ of East Timorese (statement, 1985). Schools were another 
way through which state interventions of this kind took place. Correspondingly, the 
response by female students to these campaigns when brought to schools in the 1990s 
continued to be evasion by absenting themselves from school (Inbaraj, 1997).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The Israeli state administered Depo-Provera to its Ethiopian population without their consent.  
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Emplacing the population can also be seen through the military term ‘cleaning’ 
(pembersihan) or ‘sweeping land’ which was used as a metaphor for operations against 
the resistance movement. Thus, in 1981, as noted in Chapter five, the male population 
was forced to engage in the fence of legs operation (pagar betis). This operation was 
intended to ensnare Falintil in a human chain, though these objectives were seldom 
fulfilled. Similarly, in 1999, the language of cleaning and other ‘purificatory’ metaphors 
was used by pro-Indonesian militias to indicate the hunting of pro-independence 
supporters. There was therefore some surprise when this language, carrying reminders 
of Indonesian military operations, made the transition to the postcolonial period, used 
by Fretilin’s leaders in the run up to the 2001 Constituent Assembly elections. Dasa rai 
means ‘ground sweeping’ in Tetun, and their use of this phrase as well as ‘clean[ing] 
the garbage from the territory’s streets’, was deemed by East Timor’s Electoral 
Commission to be inflammatory and threatening towards its opponents (Lusa, 22 
August 2001).  
 
With these modalities of power considered, ‘cleanings’ have not always implied overt 
and covert threats of violence. Other instances of public cleaning after independence 
have been connected with nationalist commemoration and worship. For example, and as 
discussed in chapter five, the image of Our Lady of Fatima was brought to Timor in the 
1950s coinciding with a moment when the civilising mission in the colonies was being 
restarted. By the 1980s, the same image was brought to Timor, representing both a 
commemoration of the 1950s visit, and a universal image beyond the jurisdiction of the 
Indonesian authorities. According to the Jesuit priests Felgueiras and Martins, it gave 
sustenance to the population and was worshipped by Falintil ‘under cover of the night’ 
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(Felgueiras and Martins, 2005:142). The image brought peace in its wake10, Felgueiras 
and Martins wrote, and was taken at night in an illuminated throne to Atauro island 
where it brought succour to political prisoners exiled there (2005:142-3). The visit of 
the image once again in 2002 coincided with the restoration of independence in May of 
that year, and was prepared for in many areas by a ‘general cleaning’ (TP, 11 May 
2002). Primary and secondary schools in Laularu sub-district of Aileu for example 
cleaned Aileu town. The visit of the image was pronounced as an event of great 
importance for national history and therefore required a general public cleaning. There 
are other instances of this. As described in chapter one, on 12 November, the 
anniversary of the Dili massacre in 2002 was designated as a national day by both the 
government and Catholic Church. In preparation, the Ministry of Education ordered that 
secondary school students should clean the graves of the Santa Cruz cemetery, and 
‘public places’. Groups associated with the resistance such as Sagrada Familia and 
Renetil also joined in (STL, 14 November 2005)11.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Felgueiras and Martins point to the year of the image’s visit 1987-8 being relatively peaceful with ‘no 
fighting’ between Falintil and the Indonesian military. They also note the absence of any military 
presence in Balide where the image was held, tribute, according to locals, of its aura of peace (2005:143-
4)   
11 According to this newspaper report, only two schools obeyed the Ministry and carried out the cleaning. 
However, this belies the fact that people in neighbourhoods near the cemetery, including my own, Kintal 
Kiik, carried out preparations for the commemoration through their own volition, such as cleaning streets 
and laying candles on the side of the road.  
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Figure	  7.	  Public cleaning at the National University, UNTL. Author’s photo, August 2009.	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Against the backdrop of multiple meanings, the aftermath of the events of 2006 again 
prompted the ritual of public cleaning as a means of redress. Hence, in the months 
following the events that precipitated massive displacement, international agencies, 
seeking to be seen to distribute funds quickly, began a so-called ‘cash for work’ 
programme called ‘Servi Nasaun’ (‘serve the nation’). The programme involved having 
‘the unemployed’ and ‘internally displaced’ sweep the streets of litter, and clean drains 
and gutters in exchange for a maximum amount of US$2 a day. Participants could only 
work for a maximum of two weeks, and after travel costs, wages were negligible. 
Indeed, by the programme designers’ own admissions, the programme was only 
intended to serve short-term goals, to prevent IDPs becoming ‘dependent’ on food aid 
and the relative safety of camps that at their peak in Dili accommodated almost 80,000 
people. On the programme’s introduction there was much fanfare about how it could 
complement a timetable for the closure of IDP camps by ‘encouraging’ returns ahead of 
a planned reduction in foreign military personnel, proposed to be in August 2006, 
although the closure of the last camp eventually occurred in 2009.  
 
It is tempting to see similar intentions of making the population productive in pursuit of 
improving Dili some two years later, with the publication of Decree law 33 on ‘Hygiene 
and Public Order’ (33/2008). Anticipating a programme of decentralisation, the law 
gave suco chiefs responsibility for ‘guaranteeing public order’ and regulating the use of 
‘goods in the public domain’. The decree included prohibitions on dumping polluted 
water in drains or ditches, boxes or containers on public highways, and the burial of 
dead animals on public land. Fines of between USD 5-500 could be levied for 
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infractions, or double these amounts where more than one person was culpable. The 
‘organization, hygiene and cleaning of public spaces’ fell to the police, (article 6) but 
the wording of the law did not make clear what they were required to do. It was only in 
the following year that a separate decree law was passed that provided further 
clarification: 
 
stability and security have been achieved…the principal social problems have 
been resolved or are being resolved, the important thing now is…the 
maintenance of the quality of resources through the cleaning and arranging of 
flowers, rivers, beaches, povoações and cities…so that [Timor-Leste’s] 
population and all who visit can enjoy…its landscape (9/2009, preamble).   
 
Building on decree law 33, the new regulation proposed ‘civic service of cleaning in all 
the national territory’, in which civil servants would be enlisted in the cleaning of all 
public space from 7-11 on Friday mornings (nos.1-2). F-FDTL would organise transport 
of waste outside Dili, with private companies that possessed vehicles with ‘open 
sections’ invited to similarly transport waste. It was also the responsibility of F-FDTL 
and PNTL to promote the ‘cleaning of the roads and the beautification of space 
surrounding dwellings’ (no.8). Kammen has argued that an agenda for beautifying Dili 
was a way to realise an elite vision of modernity (2009). It can also be seen as coherent 
with attempts to reach, emplace and  manage the conduct of the population. Plans for 
order, hygiene and aesthetics were therefore, like Dr Moura’s observations from the 
1930s, closely related. 
 
The elaborated guidelines echoed earlier schemes connected with public health. For 
example, in a press conference shortly before Limpeza’s commencement, the Prime 
Minister and three other ministers presented rationales for the programme. The health 
minister, Nelson Martins, quoted World Health Organisation statistics on deadly 
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diseases, noting the high incidences of these in East Timor, and the benefits that street 
cleaning could have for the control of these diseases. As in the 1930s, the incidence of 
malaria and other mosquito-borne diseases was attributed to unsanitary conditions that 
could be alleviated by street cleaning programmes (TP, 30 April 2009). In the manner 
of Sanitary Brigade in the 1930s, prison wardens at Becora prison compelled their 
charges to clean prison grounds. Although prisoners ‘received punishment every day’ 
for their crimes, the guards believed that prisoners could play a role as citizens and 
‘contribute to the nation’ by cleaning. Despite being banned from talking to prisoners, 
furthermore, journalists faithfully reported guards’ assurances that prisoners were happy 
to carry out the work (STL, 16 May 2009).  
 
As in the past, schools played a role in the dissemination of ideas of cleanliness. The 
dimensions of these ideas were not only intended to be taken up through unconscious 
practice, but were subject to instruction. The vice-minister for Education, Paulo Assis, 
hoped that schools would participate in the cleanings on Friday mornings. The Prime 
Minister Xanana Gusmao justified the participation of students by noting that many 
absences from schools had been caused by sicknesses that a cleaner environment would 
ameliorate.  Most notably, the Prime Minister told assembled members of the media and 
civil servants that cleaning must begin inside people’s houses. Cleaning was intended to 
be taught [hanorin] so that it would eventually generate favourable habits of cleanliness 
as if radiating out from within homes, schools and prisons (STL, 10 Feb 2012). As 
Mitchell notes, disciplinary power works not ‘from the outside, but at the level of detail, 
and not by restricting individuals and their actions, but by producing them.’ (2005:xi) 
The rituals of establishing this as a routine can be seen in Kaviraj’s observations of 
Calcutta’s postcolonial government. ‘Training’ was a key way for it to familiarise the 
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population with ‘the new universal practice of modernity’, (Kaviraj, 1997:112) 
moderating the ‘plebianisation’ of public spaces such as parks by instilling habits in 
subjects themselves.   
 
If the state intended to induce the population to be productive without recourse to 
coercion, this was not always obvious. Initially, during the course of these half-day 
cleanings, members of the public were conscripted as well as civil servants, although 
there was no provision for this in regulations. Police stopped people passing through the 
streets where cleaning was taking place and made them participate. The police sub-
inspector of Dili assured the public through the media that police would ‘control’ the 
cleaning. They did this by stopping public transport and making ‘driver and passengers 
get out to do cleaning’ (STL, 8 May 2005). Initially beginning in Dili, operations soon 
began in the districts, though less spiritedly. The TV news showed the Prime Minister 
taking a supervising role in the programme in Dili by stopping a middle-aged woman on 
a bicycle on one of Dili’s main thoroughfares, and ushering her towards a spot to be 
cleansed. The same news bulletin, describing the public’s enthusiasm for the 
programme, showed a fracas between Portuguese paramilitary police (GNR) and 
members of the public that had been ordered to clean a ditch on the roadside. On the 
way back from laying flowers on the graves of deceased relatives, the PNTL prevented 
members of the public from returning to their houses after the operations had started at 
7am, who, despite complaints, were given brooms and told to sweep the roadside. Such 
prohibitions on movement, as previously suggested, drew criticism from those made to 
participate. Any claims that improved public health would improve the attendance of 
sick students were negated when students were prevented from reaching school at all. 
The mikrolet vehicles that brought students across the city were prevented from 
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running, and the flow of traffic, especially from west to east, stopped completely (TP, 9 
May 2009).  
 
The disruption of schooling became a point of contention among members of 
parliament, some of whom, mainly the opposition, complained that it prevented some 
schools from operating in the run up to the second trimestral exam. Yet broadly, they 
did not raise objections to a general mobilisation of the population (TP, 12 May 2009). 
The population on the other hand complained to the media about inconvenience to 
businesses, restrictions on movement, and the use of the police and military as 
overseers. A letter to a local paper rhetorically asked whether it was the government that 
was serving the population or the population that was serving the government (TP, 11 
May 2009). They agreed with the programme as long as it was carried out by civil 
servants, whose participation was seen as justifiable by members of the public because 
they were perceived as collecting a monthly salary without working hard. This was 
compared with the Indonesian-era civil service, whose work habits were indicated using 
the abbreviation D5 (TP, 11 May 2009). Indeed, eventually civil servants participated 
while the occasions on which members of the public were randomly conscripted were 
increasingly rare, but did not end completely. If public cleaning could demonstrate that 
civil servants were earning their salaries, its effect of ‘teaching’ the population remained 
unfulfilled. One complained that  
 
The objective of Limpeza Geral is for the Government and civil servants to give 
an example to the people of Dili. But we still see that people throw their 
rubbish everywhere. While the cleaning happens on Friday, by Saturday, the 
city is full of rubbish again (Limpeza Geral, 2009).   
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Others thought instead that the problem was that the city’s streets rarely appeared 
different after the programme. In both cases the question of ‘efficient government’ and 
resource allocation was left unaddressed. Why was it seen as necessary – even common 
sense - for several thousand people to be mobilised on a weekly basis, rather than, for 
example, a much smaller permanent street cleaning operation? It is argued that the 
programme was less about either making cosmetic changes or better public hygiene, and 
more about affecting changes in people’s mentalities. The same supporter continued: 
‘This shows that Dili’s population does not yet have a conscience of its own to clean 
their houses or neighbourhoods’ (my emphasis) (Limpeza Geral). Seen in this light, the 
population’s reluctance to maintain the cleanliness of public areas derived from the fact 
that they were still practicing and internalising unproductive behaviours. Cleanliness, so 
the view had it, should start from within homes, then in neighbourhoods, before it 
became automatic across the capital city.  
 
However much this was seen as what should happen, evidently, there was another 
perspective from above. The state imposed public cleaning as a citywide practice. This 
should be considered in the context of the events that immediately preceded it. 
‘Neighbourhoods’ - aldeias, sucos and Dili’s sub-districts, were the territorial units of 
the city, no different from the districts, that their inhabitants had often either ‘defended’ 
from outsiders or ‘cleansed’ of regional others (easterners or westerners) in 2006-7. 
Thus, although administered by suco Chiefs, and carried out by suco inhabitants, 
cleaning was intended to be supra-local, a concerted way of conceiving of a city as 
greater than the sum of its parts. As an idea, it transcended the territorial units retreated 
to in the previous two years by drawing out the population to a municipality, a 
designation intended to correspond to East Timor’s ‘cities’, and proposed to be at the 
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apex of decentralised government. This was not without historical precedent. As a 
century earlier Dili was conceived of as a city by calling it a municipality, reordering it 
and cleaning it, so this process could happen again. Of course, cleaning was not the only 
way that this could happen, nor was history merely repeating itself. It fed into broader 
processes of ‘redress’. For example, the state ‘resolved’ to rebuild 2,178 homes 
destroyed during late 2006 (5/2006) but operationalized this ambitious resolution 
patchily and belatedly. In this regard, the government has been seem to redress ‘crisis’ 
according to the path of least resistance, for example by giving inhabitants of ‘IDP’ 
camps cash sums in order to return to their abandoned properties (Bugalski, 2010:23). 
In this reading, state elites have shied away from dealing with potential conflict over re-
inhabiting neighbourhoods, not by proactively sponsoring the building of new 
neighbourhoods, or promoting land and property legislation, but by throwing money at 
the problem. Yet, incentives and monetary inducements cannot be seen as the only 
approach to government. Government has meant the revival not only of history as an 
idea, but of historical practices such as public cleaning, the designation of names and 
boundaries, or the value of work, whether through civil servants’ demonstrations of 
cleanliness through Limpeza, or historically, as a substitute for subjecthood.   
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Casting Dili as a city was limited by colonial ambivalence about recognising its East 
Timorese inhabitants as subjects, much less citizens. Their work indicated not formation 
in colonial hands, but that they observed a routine and regularity of interaction with the 
colonial authorities. It showed that working subjects were sedentary not itinerant, 
predictable not arbitrary, industrious not idle, compliant not warlike. In short, city 
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dwellers were – or could be made to be – unlike people of the hills (foho) beyond Dili. 
What the city was envisioned as not being, as much as what authorities aspired to make 
it, is informative of how distinctions were formed between city and the districts. For 
example, the city was a place where, unlike the districts, subjects could be reached. 
While not illusory, colonial government did not deeply structure or emphasise this 
division, introducing aesthetics and hygiene on a modest scale. In part, this can be 
related to means: its own poverty and lack of resources limited what it could do. The 
indigenous neighbourhoods planned for the 1930s were not realised, nor did ‘superior 
inhabitants’ of prototype villages beyond Dili remain there.  
 
To the extent that a reluctance to recognise subjects marked the limits of bio-power, it 
was also marked by the resilience of indigenous strategies, such as fleeing, to avoid 
being drawn into the colonial orbit. Christian conversion could provide a more direct 
path to subjecthood, and, in the period of study leading to conversion, and perhaps 
beyond, sometimes supplanted aspects of indigenous belief. However, this process also 
saw pre-existing practices accommodated alongside ‘modern’ and ‘scientific’ norms 
propagated by missionaries. In this regard, some accounts suggest that this 
accommodation found institutional expression, as East Timorese sought to diffuse 
norms of hygiene acquired in missionary schools through a so-called nativist movement 
in the 1950s. Too much resembling an autonomous movement and thus perceived as a 
threat to the authority of the Diocese and Government, its members were stopped in 
their tracks after a short existence (Duarte, 1987)12. The movement’s activities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Duarte (1987) reports that in 1954, in the same period in which the state was attempting to draw the 
native population into its orbit via health institutions, an East Timorese priest, Father Ximenes, 
established the CPCC, established without the consent of the diocese in Dili, and headquartered in the 
Tetum-speaking heartland of Alas, an area with a long history of missionary contact. The CPCC 
maintained a number of centres, in Same, Tutuluro, Fahe-nehan, Betano (all also in Tetum-speaking 
areas) with a network of messengers moving between each. The movement interpreted the word of the 
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demonstrate that conversion was perceived not only as a matter of belief, but was 
related to practices, such as comportment and appearance, explored in the previous 
chapter. It also demonstrates the adaptability of Christianity and the possibility of power 
being expressed through varied locations and agents. 
 
In the Indonesian period, despite an intensification of state bio-political strategies, and 
high government spending to control the lives of the population, a great gulf remained 
unbridgeable as the government failed to ‘imagine East Timorese as Indonesians’ 
(Anderson, 1992). Thus state health institutions were not only a means of engaging and 
persuading the population to accept Indonesian rule, but to make interventions in their 
lives. This is distinct from less subtly coercive forms of rule. Cleaning or sweeping was 
a military metaphor for eliminating the resistance movement, often in the districts, 
where military authority was less complete. Thus Indonesian rule also served to shore 
up a distinction between the districts and the city. Dili served as an opening to intensive 
inward and outward flows from the rest of Indonesia, reflected in its changing 
appearance as trading post, port, and home to transmigrants, but it was also a closing 
from a threatening hinterland, reflected in its appearance as a garrison and bunker. 
Colonial authority was insecure, accurately perceiving sources of power other than its 
own to exist throughout the territory.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
bible strictly, with its members (‘disciples’) going barefoot. One of its aims was to instil in members 
‘norms of hygiene’, contained on a single sheet of paper: take a bath at least once a week, wash hands 
before eating, eat with your own spoon at dinner; of presentation in public (‘do not walk outside the 
house with a blanket over one’s shoulder’); and encouraged its members to maintain a ‘natural diet’ (to 
eat soup once or twice a week). Writing of the movement with a mixture of bemusement and scorn, 
Father Jorge Barros Duarte noted that the initiation ceremony for new members involved entering a hut 
where the movement’s prophets observed a number of rituals, one of which involved new recruits holding 
a towel and soap aloft.  	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That other sources of power were also perceived to exist by the RDTL state (and which 
became obvious between 2006-8) is partly attested to by Limpeza Geral, an 
unconventional form of reordering territory and people. Although it was introduced in 
response to events of 2006-8, cleaning was far from being a policy without precedent. It 
crystallised through certain East Timorese interactions with the state. Cleanliness could 
be both induced in state institutions, but also enforced as people cleaned streets without 
recompense. Avowedly productive, bio-power invariably bore traces of repression. 
Public cleaning therefore showed an impulse that reacted as a contingency to events of 
‘crisis’, called forth to teach Dili’s inhabitants compliance as well as being used to 
conceive of Dili as a city again, of a piece with plans to rename territorial units and 
‘decentralise’ power.  
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8. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has argued that the nature of power relations particular to East Timor placed 
limitations on ‘modern bio-power’. Such existing power relations were not significant 
only in the colonial era, but contributed to the practices of East Timor’s postcolonial 
politics. This analysis therefore stands in contrast to many accounts that have seen the 
politics of post-1999 East Timor as a matter of statebuilding, or democratic 
consolidation through normative evaluations of state and society’s strengths and 
weaknesses (Kingsbury and Leach, 2013). For the same observers, a weak ‘rule of law’ 
caused by a weak state/disempowered civil society framework, endemic to ‘post-
conflict’ nations, was exemplified in ‘crisis’. For others, a vibrant civil society, in the 
form of organisations that emerged from the resistance network against Indonesia, 
showed evidence of the potential to avert this situation through ‘networked 
governance’. Democracy pivoted on ‘good governance’, and ‘crisis’ showed that it had 
‘lost balance’. Thus, low ‘human development’, inadequately addressed by UN and 
donor ‘capacity building’ programmes, an indigenous elite that fought among 
themselves, and failures of other institutions such as political parties were used to 
explain ‘crisis’.  
 
Instead, by centring the analysis on power and history, the ambit of power can be taken 
as broader and deeper than either an analysis of the events of 2006-‘8 or even the 
decade following independence allows. In establishing alternatives to the normative, 
liberal perspective that informs most analyses of both these periods, I showed the extent 
and limits of ‘modern bio-politics’ at various stages of the 20th century. Longstanding 
patterns of power militated against a profuse modern bio-power, but also mediated its 
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nature. A central question addressed therefore was: what are the extent and limits of 
bio-power? To address this, the forms of power particular to East Timor that mediated 
bio-power can be made sense of in three broad ways.  
 
i. Three forms of power: ‘pre-modern’, ‘missionary-modern’ and ‘developmental’ 
 
First, while ‘pre-modern’ forms of power have been posited as having re-emerged after 
1999, they were rarely ‘unsullied’ by having evaded colonial contact. Rather, the 
impacts of colonial contact show how a supposed pre-modern power was not 
irremediably ‘traditional’ but bore traces of colonial influence. Second, missionaries, 
rather than exclusively transmitting ‘modernity’, retained a prerogative of using magic. 
Priests’ priming of land for ‘modern’ uses by banishing demons, for example, should 
present problems for making sense of these events according to conventional 
understandings of ‘modernity’ and ‘tradition’. Yet such ‘contradictions’ revealed both 
the endurance of these forms of power while pointing towards how modernity and 
tradition, used to make sense of such occurrences, are themselves the result of 
designations of power-knowledge. Third, the 20th century saw a profusion of 
developmental ideologies under successive colonial regimes. Yet an intrusive form of 
bio-politics was tempered by colonial ambivalence and indigenous strategies of evasion 
and, eventually, resistance. Thus, whether in the 1930s or following the ‘normalisation’ 
campaign of the 1980s, the East Timorese population could neither be fully Portuguese 
subjects nor Indonesians citizens. This requires qualification, so that, for example, 
citizenship under Indonesian rule was dependent on the logic of a developmental 
calculation in which East Timorese were destined to remain ‘backward’, and 
‘normalisation’ – a gross misnomer - was eclipsed by violence, intrinsic to the 
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occupation of East Timor. Yet despite the fact that bio-power was mediated by existing 
forms of power, successive colonial regimes aimed to make populations sedentary, 
simultaneously docile and productive, and to establish control not only of birth-rates but 
also the moral trajectories of families.  
 
ii. Recapitulating arguments  
 
Instead of discussing how bio-power was refracted through authoritarian and liberal 
developmental regimes, therefore, the thesis takes the state as a point of departure. As 
noted at the outset of the thesis, this approach chimed with the broader literature on the 
state specific to East Timor, but parted company with it in crucial aspects. Above all, as 
chapter one argued, the state was viewed as being instituted not on the basis of norms of 
‘good governance’, but by being remade in the image of resistance to colonial rule. In 
this regard, the 2006-8 ‘crisis’, is best understood by examining the schisms and 
struggles that took place in the resistance movement. Moreover, attempts to make the 
state in the image of the resistance movement, it is argued, essentially saw elite attempts 
to consolidate and inscribe an authentic version of history in the state. Doing this not 
only catalysed the resolve of groups that propagated alternative histories and did not 
recognise state authority, but also brought into focus the personal histories of the 
population at large, which did not neatly cohere in and conform to official histories. In 
the wake of the events of 2006-8, state elites again attempted to establish the state in the 
image of the resistance, by instituting ex-combatants in the state and bringing ‘under 
control’ the thousands of histories of the population that state elites saw as being out of 
control during 2006-8. Moreover, by establishing hierarchies among ex-combatants, and 
awarding them honours and pensions, not only could history become ‘secure’, but a 
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system of relative value would be imposed on the population’s most esteemed living 
and dead. As such, the state was not the end result of the resistance period, nor was it 
merely a patronage machine used to distribute power in the form of sums of money, but 
was instituted in the image of resistance and, as such, was a site of continuing struggle. 
The process of conferring awards, making resistance symbolism merge with that of the 
state, and pronouncing on a definitive version of history, was inevitably subject to 
contestation. 
 
Configuring the state within this framework by assigning hierarchy and award therefore 
excluded and disqualified those that fell beyond these categories, and ‘collaborators’, 
while sanctifying and elevating Founders and Martyrs above others. The image of the 
dead enlivened the state through connecting it with resistance history, characterised by 
the care of the families of Martyrs, repatriating and honouring the dead, and invoking 
disappeared ex-Combatants. This contrasted with an earlier, pre-2006 period of 
spiritless, technocratic politics inaugurated under UNTAET. This process also showed a 
particular kind of bio-politics at work that preserved the dead and living, placing them 
into a hierarchical order. However, this ordering was officiated over by the state. The 
history of the resistance period and foreign occupation in which a glorious, unified and 
homogenous resistance movement countered foreign occupation, with state beneficence 
bestowed on all nationalists, bore scant resemblance to antipathies that were magnified 
among the population under conditions of war.  
 
This is in no clearer way illustrated than in cases where people were accused of having 
used ‘witchcraft’ to cause sickness, misfortune, and sabotage or disrupt the operations 
of the resistance movement or Indonesian military. Chapter two showed how 
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‘witchfindings’ eventuated under conditions of military occupation. It posited that such 
events could only be better understood when they came to light at all, using a 
framework that focussed on their deliberative, genealogical, territorial, and historical 
dimensions. The historical dimension was above all crucial in explaining that such 
events should be seen in a broader and longer-term perspective. In the postcolonial 
period, judicial proceedings against those accused of killing ‘witches’ were informed by 
colonial understandings about differences between Dili and the districts. Colonial 
epistemologies were used to assign, aggregate and disaggregate categories such as 
witchcraft, magic and religion. Moreover, as military occupation created conditions in 
which the population identified ‘witches’, so this was suggestive of the limitations of 
bio-power in two ways. First, colonial contact, rather than giving rise to exponential 
surveillance and an irresistible intrusion of a rational, modern form of bio-power that 
ordered lives, was shown instead to have instituted a ‘bifurcated’ form of authority. 
Different colonial and indigenous domains operated under different ‘laws’, reifying 
divisions between city and districts. These designations were not as diametrically 
opposed as assumed, yet they were operationalized in the postcolonial period as taken-
for-granted distinctions between city and districts, that resonated with divisions 
common to successive colonial and postcolonial periods.  
 
Second, chapter two also provided an alternative to the argument that sorcery and 
malevolent witchcraft is culturally determined and may be countered through 
‘modernization’, by drawing attention to dimensions of power and historical 
contingency. This argument proposed that subsistence agriculture gave rise to power 
relations whereby suco chiefs perpetuated superstitious beliefs through their top-down 
authority, and traditional culture was inherently violent. In such an argument, elements 
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of culture were held to be common in economic and utilitarian terms whereby 
compensation levied on injurious acts caused by sorcery could be compared with 
similar sums of money involved in marital exchange. As an alternative, through the 
exploration of a four-fold framework for the understanding of witchfindings, power 
relations were conceived of as beyond economic transactions. The chapter revisits a 
theme of chapter one, positing that the state could not be viewed only in terms of a 
patronage machine from which power was distributed.  
 
Chapter three posited that on one level, state formation in the early 20th century was 
accompanied by processes of taxation, forced labour, and monetization. On another 
level, this process was characterised and given coherence by evaluating life on the basis 
of work. At yet another level, work changed meanings of objects and symbols (and 
relations between people and objects in their midst). The practical engagements of work 
impacted on meaning more effectively than colonial attempts to change meaning by 
way of consecration, desecration or other representation. This point was made through 
an exploration of the lives and deaths of East Timorese that collected mineral deposits 
at the behest, or independently of, successive colonial authorities. Bio-power was 
mediated through a form of power contingent on historical colonial engagements, as 
people and objects were evaluated. Therefore, although the state ostensibly had at its 
disposal means – principally taxes and forced labour – strongly to influence power 
relations and ensure that an increasingly rationalised order eventuated at the local level, 
neither strategy was followed totally. However, despite an absence of a totalising 
regime, the population’s work, and precedence, established during colonial rule were 
used to claim ownership of minerals in the postcolonial period. These claims were 
characterised by two things. First, claim making was affected as a result of altered 
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configurations of power after the Indonesian occupation in the interim. Second, the state 
conferral of rank and hierarchy on the population had been mediated through local 
views of the state. In this sense, the state evaluates and regulates life and death through 
recompense and through reburying and sanctifying ex-combatants in its own image. In 
short, the form of bio-power at work in postcolonial politics largely goes against 
perceptions of the state as a (necessarily) mechanistic, modern and rational entity.  
 
As chapter three showed the state and others’ evaluations of life and death, chapter four 
elaborated on missionary power as cohering with, yet semi-autonomous from the 
colonial state. This was underscored by similar state and missionary aspirations to 
‘emplace’ Christian families. Missionaries attempted to emplace populations by 
projecting the influence of exemplary aristocratic Christian converts, and by cultivating 
women and children as the backbone of ‘modern’ families. Missionary authorities 
envisaged that this strategy could be buttressed by plantation agriculture. Neither 
strategy endured, but legacies of missionary power can be seen in other ways, for 
example by the care of children and the semi-autonomous reproduction of ‘modern’ 
habitat by the population. As in chapter three, it was argued that modern bio-power did 
not seamlessly manifest itself through an enumerated and sedentarised population. Yet 
traces of ‘missionary modernity’ have eventuated in ways particular to postcolonial East 
Timor, as the population has built houses with aesthetically ‘modern’ features. It was 
posited that such houses built with the proceeds of ex-combatant pensions serve as 
symbols of esteem, but also performative and affective symbols with which to 
remember the dead and absent living.  
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Dili was differentiated from the districts in a number of ways, and this division was also 
‘engineered’ through education. Chapter five argues that missionary education reified 
this distinction through cultivating an elite by inculcating habit and comportment. 
Colonial and Christian notions of civility and comportment were a significant part of 
constituting a ‘civilised society’ in the capital, from which notions of a civil society 
later emerged (cf. Friend, 2003: 437). Such an argument was illustrated by examining 
the close correlation between language, comportment and appearance under the 
Indonesian occupation. Resistance elites were both influenced by, and circumspect 
about practices of ‘norms of civility’. The chapter also shows how missionary power 
reasserted claims to government, by ostensibly demonstrating against the removal of 
religious education from the school curriculum. These demonstrations were significant 
for marking a shift in Church-state relations and showing the Church’s dismay at not 
being adequately recognised for its role in supporting the resistance movement. 
Moreover, the demonstrations also pointed towards how its leaders viewed missionary 
power as being historically embedded in colonial power as well as being close to 
indigenous leaders (liurais). The Church’s declarations and the symbols that it invoked 
(such as the priest’s uniform) were used to perpetuate a role that had been historically 
instituted.  
 
To further illustrate mediated forms of bio-power, particular to the context of East 
Timor, chapter six examined the postcolonial public policy of mass street cleanings. 
Although this policy ostensibly came to exist in the wake of the 2006-8 ‘crisis’, it was 
of longstanding provenance, having been introduced in the colonial era as a means to 
define the capital city of the colony as an urban area as such. In colonial settings, 
cleanings showed that the population that carried it out could be regarded as subjects, 
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only when they worked. A limited recognition of subjects also served to limit colonial 
aspirations to ‘reach’ or emplace the population through reform of the urban 
environment. On the other hand, the benefits and hardships of Christian conversion and 
parallel missionary objectives of emplacement made subjecthood comparable with 
salvation. Through examining colonial authorities’ attempts to alter the environment of 
the city and affect subjects, cleanings are suggested to be a continuation of broadly 
colonial practices, rather than as a civic activity that indicated peaceable agreement 
between state and citizen.  
 
iii. Themes of the thesis 
 
Each chapter has therefore adopted a longer-term perspective to establish characteristics 
of power that have forged contemporary politics. This perspective moreover, is 
suggestive of the nature of power itself. In particular, it indicates that power was 
manifested in multiple contexts, rather than issuing from the state and being 
counterbalanced by civil society, as the liberal view suggests. Allied with this 
perspective are questions regarding how the quality of power was to be regarded. If, as 
Foucault proposed, power is present in multiple locations and relations, wherever it may 
exist, should it not also encounter resistances that are coterminous with it? An example 
of this can be seen in the nature of resistance to Indonesian rule, which emerged during 
the course of internal struggle in the resistance movement. Sometimes this was 
manifested through ideological differences, such as in the schisms of May 1976 or 
1983, or through insurgent sentiment some 30 years later, in May 2006. The thesis has 
not sought to explain the motivations of agents associated with challenges to power. 
Nevertheless, an examination of ‘disaffected’ individuals such as Mauk Moruk and L-7, 
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Ai-Tahan Matak or Alfredo Reinado, reveals, first, that they became resistant 
essentially from within the resistance movement and second, that the causes with which 
they were associated have had enduring postcolonial existences.  
 
Second, the analysis further explored power’s specific qualities by asking whether it 
was productive or repressive. In the postcolonial period, for example, if it is accepted 
that the state and international community aspired to forge subjects by using 
‘disciplinary power’ with a productive quality, this was tempered by repressive forms of 
power. Yet if repression may be an obvious legacy of the colonial past, its deployment 
is also complex, so that successive colonial regimes were ambivalent about, but not 
ignorant of subjects. Subjecthood – in however limited a way the terms of this were 
understood - could take the form of recognition through work in the late Portuguese 
period. Similarly, and paradoxically, a strategy of repression was undermined as much 
by Indonesian ambivalence by failing to imagine East Timorese as Indonesians, as by 
actions of the resistance movement.  
 
Third, interrogating power’s quality has shown its inseparability from knowledge. It is 
in this regard that the extent of bio-power during the 20th century can be seen most 
clearly. Whereas the extent to which subjects could be recognised through work was 
limited insofar as its benefits were almost always outweighed by hardships that it 
brought, up to and including forced labour and death, salvation through Christian 
conversion may have had a clearer appeal to potential converts. The appeal of 
conversion was evident in that Christianity – in certain of its aspects - could be readily 
accommodated into indigenous belief (Hicks, 1976). Furthermore, if subjecthood was 
qualified by work, salvation was qualified through rites. Rites not only consisted of 
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negotiating conversion, but were imbued with a ‘scientificity’ that mediated an 
indigenous Christian’s soul’s place in an economy of salvation. Christianity was 
underpinned by western science that privileged the knowledge of its missionary 
purveyors. All of this facilitated intrusions into the population’s lives.  
 
Both work and the observance of rites also required regularity of contact with the 
colonial authorities. As such, emplacement, the ‘anti-nomadic technique’ (Foucault, 
1991b:218; Scott, 2009) intrinsic to modern government intended to facilitate proximity 
to populations that missionaries increasingly evangelised. Given that emplacement had 
been a longstanding, ‘pre-modern’ strategy of ensuring missionary-indigenous, and 
indeed, colonial-indigenous contact, it had been integrated into, rather than suddenly 
emerging, as a tool of ‘modern’ government in the late-19th century. In part, what made 
older patterns of contact distinctive from ‘modern’ government were colonial health 
institutions. In and around these places, priests admonished the indigenous population 
for heathenism while encouraging them to put faith in the rationality of salvation 
guaranteed through scientific rites. Yet priests also continued to wield magic power, 
recognised by the same populations that were targeted for conversion. A significant 
limitation of bio-power could therefore be seen from the quality of existing forms of 
power. For example, priests’ knowledge was less a dispensation than a negotiation of 
existing belief. Missionary power was therefore not only predicated on maintaining a 
sufficiently high barrier to conversion, and not just a matter of maintaining knowledge 
of a flock, but also required negotiating and appeasing indigenous perceptions of their 
spiritual authority.  
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iv. Implications for broader debates 
 
The thesis has three main implications that concern how studies of postcolonial politics 
may be informed by analyses of power. First, it proposed that power may be understood 
by combining two approaches, one that historicised the bifurcated nature of colonial 
rule (Mamdani, 1996), and a poststructuralist approach that used different tools for 
historicising this division. Thus, following Mitchell (2005), the state has been taken 
seriously as an object of analysis, but diverging from Mitchell’s approach, it has been 
conceived not only as being constituted by procedures, surveillance and arrangements, 
but also symbols, discourses and invocations of the past. Similarly, the study took the 
term civil society seriously insofar as its antecedents in colonial notions of civilisation 
were concerned. On the other hand, it identified some of these antecedents by 
examining Portuguese language education. As such the approach taken was not directly 
comparable with other studies of East Timor that have emphasised either the co-
optation of Indonesian and growth of Tetum by a ‘new generation’ of East Timorese 
resistance (Carey, 2003). Nor is it directly comparable with other studies that propose 
that a key marker of the growth of nationalist consciousness was assertions of the 
validity of vernacular languages by elites in colonial schools (Anderson, 2006), or while 
incarcerated by colonial authorities (Zinoman 2001; Dikötter and Brown, 2007; Chriost 
2012; Mac Ionnrachtaigh 2013). It diverges from the approach of these studies by 
showing how Portuguese – language of the ex-coloniser - was taken to be emblematic 
of nationalist resistance as much as Tetum. Yet from a postcolonial perspective, the 
relationship between Portuguese and nationalist resistance was not unproblematic, as 
Portuguese colonialism was recast in positive terms by elites and Portuguese became a 
language of the administrative elite (Silva, 2012). Second, by using a poststructuralist 
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analysis, language was held to have been inseparable from broader practices of 
comportment and appearance. Using this analysis, resistance may be understood as 
motivated not only through opposition to Indonesian rule, but as having drawn on a 
repertoire of colonial practices and responses to them. 
 
Similarly, the thesis also compared state formation in the colonial era with postcolonial 
state formation by acknowledging attendant processes such as monetization. The thesis 
combined a broader literature that saw monetization primarily in causative terms (Elias, 
1994; Simmel, 2004) with other insights that emphasised changing meanings of objects 
and symbols. It thus drew on another body of literature that saw currencies and symbols 
serving both colonial and indigenous objectives of stabilisation and emplacement 
(Keane, 2008; Foucault, 2013). The thesis developed the insights of these works by 
proposing that changed meanings of objects and symbols could eventuate practically, as 
the result of work, or by being imbued with relative values that operated in wider 
constellations of meaning. Thus, the thesis has developed an analysis that emphasises 
that changing power relations may be constituted by (as much as corresponding with) 
symbols such as uniforms, practices such as courtesy, and objects such as salt (Elias, 
1994; Schieffelin 1976). These may collectively serve as an alternative way to analyse 
change rather than by referring to the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’, which, as suggested 
above, can often be problematic.   
 
Finally, the thesis contributed to a modest body of literature on East Timor that 
analysed knowledge in colonial formations of power (Roque 2010; 2012). Rather than, 
as studies of other contexts have emphasised, develop the notion that colonial rule was 
characterised by the unstable nature of colonial knowledge (Stoler, 2009), it differed 
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from this work by emphasising two aspects of power-knowledge. On one hand, it 
emphasised the mediated nature of power; and on the other, power’s constitution of 
categories and designations. Thus, rather than being a historical study per se, the work 
showed how history was invoked to order and give a practical thrust to politics in the 
present through processes of evaluation. Analysing both the overarching creation of a 
system as well as assigning material and symbolic awards therefore stood in contrast to 
seeing evaluation of life and death as a simple process of awarding sums of money.  	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